Argumentative Research Paper 2000 words

Looking for someone to write a 2000 word research paper

C O R P O R A T I O N

Never use plagiarized sources. Get Your Original Essay on

Hire Professionals Just from $11/Page

Order Now Click here

Addressing Barriers to
Female Officer Retention
in the Air Force
Kirsten M. Keller, Kimberly Curry Hall, Miriam Matthews,

Leslie Adrienne Payne, Lisa Saum-Manning, Douglas Yeung,

David Schulker, Stefan Zavislan, Nelson Lim

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2073.html

https://www.rand.org/

Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND
intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication
online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it
is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of
its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit
www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.

The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make
communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit,
nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest.

RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.

Support RAND
Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at

www.rand.org/giving/contribute

www.rand.org

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication.
ISBN: 978-0-8330-9878-8

For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2073

Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.

R® is a registered trademark.

Cover: U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Joe W. McFadden.

http://www.rand.org/t/RR2073

http://www.rand.org/pubs/permissions

http://www.rand.org/giving/contribute

http://www.rand.org

iii

Preface

Women are underrepresented among the Air Force’s senior leadership compared with their
representation among the lower ranks. One factor contributing to this underrepresentation is that
women tend to leave the active duty Air Force at higher rates than men. This report documents
the results of a qualitative study designed to better understand the factors that female Air Force
officers consider when deciding whether to remain in or separate from the active duty Air Force.
The study conducted a total of 54 focus groups with 295 female Air Force officers in the spring
of 2016 from across 12 different Air Force installations. The report describes the key retention
factors identified through these focus groups and provides recommendations for improving Air
Force policies and programs to help address potential barriers and improve female officer
retention.

This research was cosponsored by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Manpower and Reserve Affairs (SAF/MR) and the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for
Manpower, Personnel and Services (AF/A1). It was conducted within the Manpower, Personnel,
and Training Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE as part of a fiscal year 2016 study looking
at improving diversity within the Air Force.

RAND Project AIR FORCE
RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), a division of the RAND Corporation, is the U.S. Air

Force’s federally funded research and development center for studies and analyses. PAF
provides the Air Force with independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the
development, employment, combat readiness, and support of current and future air, space, and
cyber forces. Research is conducted in four programs: Force Modernization and Employment;
Manpower, Personnel, and Training; Resource Management; and Strategy and Doctrine. The
research reported here was prepared under contract FA7014-16-D-1000.

Additional information about PAF is available on our website: www.rand.org/paf/
This report documents work originally shared with the U.S. Air Force in September 2016.

The draft report, also issued in September 2016, was reviewed by formal peer reviewers and U.S.
Air Force subject-matter experts.

http://www.rand.org/paf/

Contents

Preface ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. iii
Figures and Tables …………………………………………………………………………………………………………. vi
Summary ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… vii
Acknowledgments ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… xvi
Abbreviations ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… xvii

1. Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 1
Gender Differences in Air Force Officer Retention Patterns …………………………………………………………..2
Study Objective and Approach ……………………………………………………………………………………………………4

Current Study ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….6
Limitations …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..7

Organization of the Report …………………………………………………………………………………………………………8
2. Focus Group Methodology …………………………………………………………………………………………… 9

Participants …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….10
Focus Group Structure ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..12
Qualitative Coding and Analysis ……………………………………………………………………………………………….12

3. Key Retention Factors for Female Air Force Officers …………………………………………………….. 14
Family and Personal Factors …………………………………………………………………………………………………….14

Children ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..15
Pregnancy …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..17
Breastfeeding ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………18
Spouses ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………19
Dating ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..22
Additional Family and Personal Factors …………………………………………………………………………………24

Career Factors …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………24
Career Path Flexibility …………………………………………………………………………………………………………25
Ability to Cross-Train ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….26
Civilian Opportunities ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….27

Work Environment Factors ………………………………………………………………………………………………………28
Leadership ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….28
Female Role Models …………………………………………………………………………………………………………….29
Mentorship …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………29
Gender Composition ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………30
Sexual Harassment and Assault …………………………………………………………………………………………….31
Long Work Hours and Shift Work …………………………………………………………………………………………31

Broader Air Force and Military-Related Factors ………………………………………………………………………….32
Benefits ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………32

PCS and Deployments ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….34
Force Reduction ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….35

Recently Established Air Force Programs/Policies ………………………………………………………………………35
Updated Maternity Leave Policy ……………………………………………………………………………………………36
Career Intermission Program ………………………………………………………………………………………………..37

Summary ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….39
4. Conclusion and Recommendations ………………………………………………………………………………. 40

Recommendations …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..40
Family/Personal Focused Initiatives ………………………………………………………………………………………42
Career-Focused Initiatives …………………………………………………………………………………………………….44
Work Environment Factors …………………………………………………………………………………………………..46
Broader AF/Military Factors …………………………………………………………………………………………………47

Implementation Framework ……………………………………………………………………………………………………..47
Quick Wins …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………49
Enduring Systemic Change …………………………………………………………………………………………………..49
Contributors to Incremental Change ………………………………………………………………………………………50
Further Evaluation of Proposed Initiatives ………………………………………………………………………………50

Summary ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….51
Appendix A. Previous Research on Barriers to Female Officer Retention ……………………………. 52
Appendix B. Base Selection Methodology ……………………………………………………………………….. 60
Appendix C. Focus Group Protocols ……………………………………………………………………………….. 63
Appendix D. Qualitative Coding Approach and Coding Guide for Female Air Force Officer

Retention Focus Groups ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 69

References ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 80

Figures and Tables

Figures
S.1. CCRs by Gender for Rated and Nonrated Air Force Officers ………………………………………. viii
1.1. Cumulative Continuation Rates by Gender for Rated and Nonrated Air Force Officers …….. 3
1.2. Cumulative Continuation Rates by Gender for Fighter Pilots and Pilots of

Nonfighter Major Weapon Systems ……………………………………………………………………………. 4
2.1. Air Force Bases Included in Focus Group Sample ………………………………………………………… 9
4.1. Implementation Framework ……………………………………………………………………………………… 48
B.1. Air Force Bases Included in Focus Group Sample ……………………………………………………… 62

Tables
S.1. Initiatives for Addressing Barriers to Female Officer Retention …………………………………… xiii
2.1. Focus Group Participants by Pay Grade …………………………………………………………………….. 10
2.2. Focus Group Participants by Career Field Group ………………………………………………………… 11
2.3. Focus Group Participants by Commissioning Source ………………………………………………….. 11
4.1. Initiatives for Addressing Barriers to Female Officer Retention ……………………………………. 41
B.1. Final Base Selection ……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 61
D.1. Interrater Reliability Test Results …………………………………………………………………………….. 70

vii

Summary

With a focus on the potential value of diversity for improving innovation, agility, and
ultimately the mission, the U.S. armed forces has long worked toward improving demographic
representation within its ranks, including the representation of women (see Lucas and Segal,
2012). In the Air Force, Chief of Staff Gen David L. Goldfein has stated that, “Recruiting and
retaining diverse Airmen cultivates innovation. Like different aircraft and missions make up one
Air Tasking Order, different people make the best teams when integrated purposefully together”
(U.S. Air Force, undated). To this end, starting in March 2015, the Air Force implemented a
series of initiatives to try to improve diversity, including female representation within its ranks
(see Secretary of the U.S. Air Force, 2015a; 2015b; 2016).

When it comes to improving female representation in the officer corps, military personnel
statistics have shown a pattern for many years in which female officers in all services are
generally less likely to progress through career milestones at the same rates as male officers. One
consequence of this pattern is low female representation at the highest levels of leadership. In the
Air Force, female officers currently make up 21.1 percent of officers in pay grades O-1 (second
lieutenant) through O-5 (lieutenant colonel), but only 13.9 percent of officers at the O-6 level,
and only 7.5 percent of officers at brigadier general (O-7) or higher.1 In addition to promotion-
related differences, research finds that persistent differences in retention are an important driver
of the differences in officer career progression for men and women in the Air Force and military
services more broadly (Asch, Miller, and Malchiodi, 2012; Hosek et al., 2001; Lim et al., 2014).

Figure S.1 illustrates the gender differences in retention for Air Force officers by showing
cumulative continuation rates (CCRs) of Air Force personnel; the CCR for each commissioned
year of service (CYOS) represents the average rate of continuation through that year and all
previous years.2 Due to differences in the length of initial active duty service commitments, the
figure depicts the CCRs separately for rated or flying related occupations and nonrated
occupations.3 Most Air Force officer occupations require a four-year active duty service

1 Based on RAND analyses of Air Force personnel data for August 2016 provided to RAND by the Air Force
Personnel Center.
2 CCRs are based on our calculations from FYs 2001–2015 Air Force personnel data. To form the CCRs, we first
calculated the percentage of officers in each CYOS who remained through the next CYOS. Then, we multiplied
these CYOS-specific continuation rates to form the CCR curves. The CCR for each CYOS, then, is the average rate
of continuation through that year and all previous years. For example, the CCR for CYOS 2 is the percentage of all
officers who remained through their first and second year of service, while the CCR for CYOS 20 is the percentage
of officers retained through 20 years of service. We were not able to separate out individuals who left because of
involuntary downsizing.
3 Rated occupations include flying-related positions, such as pilot, navigator, combat systems officer, Air Battle
Manager. Nonrated occupations are those that are not flying-related positions.

viii

commitment. However, pilots make a ten-year active duty service commitment, and both
Combat System Officers and Air Battle Managers make a six-year active duty service
commitment. As expected, officers in rated occupations have higher CCRs in general because
they tend to have a longer initial service commitment. However, female officers tend to have
lower overall continuation rates than male officers in both rated and nonrated occupations. For
example, the majority of male nonrated officers (55 percent) are retained through ten years,
while the CCR for female nonrated officers at that point is only 37 percent. The gender
differences among rated officers are even larger than among nonrated officers. Through 13 years
(at which point initial service commitments would have been complete), 63 percent of male rated
officers remain, on average, compared with 39 percent of female rated officers. Thus,
understanding the reasons for these differences in retention rates is important for improving
overall female representation within the Air Force, including among senior leaders.

Figure S.1. CCRs by Gender for Rated and Nonrated Air Force Officers

SOURCE: Air Force personnel data for August 2016 provided to RAND by the Air Force Personnel Center.

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31

Rated Male Rated Female
Non-Rated Male Non-Rated Female

Cumulative
continuation rate

Commissioned years of service

FY 2001-2015

Study Objective and Methodology
The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs

(SAF/MR) and the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower, Personnel and Services
(AF/A1) asked RAND to conduct an exploratory qualitative study focused on gaining a better
understanding of the factors that female Air Force officers consider when deciding whether to
remain in or separate from the active duty Air Force and to provide recommendations for
improving Air Force policies and programs to help address potential barriers and improve
retention of female officers.

The Air Force already has several survey efforts focused on identifying the top personnel
retention factors, and these have helped highlight gender differences in some of the top
influencers (e.g., compatibility with spouse’s career/job). Research also has been done
examining gender differences in military career progression and retention that has highlighted
the importance female service members place on such factors as marital and family status, work-
family balance, occupation, aspects of the work environment, and frequency of deployments and
moves when making retention decisions. However, past research has yet to be able to fully
explain the gender differences in retention in the Air Force or in the U.S. armed forces more
broadly (see Asch, Miller, and Weinberger, 2016; Lim et al., 2014), and further insight is still
needed to better understand some of the key influencers identified through Air Force surveys.

To identify approaches that may improve retention of female Air Force officers, RAND was
asked to conduct focus groups in the spring of 2016 with female officers to learn about factors
that influence their decisions regarding whether to stay in or leave the active duty Air Force.
Focus groups provide an opportunity to gather rich qualitative data from participants through a
group discussion and are particularly useful for more-exploratory research questions, such as the
focus of this study. To ensure that our focus groups were as inclusive as possible of female
officers in the Air Force, we held the groups across 12 different installations that we selected
based on their representation across Air Force Major Commands, various functional
concentrations (e.g., intel, logistics, etc.), geographic location, and other installation
characteristics (i.e., joint base, presence of a guard or reserve unit). These installations included
Andrews, Barksdale, F.E. Warren, Hurlburt, Lackland, Langley, Los Angeles, McChord,
Randolph, Schriever, Seymour Johnson, and Wright Patterson.

Across the 12 locations, we conducted a total of 54 focus groups that included
295 participants. The female officers who participated in the focus groups ranged in pay grade
from O-1 to O-5 and represented a variety of Air Force career fields. We also included local Air
Force Reserve and Air National Guard members who had previously been active duty to gather
their perspectives about what factors influenced them to leave active duty. Some of our active
duty focus group members had a separation date set, and we were able to get their perspectives
on their decisions to leave as well. During the focus groups, which ran roughly 90 minutes in
length, we asked participants about their career choices, factors that might influence a decision to

stay in or leave the Air Force, and how the Air Force might improve its ability to retain female
officers, in addition to general background questions.

Following completion of the focus groups, we coded transcripts from the group discussions
to identify key themes common across the groups. We also coded focus group comments
according to participants’ background characteristics (obtained during the sessions) as a way to
identify any unique trends; for example, for different pay grades or career fields. Key retention
factors that emerged from the groups are described next.

Key Retention Factors for Female Air Force Officers
Through our analysis of the focus group discussion transcripts, we identified factors in four

main areas that female officers in our groups highlighted as important considerations when
deciding to remain in or separate from the Air Force: (1) family and personal issues, (2) career,
(3) work environment, and (4) broader Air Force and military issues.

Family and Personal Factors

Family and personal life as key factors influencing retention were a prevalent theme across our
focus groups with female Air Force officers. Comments included statements about children,
pregnancy, spouses, dating, and other issues related to officers’ personal lives. For example, all focus
groups discussed children or wanting to have a family as a key retention factor, noting the difficulty
of frequent moves, deployments, and demanding work schedules on children. Among the focus
groups, 59 percent also noted that balancing work and family was further complicated by issues with
Childcare Development Centers (CDCs), such as incompatible hours, inconsistent quality, and long
waitlists. Participants in 85 percent of the groups also discussed difficulty in timing pregnancies to fit
within rigid career time lines and then difficulties in finding accommodations for pumping breast
milk following maternity leave (nearly half the groups discussed issues related to breastfeeding). We
also asked focus groups about the importance of spouses as a retention factor, although this issue was
usually raised organically by participants. Similar to concerns they expressed about children,
participants cited frequent moves and deployments as challenges for both civilian and military
spouses. Participants also noted that civilian male spouses often faced a lack of support from Air
Force spouse groups and programs. For dual-military couples, separation due to incompatible
assignments and back-to-back deployments were difficult to endure. In 48 percent of focus groups,
single participants noted similar concerns regarding the negative effect of frequent moves and
deployments on their relationships.

Career Factors

Beyond family and personal life factors, female officers also discussed issues related to their Air
Force careers that affect their retention decisions. These career factors focused primarily on three
areas: career path flexibility, ability to cross-train, and civilian opportunities. For example, 52 percent

of the focus groups raised the influence of inflexibility of career paths on retention decisions.
Participants described the Air Force career pyramid as a rigid career path they must follow that
allows for very little deviation and few alternatives. Female officers also perceived this strict career
path to often be incompatible with family and personal lives. Instead, female officers expressed the
desire for alternative career paths, such as part-time options. Many participants also stated that they
would prefer to continue working in the technical aspects of their career fields without transitioning
to the management roles and associated demands of senior leadership. Participants in 37 percent of
our focus groups also expressed a desire to cross-train into another career field, usually due to lack of
interest in their current field or to find a field more compatible with a spouse also serving in the
military. Finally, some female officers said they believed that opportunities in the civilian workforce
might provide options more attractive than their Air Force careers in terms of pay, hours, and
flexibility (raised in 43 percent of focus groups).

Work Environment Factors

Female officers also commented on several factors related to the work environment that
influenced retention decisions, including the importance of leadership, female role models,
mentoring, gender composition, sexual harassment and assault, and long work hours or shift work.
For example, when asked about the importance of leadership on their retention decisions, participants
discussed the difference that a supportive leader can have compared with a toxic one on job
satisfaction, motivation, and desire to remain. In 83 percent of focus groups, the importance of
having female role models in senior leadership positions was also discussed, with participants noting
that they rarely see female leaders who are married with children. As a result, the perception among
younger female officers is that it is not possible for women to both have a family and make senior
leadership in the Air Force. Related to the importance of having role models, 56 percent of the focus
groups discussed the importance of mentorship on career success and a desire to receive mentorship
from successful females. When asked how, if at all, gender composition across career fields
influenced retention decisions, participants had mixed responses. Many participants in male-
dominated career fields reported often facing sexism and the existence of an “old boy’s network.”
Some also associated male-dominated career fields with experiences of sexual harassment and
assault. A few participants also cited cases in which either they or individuals they knew had decided
to leave specifically because of a sexual assault. Finally, as already referenced in relation to
difficulties managing work demands and family life, 85 percent of our focus groups raised long hours
or shift work leading to burnout and work-life balance challenges.

Broader Air Force and Military Factors

Finally, focus group participants discussed several retention factors associated more broadly
with an Air Force career. These are factors that may be important across gender given their
presence across the military, but they were specifically raised as an issue in our focus groups.
These included Air Force benefits, Permanent Change of Station (PCS), deployments, and force

xii

reduction. For example, participants in 54 percent of our focus groups raised a number of Air
Force benefits that were important in deciding to remain in the service, including health care,
education, and retirement benefits. In contrast to benefits as a positive influencer, nearly all focus
groups discussed PCS (93 percent) and deployments (94 percent) as important negative
influencers, particularly due to …

Expeditionary Warfare School
Marine Corps University

EP1221: Argumentative Research Paper Revision Date: 20 August 2020
Profession of Arms: Professional Communication Mr. Grant
Campbell
Written Communication Major Joseph
Williams

This is how you do it: you sit down at the keyboard and you put one word after another until it’s
done. It’s that easy and that hard.

– Neil Gaiman, journal.neilgaiman.com (2004)

1. Introduction
As professional leaders progress through military service, their opportunities for in-person and
face-to-face communication to small audiences diminishes. In contrast, the requirement for
effective, efficient, and critical written communication to large audiences increases. Graduates of
EWS must have the ability to conduct and articulate credible research on issues affecting the
Marine Corps (or other respective services), utilizing critical thinking, and employing deductive
and inductive reasoning. To develop these skills, students will write a 1,500-2,000 word
Argumentative Research (AR) Paper on a military topic with appropriate documentation in
accordance with the current MCU Style Guide.

Prompt: In an argumentative research paper, present and defend a change—on a policy, value,
or innovation level—you would like to see in the Marine Corps, your service, or your home
country’s military.

Scope: Appropriate topics for the paper are limited to military topics, preferably within the
service or MOS to which the student belongs. This paper is more than a report or survey of
information on a subject; it is an ARGUMENTATIVE paper that presents one side of a
debatable position, supports and defends that stand with documented research, and refutes valid
and anticipated counterarguments. The supporting documented research of this paper must
advance beyond the scope of a personal opinion or position paper. Your FACAD is the final
approval authority for your topic.

Audience: The audience for this paper is the policymakers of the relevant service or DoD
headquarters.

Writing Awards: A faculty and staff committee will review FACAD selected student papers for
awards and publication opportunities. The EWS selection committee will forward those papers it
considers publishable to the Marine Corps Gazette, the Naval Institute’s Proceedings, or other
academic journals for possible publication. Only papers that are the original work of the
individual student and not previously submitted, in part or in full, elsewhere for publication or an

EP1221 LC – 1

Expeditionary Warfare School
Marine Corps University

academic requirement outside of EWS are eligible for consideration. Faculty will provide more
information later in the academic year.

2. Educational Objectives

a. EP1221.a – Demonstrate an understanding of the rules of grammar and writing.
b. EP1221.b – Organize information to build and defend a sound argument.
c. EP1221.c – Compose a clear and concise thesis statement.
d. EP1221.d – Support an argument with research that is properly cited.

3. Linkages to Curriculum

a. EP1100: Officership
b. EP1200: Professional Communication

4. Student Requirements

a. Students are responsible for managing time to accomplish this requirement over the
course of the first semester and beginning of the second semester. The timeline of
requirements follows:

Date Assigned Date Assigned Date Due Week

POA: Argumentative Research (AR)
Paper Topic Proposal 02-Sep-20 22-Sep-20 5

POA: Argumentative Research (AR)
Paper Thesis and Outline 02-Sep-20 13-Oct-20 8
POA: Argumentative Research (AR)
Paper Rough Draft 02-Sep-20 16-Dec-20 17
POA: Argumentative Research (AR)
Paper ProComm Review 02-Sep-20 08-Jan-21 23
POA: Argumentative Research (AR)
Paper Final Submission 02-Sep-20 29-Jan-21 26
POA: Individual Research Fellowship
Project (IRFP) 02-Sep-20 29-Jan-21 26

b. Paper will conform to size 12 point font, Times New Roman, 1” margins.
c. Word count: 1,500 – 2,000 (6-9 pages, excluding title page, endnotes, bibliography).
d. Paper layout will follow the guidance provided in the MCU Style Guide and Hacker’s

Writer’s Reference.
e. FACAD has final approval of the student’s proposal. Criteria for approval are:

i. Initial approval of proposed topics requires that the student’s thesis presents an
appropriate argument for an applicable military topic related to the student’s
service or MOS.

EP1221 LC – 2

Expeditionary Warfare School
Marine Corps University

ii. Student’s outline supports the thesis and provides an argument that includes a
claim, supporting points, and supporting evidence.

iii. Supporting evidence is within the student’s ability to effectively research.
iv. Students will use endnotes with citations marked as superscript numbers within

the body of the paper and a notes page appearing after the last page of the body of
the paper. The paper will also include a bibliography.

v. Prior to submission, students will merge the cover page, body of the paper, notes
page, and bibliography into a single final Word file. Students will include in the
file name his or her last name, first and middle initials, conference group number,
and short title (e.g., LipositzEC_CG1_AR_Paper_Tanker_Retention).

5. Lesson Hours

Lecture Guest Lecturer Seminar discussion Film
Practical

Application
Staff Ride/
Battle study Assessment

Student
Preparation

Time

TOTAL
HOURS

4 17 21

6. References

a. Hamlen-Ridgely, Andrea L., Stase L. Wells, and Brandy Lyn G. Brown. The Marine
Corps University Communications Style Guide Online. 13th ed. MCB Quantico, VA:
Marine Corps University. https://grc-usmcu.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=37713867.
Accessed August 6, 2020.

b. Hacker, Diana, and Nancy Sommers. A Writer’s Reference. 7th ed. Boston, MA:
Bedford/St. Martins, 2010.

7. SLO Cross Walk

1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5
Prep

6 3 8
Contact

EP1221 LC – 3

https://grc-usmcu.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=37713867

Expeditionary Warfare School
Marine Corps University

Future Warfare Sub-Prompt

“Modest and incremental improvements to our existing force structure and legacy capabilities
[are] insufficient to overcome evolving threat capabilities… [and such incremental
improvements will not] enable us to develop forces required to execute our approved naval
concepts.”

– General Berger
1. Introduction
In his Commandant’s Planning Guidance: 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps, the
Commandant described force design as his highest priority and tasked Combat Development
Command to conduct the appropriate analysis. An output of this was the Force Design 2030
Report released in March 2020. While this document described many sweeping changes to the
Marine Corps’ organization and equipment, the Commandant also identified “findings that
require further analysis.” The purpose of the Future Warfare sub-prompt is to develop and
research your own thesis that continues this analysis.

2. Topics for Research
Prompt: In an argumentative research paper, provide a clear and focused thesis statement that
answers your selected question. Then, defend your answer using the argumentation and
assignment guidelines from the AR Paper prompt.

Select ONE (1) Future Warfare question listed below from the Force Design 2030 Report:

1. Given the implications of the future operating environment, how should a Marine Corps
infantry battalion be structured to be more capable of Distributed Operations?

2. Given the context of the threats outlined in the Summary of the 2018 National Defense
Strategy and Commandant’s Planning Guidance, does the Marine Littoral Regiment
possess the capabilities required to be tactically effective in the operational environment?

3. What additional structure is required to provide the tactical maneuver and logistical
sustainment needed to execute Distributed Maritime Operations, Littoral Operations in
Contested Environments, and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations against the
pacing threat defined by the National Defense Strategy?

4. How should a Marine Expeditionary Unit be organized and equipped other than the
traditional three-ship Amphibious Readiness Group to be more capable to answer
operational requirements in the future?

5. How should ground reconnaissance units (Amphibious Reconnaissance, Light Armored
Reconnaissance, Radio Reconnaissance, etc.) be organized and equipped to answer the
challenges of operating in the INDOPACOM area of responsibility?

EP1221 LC – 4

Expeditionary Warfare School
Marine Corps University

6. In what ways should Marine F-35 squadrons support Naval Expeditionary TACAIR
requirements?

3. Coordinating Instructions

1. When developing your thesis, select one of the above topics and narrow the scope to a
manageable level.

2. The timeline you consider should be roughly 2025-2035.
3. The Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) considers the doctrine,

organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMPLF)
required to accomplish a mission. While it is not necessary to address every component
of DOTMPLF in your paper, it is a useful tool to frame your thesis.

4. References

1. Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America:
Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge. Available at:
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Sum
mary.pdf.

2. Commandant’s Planning Guidance: 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps. Available
at:
https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/%2038th%20Commandant%27s%20Pl
anning%20Guidance_2019.pdf?ver=2019-07-16-200152-700.

3. USMC Force Design 2030 Report. Available at:
https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20Design%202030
%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II.pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460.

4. Marine Corps Security Environment Forecast Futures: 2030-2045. Available at:
https://www.mcwl.marines.mil/Portals/34/Documents/FuturesAssessment/Marine%20Co
rps%20Science%20Fiction%20Futures%202016_12_9.pdf?ver=2016-12-09-105855-733
.

EP1221 LC – 5

https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf

https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/%2038th%20Commandant%27s%20Planning%20Guidance_2019.pdf?ver=2019-07-16-200152-700

https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II.pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460

https://www.mcwl.marines.mil/Portals/34/Documents/FuturesAssessment/Marine%20Corps%20Science%20Fiction%20Futures%202016_12_9.pdf?ver=2016-12-09-105855-733

Chapter Three

EFFECTS OF GENDER INTEGRATION ON READINESS

This chapter explores the effects of gender integration on individual
and unit readiness. It begins by adopting a working definition of per-
sonnel readiness, which includes five attributes: availability, qualifi-
cations, experience, stability, and motivation. Next, the results of the
survey questions that addressed individual and overall unit readiness
are discussed. Finally, this chapter discusses the effects of gender
integration on each of the five attributes of personnel readiness.

DEFINING READINESS

The concept of readiness was purposely undefined in the written
survey, as we resolved to determine what factors the study partici-
pants would highlight as affecting readiness. The diversity of factors
mentioned in the written comments illustrates broad variation in the
definition of readiness and substantiates the need to break this item
down into its components to facilitate further analysis.

Numerous research efforts have examined force readiness. An
aggregated examination of this work indicates that there is consider-
able variation in the definition of “readiness.” The term refers to
multiple issues, but many attempts to define readiness address the
capability of a military force or unit to accomplish specific goals and
missions. Previous research, however, does indicate that there is a
hierarchy of readiness, whereby the readiness of individual units is
one element that determines the readiness of a service, and the
readiness of a service contributes to the overall joint force readiness.
Unit readiness is the typical level of focus.

34 New Opportunities for Women

However, even unit readiness contains several ratings of readiness.
Personnel, materiel, and unit training all contribute to an overall unit
rating of readiness. Clearly, the degree to which women are well-
trained in their occupations and possess sufficient military experi-
ence will affect personnel and unit readiness. Thus, this discussion
will concentrate on the effects of gender integration upon the per-
sonnel readiness of the units studied, as assessed by the units’ com-
manders and personnel. We will examine the degree to which the
presence of women in newly opened occupations or units affects the
five attributes of personnel readiness: whether personnel are avail-
able, qualified, experienced, stable to the unit, and motivated.1

Availability represents the personnel assigned to the unit and avail-
able to deploy. Qualified personnel are those trained in their duty
skills and capable of performing the job to which they are assigned.
Experienced refers to the number of people in the unit with senior
grades. Stability represents the degree to which turbulence or per-
sonnel turnover in the unit is minimized. Motivation is a subjective
measure, which will be evident only from the perceptions and atti-
tudes reflected in interviews, focus groups, and surveys. The effects
of gender integration on the motivation of personnel will be
addressed in Chapters Five and Six, which discuss the effects on unit
cohesion and morale. When examining these factors, we recognized
that gender may or may not have an effect upon any or all of them.
In addition, we also recognized that, if the data do indicate a correla-
tion between gender integration and lower measures of these
attributes, the order of causality of these measures is uncertain. If
such a correlation were indicated, one would need to ask whether
the assignment of women lowering the readiness of these units, or
are women being assigned to less ready units.

OVERALL ISSUES THAT AFFECT INDIVIDUAL AND UNIT
READINESS

The combination of interview, survey, and discussion findings indi-
cates that neither gender issues nor the presence of women in the
units studied is perceived to have a significant impact on readiness.

______________
1See Schank, Harrell, Thie, et al. (1997) for the development of these attributes.

Effects of Gender Integration on Readiness 35

Individual Readiness Survey Results

When queried about the state of their individual readiness to deploy
on a combat mission, roughly half of the officers and senior enlisted
personnel believed their readiness to deploy for a combat mission
was very high, and very few people rated their readiness as low.
These survey results are shown in Table 3.1. Except for junior
enlisted women, women respondents tended to rate their own
readiness the same or higher than men of the same grade. Half of
junior enlisted women surveyed evaluated their readiness as
medium, and less than a third rated it as high. This category of per-
sonnel was most likely to rate readiness as low.

Unit Readiness Survey Results

Table 3.2 indicates the responses when queried about the state of
unit readiness. Women in leadership roles also tended to evaluate
their unit’s readiness to deploy higher than men did. The difference
is most dramatic between men and women of the senior enlisted
grades.

Open-Ended Readiness Survey Results

One of the most important findings gathered from written responses
to open-ended questionnaire items was that people believed gender
integration was not one of the key factors people attributed to readi-
ness.

When introducing our study at the research sites, we always
explained that our mission was to examine the effect that gender
integration had upon readiness, cohesion, and morale. In addition,
the cover pages of the surveys were titled “Survey to Support the
Study of ‘Integrating Women Into Previously Closed Military
Occupations.’” Thus, if anything, survey respondents were
prompted to mention gender as a factor in readiness, cohesion, and
morale above all others. Instead, in answer to the question about the
perceived reasons for personal readiness and unit readiness, we
received very few written comments that identified gender issues or
conflicts as salient. Instead, training, leadership, and individual
workloads were identified as having the primary effects upon readi-

36 New Opportunities for Women

Table 3.1

Responses to the Question: “How Would You Rate Your Readiness for a
Combat Mission?” (by grade and gender, in percent)

Officers E7–E9 E5–E6 E1–E4

Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women

High 59 66 61 63 49 51 50 29
Medium 36 28 35 37 44 40 44 53
Low 5 7 5 — 7 9 7 18

Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

NOTES: p is the probability that the null hypothesis (that the variables used to
classify the population are independent) is true.
For gender, p < 0.05; for grade, p < 0.001. Unit was also significant (p < 0.001): Personal readiness tended to be rated higher in units that had recently deployed and lower in units that had been in the shipyard or had not recently deployed. Service and race were not significant. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding. ness. These written comments are presented in Table 3.3. The first two columns organize responses into like categories; the right col- umn indicates the number of comments that mentioned each item as a factor of readiness. The comments have not been coded by negative or positive effect. For example, 275 individuals mentioned training as the reason for their level of readiness. This category rep- Table 3.2 Responses to the Question: “How Would You Rate Your Unit’s Readiness for a Combat Mission?” (by grade and gender, in percent) Officers E7–E9 E5–E6 E1–E4 Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women High 50 54 42 68 31 46 47 42 Medium 43 29 43 32 54 40 41 44 Low 7 18 15 — 16 15 12 14 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 NOTES: For grade, p < 0.01. Gender alone was not significant, but as the table demonstrates, its interaction with grade was (p < 0.05). Unit was also significant (p < 0.001): Unit readiness tended to be rated higher in units that had recently deployed, lower in units that had been in the shipyard or had not recently deployed. Service and race were not significant. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding. Effects of Gender Integration on Readiness 37 Table 3.3 Written Comments in Response to “Why Do You Think Your Readiness and Your Unit’s Readiness Is the Way It Is?” Categories Written Responses Number of Mentions Training Training 275 Workload Operations Tempo 77 Personnel Tempo 25 Workload/Schedule 23 Personnel Shortages 21 How Hard People Work 12 Leadership Leadership/Chain of Command 66 Clarity of Unit Organization and Unit Mission 14 Unit Management 10 Discipline 6 Level or Consistency of Unit Standards 5 Materiel Materiel/Maintenance 65 Shortage of Funds 11 Attitudes/Morale Morale/Attitude 62 Priorities Other Than Combat Mission 10 Quality of People and Unit Quality of People 40 Relevant/Combat Experience 16 Successful Unit 15 Unit Pride 14 Mission of Unit 11 Time with Unit 6 Cohesion Teamwork/Cohesion 40 Communication 4 Gender 2 resents both such comments as, “We train constantly and automati- cally people know what to do for certain situations,” and “Need more training, practicing. . . . Yes I am learning my MOS, but when it comes to combat training we haven’t done anything besides what I did in Basic Training. I don’t think that is enough training.” People commented not only on the amount of training, but also on whether the type of training seemed relevant or necessary. Regardless of the 38 New Opportunities for Women positive or negative nature of the comment, training was perceived as having the greatest effect upon their individual and unit readiness. Likewise, the emphasis the chain of command placed on readiness or the quality and experience of the chain of command was also an important factor. Some participants mentioned the “[t]one set by current and prior CO and supported by entire chain of command,” and some linked leadership to training: “[t]he amount of training offered is tremendous. The CO really pushes combat readiness.” In contrast, negative reports included “the chain of command is afraid to let others (lower chain of command) take action and make deci- sions.” Given the stated focus of our research, it is surprising that out of 934 surveys, only 2 respondents indicated that gender issues had an effect upon readiness, indicating a general perception that gender integration plays a minor role in unit or individual readiness. THE EFFECTS OF GENDER ON PERSONNEL READINESS ATTRIBUTES Again, gender was perceived to be a minor factor in the readiness of a unit, but the following discusses the issues that gender integration does raise for specific readiness attributes: availability, qualification, experience, and stability. Availability There are two reasons personnel may not be available: (1) no indi- viduals have been assigned to some positions, or (2) the individuals who have been assigned are not available for work or are on restricted duty. Duty restrictions can include nondeployability by itself or other restrictions on the tasks and locations at which an individual can perform.2 In discussions at service headquarters and units, we heard few gender-related problems in filling positions. In the Navy and Marine ______________ 2These availability effects also have implications for morale, which are discussed in Chapter Five. Effects of Gender Integration on Readiness 39 Corps, gender could restrict assignment flexibility because the spe- cific number of bunks available for women on ships prescribes the number of female billets. For the Marines, this issue is especially problematic because they have integrated units that currently deploy on ships with no female accommodations. Thus, some Marine women are currently not allowed to deploy with their units. The problem will decrease as more combatant ships are modified. Units that deploy on ships are the only ones with official female quotas. We heard more about gender-related causes of unplanned personnel losses, absences, and duty restrictions.3 Three causes were most often mentioned: pregnancy, single motherhood, and sickness or injury. Pregnancy. The deployability of pregnant women is restricted by policy. Under some conditions, pregnant women can participate in field exercises, but they cannot deploy overseas or out to sea.4 Pregnant women are also excluded from military activities that are considered potentially dangerous to the baby, such as using chemi- cals or firing weapons.5 Many commanders we spoke with indicated that they had data showing a higher rate of nonavailability among women than among ______________ 3There is considerable debate in the research community regarding whether women miss more time from work than men do. The majority of the research concentrates upon the civilian workplace. The findings that do suggest women are absent more frequently cite life events, such as motherhood, as the primary factor explaining these differences (see, for example, Leigh, 1991; Vistnes, 1997; VandenHeuvel and Wooden, 1995). The studies that find women do not necessarily miss more time from work argue that other studies did not control for the different levels of seniority between men and women, the different types of jobs men and women tend to have, or other demographic or job differences (see, for example, Haccoun, 1988; Scott and McClellan, 1990). One recent study, however, did find that military women pilots were medically grounded more frequently than were their male colleagues (Voge, 1996). 4The Navy and Marine Corps policies state that pregnant women cannot be more than six hours from a hospital. The six-hour policy was established not to permit pregnant servicemembers to deploy to sea, but to allow some flexibility for short under way periods, such as transits to and from local shipyards or changing a ship’s berth. 5Further research might compare these military policies regarding pregnancy to those from civilian organizations that employ women in environments that would be considered hazardous to pregnant women (e.g., factories with high noise levels or chemical exposure). 40 New Opportunities for Women men. However, they differed in their assessments of the effect of pregnancy on their units’ overall ability to deploy. For commanders of undermanned units, unplanned losses of any type are difficult to manage. In the Navy, where women are removed from the ship when they are 20 weeks into a pregnancy, the effect of this “unplanned loss” depends on how long it takes to get a replacement.6 In the other services, pregnant personnel are less likely to be detached from the unit, but they typically take convalescence leave following the birth. These losses must be compensated for because replacements are rarely available. Obviously, the management challenge of pregnancies also varies with the number of women who become pregnant at the same time or in close succession. Pregnant women who remain in the unit may not be able to perform all their usual duties. This depends on the job, the woman’s medical circumstances, and decisions made by the woman, her physician, and her commander or supervisor. Most unit personnel we spoke with drew contrasts between women who participated in unit physi- cal-training runs to the very ends of their pregnancies and women who were on limited duty or sick leave during a considerable portion of their pregnancies. Performance during pregnancies is thought to vary across women. If the commanding officer and other unit per- sonnel are familiar with and exhibit a knowledge of the regulations and restrictions accompanying pregnancy, managing a unit with one or more pregnant women is easier, and attitudes toward the preg- nant woman appear to be more positive. We heard many times that who was pregnant and when she was pregnant made a tremendous difference to unit readiness. There was a general perception that women officers and senior enlisted personnel try to time their pregnancies to have the least effect upon the unit—e.g., not before a scheduled deployment. This was due, in part, to their pride in and concern regarding their units and also ______________ 6We were told on our visits to ships that a replacement cannot be requested before the pregnant woman departs. This practice would ensure a considerable gap between departure and the arrival of a replacement and increases the resentment toward the pregnant woman. The actual Navy assignment policy, however, is that ships can begin the process to request a replacement as soon as they are aware of pregnancies. Assignment priority will depend upon multiple factors, though, such as the deploy- ment schedules of the ships; thus, the ships may not receive replacements as soon as the pregnant women leave, even if they apply well in advance. Effects of Gender Integration on Readiness 41 because, we were told, these women had invested a lot of time in their careers and would not want to damage them. These opinions stood in marked contrast to those concerning junior female person- nel, especially single mothers. Single, pregnant, junior enlisted per- sonnel were considered the most problematic because the pregnan- cies were less likely to be planned and more likely to create other problems, such as financial and child-care problems, that impacted the unit. Single Mothers. Single parents of either gender were perceived to place a burden on the unit. We should note that, numerically, single fathers are more common in the military than single mothers, but the latter seem to be more visible to others, perhaps because a much higher percentage of women than men are single parents.7 We heard about many specific problems, particularly in the junior enlisted ranks. Young single parents often cannot afford adequate housing, child care, or transportation. They may amass considerable debt and then need assistance in managing financial crises. Further, young single parents frequently cannot attend early morning or late evening unit activities because of the restrictions of daycare, etc. Of the many issues that arise in these situations, few of the issues are unresolvable, but many consume the time of supervisory personnel, including the unit commander and/or executive officer, or senior noncommissioned and petty officers. Sickness or Injury. Whether the number of women in a unit affects personnel availability also depends on whether the women are more or less likely than the men to be absent for all reasons, including sickness and injury in addition to pregnancy. The research team was ______________ 7Using data from DoD’s 1992 Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel, we were able to estimate the fraction of all military personnel who are single parents. Two percent of men and 14 percent of women were single parents at that time. The biggest difference was for mid-grade enlisted personnel (E5–E6); in this group, 4 percent of men and 20 percent of women were single parents. Among single parents, just over half were men. The survey also provides some evidence to support the perception that women are less available than men. One question asked whether the individual “found it difficult to respond very quickly to a recall/alert or to a change in work schedule . . . in the past 12 months.” Among those who had faced this situation, 38 percent of men and 51 percent of women found it difficult. Actually, there were few differences between men and women at the same grade; the overall difference mostly reflects that women are more likely to be in the junior enlisted grades, where servicemembers were more likely to report these difficulties. 42 New Opportunities for Women told that women were more frequently on sick call, light duty, or profile (i.e., limited physical duties for health reasons) than the men. There are no automated records of the frequency of and reasons for absence, however, so we could not confirm these reports. There were several explanations given for this perceived pattern. One explanation, as told to us by Marines, was that women are “broke more often,” or experience a disproportionate number of injuries. We were also told that men are more likely to be ordered to “suck it up” and perform despite pain or illness, whereas male com- manders would usually not push women to that degree. Additionally, many individuals thought that junior enlisted women used “female problems” to get out of unattractive work duties and that male supervisors would not challenge these complaints. In contrast, the perception was that senior women did not permit junior women to use menstruation as an excuse to get out of work and that they did not use this themselves. In conclusion, most units we studied did not report that gender inte- gration has had a significant negative effect upon the number of per- sonnel available to the unit. When units were fully staffed and the proportion of women was representative, pregnancy seemed to be of little concern to commanders and coworkers. When the units visited were undermanned or had a disproportionate number of women, pregnancy or injuries among the women tended to be noted as a problem regardless of whether men were also becoming injured or regardless of whether the overall percentage of personnel on conva- lescence leave due to pregnancy was small. In Chapter Two, we described policies that continue to restrict duty assignments that women can fill, particularly in some occupations. These policies disproportionately concentrate women in units with unrestricted positions and emphasize concerns about the effects of gender integration on personnel availability. These concerns, in turn, may also serve to justify the policy (i.e., if we have all those problems with women, it is a good thing women are not in the “important” units). Effects of Gender Integration on Readiness 43 Qualification Given that a unit has the necessary personnel available, the next per- sonnel readiness criterion is “qualification,” which reflects whether the people are trained and capable of performing their jobs within the unit. All the commanders with whom we spoke asserted that their units were 100 percent trained in their duty skills. Gender clearly had no effect on the degree to which the units were filled with individuals qualified and trained in the correct skills. However, we also took a broader look at whether it was generally perceived that women could perform their jobs as well as the men. As Table 3.4 indicates, the majority of individuals in our survey of grade E5 and above believed that women performed similarly to men. Most supervisors asserted that they had women who per- formed throughout the performance spectrum; some women per- formed better than the men, some performed at the lower end of the scale. More junior enlisted respondents were inclined to respond that women did not perform as well as men. However, when discus- Table 3.4 Answers to the Question: “How Would You Rank the (Other) Women in Your Unit?” (by grade, in percent) Officers (N=110) E7–E9 (N=102) E5–E6 (N=260) E1–E4 (N=416) They tend to perform better than the men. 6 6 7 2 They tend to perform in the same range as men do. 65 68 52 38 They tend to perform worse than the men. 21 12 23 32 I don’t know. I don’t really have much interaction with them. 9 15 18 27 NOTES: For grade, p < 0.001. Unit was significant (p < 0.01), but there was no evident pattern among them. Thus, we attribute the differences to com- mander influence. Service, gender, and race were not significant. Men were asked to rank the women in the unit; women were asked to rank the other women in the unit. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding. 44 New Opportunities for Women sions turned to women who were not performing well in the units, junior women were those most frequently mentioned as examples. Frequently, these junior women were dissatisfied with the service or with their jobs; women who had reenlisted were committed to the military as a career and tended to be seen as performing as well as men. When individuals were asked to rate their own performance and estimate how they would be evaluated by their peers, they tended to believe that they performed very well, but that their peers would not evaluate them as highly. This pattern is evident for both men and women, across all the services, although the gap between self-eval- uation and peer evaluation was greater for women. Table 3.5 indi- cates the results for the men, and Table 3.6 displays the results for the women. For each grade, the tables indicate the results of the respondents’ self-evaluations and then how their peers would rank them. For many of the women in newly opened units, the jobs they are per- forming are the same as the ones women have been performing for years in other units, such as military police, and many of these assignments are traditional for women, such as administration. Thus, this question is only interesting when applied to newly opened MOSs, and then the question becomes problematic because of the small numbers of women assigned to these MOSs. Given such small numbers, it is not yet apparent whether women perform differently than men within these occupations. For example, one commander told us that two out of two women he has in a newly opened occupa- tion have job-related injuries. From this evidence, it is impossible to infer whether women who perform that job will be more prone to injury. Another issue was whether the ability to perform in their occupation was more important than general military skills. This issue came up more during our Marine Corps visits. For example, “I don’t feel women should be in the Marines. A Marine is a basic rifleman, an MOS women cannot be assigned to. Therefore, women shouldn’t be Marines. Other services, yes, but not Marines.” Because women cannot be infantrymen, this kind of logic asserts that whether or not women can perform within their occupations is irrelevant. The Utopia R ✺❁❐❆ Table 3.5 Responses of Men to the Questions: “How Do You Rank Your Overall Work Performance Compared to the Others that You Work With?” (by grade and service) and “How Do You Think Your Peers Would Rank Your Overall Work Performance?” (by grade and service, in percent) Officers E7-E9 E5-E6 E1-E4 Self Peers Self Peers Self Peers Self Peers Army men Top 15% 62 48 68 53 59 50 35 25 Above average 28 36 26 38 29 31 35 38 Average 10 15 6 8 10 16 29 33 Below average — 1 1 1 2 2 1 3 Bottom 15% — — — — 0.4 1 1 1 Navy men Top 15% 61 49 70 50 64 53 38 29 Above average 26 33 26 39 23 28 35 35 Average 14 19 4 9 12 17 27 33 Below average — — — 2 1 2 — 3 Bottom 15% — — — — — — — 1 Marine men Top 15% 68 61 75 74 74 74 46 29 Above average 18 21 20 21 21 15 32 49 Average 14 18 14 5 6 12 20 20 Below average — — — — — — 1 1 Bottom 15% — — — — — — 1 1 NOTES: For grade, p < 0.001. For service, p < 0.01. Unit and race were not significant. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding. E ffects o f G en d er In tegratio n o n R ead in ess 45 Utopia R ✺❁❐❆ Table 3.6 Responses of Women to the Questions: “How Do You Rank Your Overall Work Performance Compared to the Others That You Work With?” (by grade and service) and “How Do You Think Your Peers Would Rank Your Overall Work Performance?” (by grade and service, in percent) Officers E7–E9 E5–E6 E1–E4 Self Peers Self Peers Self Peers Self Peers Army Women Top 15% 61 33 68 50 44 40 32 22 Above Average 33 56 18 41 41 38 32 36 Average 6 11 9 9 11 20 33 36 Below Average — — 5 — 2 — — 4 Bottom 15% — — — — 2 2 2 2 Navy Women Top 15% 60 44 56 44 50 39 20 15 Above Average 36 44 39 50 41 41 40 39 Average 4 12 6 6 4 14 37 42 Below Average — — — — 5 4 2 5 Bottom 15% — — — — — 2 2 — Marine Women Top 15% 67 67 N/A N/A 75 50 30 26 Above Average — — N/A N/A 13 38 39 35 Average — — N/A N/A 13 — 30 35 Below Average — 33 N/A N/A — — — 4 Bottom 15% — — N/A N/A — 13 — — NOTE: For rank, p < 0.001. For service, p < 0.01. Unit was not significant. Race was not significant for Army or Marine women. Race was significant (p < .05) for Navy women. Among Navy women, black E7–E9s tended to rate themselves higher than white women of the same ranks, and black E1–E6 tended to rate themselves lower than white women of the same ranks. Hispanic women and Others rated themselves lower than black or white women. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding. 46 N ew O p p o rtu n ities fo r W o m en Effects of Gender Integration on Readiness 47 Marine Corps has a considerably lower percentage of technical skill requirements than the other services; instead, the service emphasis is on general military skills. In addition, the Marine Corps is consider- ably more junior in experience mix; over 60 percent of the Marine Corps has one to four … TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 xii manner. (Supported by Army Materiel Modernization Priorities: Army Network, Soldier Lethality, Synthetic Training Environment) (10) Providing to the Joint Force Commander multi-domain formations and systems that can converge capabilities to attack specific vulnerabilities in Chinese and Russian multi-layered, mutually reinforcing military forces and systems. This means creating commanders and staffs who have the means and ability to access and employ capabilities that reside across the Joint Force. (Supported by Army Materiel Modernization Priorities: Long-Range Precision Fires, Next Generation Combat Vehicles, Future Vertical Lift, Soldier Lethality) (11) Providing to the Joint Force Commander with multi-domain formations that have systems, leaders, and Soldiers that are durable, can operate in a highly contested operational environment, cannot easily be isolated from the rest of the Joint Force or from partners, and are able to conduct independent maneuver and employ cross-domain fires. This requires extended sustainability of systems and formations, and leaders and Soldiers who continue to operate effectively in austere environments and conditions. (Supported by Army Materiel Modernization Priorities: Long-Range Precision Fires, Next Generation Combat Vehicles, Future Vertical Lift, Army Network, Air and Missile Defense, Soldier Lethality) (12) Consolidating gains through clear demonstrations of U.S. security commitments to partners through combined exercises, training, information exchanges, and other presence activities. (13) Enabling and complementing land, air, and maritime capabilities with operations in space, cyberspace, and the EMS to support the opening of and exploitation of windows of superiority that create dilemmas for the enemy while protecting the ability to conduct friendly operations in degraded, disrupted, and/or denied operational environments. (14) Attracting, retaining, and making maximum use of high-quality, physically fit, mentally tough Soldiers who have the skills and expertise to conduct Multi-Domain Operations. f. Success in Multi-Domain Operations requires these capabilities be sufficiently developed, trained, and practiced within the Army, with the remainder of the Joint Force, and with allies and partners. sustainability of systems and formations, and leaders and Soldiers who continue to operate (Supported by Army Materiel Modernization effectively in (Supported by Army Materiel Modernization Priorities: Long-Range Precision Fires, Next Generation Combat Vehicles, Future Vertical Lift, Long Range Precision Fires, Next Generation Combat Vehicles, Future Vertical Lift, Army Network, Air and Missile Defense, Soldier Lethality) (14) Attracting, retaining, and making maximum use of high-quality, physically fit, (1 ) Attracting, retaining, and making maximum use of high quality, physically fit, mentally tough Soldiers who have the skills and expertise to conduct Multi-Domain Operations. f. Success in Multiff -Domain Operations requires these capabilities be sufficiently developed, Domain Operations requires these capabilities be sufficiently developed, trained, and practiced within the Army, with the remainder of the Joint Force, and with allies and trained, and practiced within the partners. R e s e a r c h B r i e f dependent children living with their parents in diff erent family types (single parent, dual military, military married to civilian). Survey results suggest that there may be problems with the accuracy of some inputs to the formula. For example, of those families identifi ed by DEERS as “single parent,” only 43 percent reported this same status on the survey. Simi- larly, only 83 percent of those identifi ed by DEERS as “mili- tary married to civilian” and 90 percent of those identifi ed as “dual military” reported the same status, respectively, on the survey. In addition, because DEERS no longer includes a fl ag denoting dual-military families, identifying this family type proved quite challenging. Assumptions made by the formula about the fraction of children living with a military parent or parents and about spousal employment rates also diff ered substantially from what was found in the survey. Multiple Child-Care Indicators Provide Important Insights into How Well the System Is Working Th e survey and focus group results also pointed to other important indicators of system functioning besides potential child-care need that the DoD should consider monitoring. Th ese include use of multiple child-care arrangements, unmet need for care, unmet preference for care (i.e., Need for High-Quality Child Care Affects Military Readiness and Retention Key fi ndings Focus groups and survey results pointed to several options for improving the DoD’s approach to addressing the child-care needs of military families: • Identify a broader range of goals for the military child-care system, such as reducing the level of unmet need and unmet preference in child-care arrangements, or reducing the number of workdays lost because of child-care problems. • Create policy alternatives to DoD-sponsored child-care centers (e.g., vouchers for child care at non-DoD providers, subsidized slots in civilian centers, subsidized wraparound care) and provide fl exibility in applying options according to local need. • Improve the quality of data used to estimate child-care need. • Consider establishing a mechanism to provide centralized assessment of child-care needs across installations. T he Department of Defense (DoD) supports the largest employer-sponsored system of high-quality child care in the United States. Th rough accredited child development cen- ters (CDCs), family child-care homes, youth centers, and other aft er-school programs, the DoD provided approximately 176,000 spaces for military children ages 0–12 in fi scal year 2006. Th e DoD recognizes that high-quality child care is both a readiness and a reten- tion issue. If parents are forced to make do with inadequate child- care arrangements or cannot fi nd child care, they may be distracted from duty or in some instances may even fail to report for duty in order to care for their children. Inadequate child care may also aff ect a family’s decision to remain in the military. Th e Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense recently asked the RAND Corporation to assess its formula for estimating child-care need among military families and to improve understanding of the factors that infl uence key child-care outcomes of interest. To perform the assessment, research- ers conducted focus groups on eight installations and fi elded a mail survey to assess parental preferences and other factors that might aff ect child-care need. Some Data Elements Used in the DoD’s Child-Care Demand Formula Need Attention Th e DoD currently uses a “child-care demand formula” to estimate potential need for child care among military families and to determine how many child-care spaces or “slots” the system should provide. However, the DoD does not oversee the needs-based allocation of spaces across installations. Th e child-care demand formula incorporates data from the Defense Manpower Data Center, Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS), and the services, and also makes assumptions about the fraction of whether families are using their preferred type of care), and the eff ect of child-care problems on military readiness and retention. Among the study’s key fi ndings: Families living off base are less likely to use DoD- sponsored care. Th e distance between a family’s home and the installation is strongly related to the type of child care used. Also, families with preschool-aged children who live in lower-income areas are more likely to use less-expensive civilian child-care options than DoD-sponsored care. Unmet child-care need is not prevalent among mili- tary families, aff ecting fewer than 10 percent of families surveyed. However, unmet need is more prevalent among families with preschool-aged children compared with those with older children (4 percentage points) and those earning less than $50,000 per year (18 percentage points). Military members with a civilian spouse are also more likely than single parents to report unmet need. Unmet preference is more common than unmet need, aff ecting 22 percent of those surveyed, especially families with preschool-aged children. Fift y-four percent of these families stated that they would prefer some form of DoD- provided care. Child-care issues impact the readiness of military members. Challenges in fi nding child care aft er the birth of a child or when moving to an installation sometimes prevent military families from reporting for duty. Problems fi nding child care were particularly common among single- parent and dual-military families with preschool-aged children. Single parents, and especially female military members, oft en reported challenges of this nature. Child-care concerns may infl uence retention decisions. More than one-fi ft h of survey respondents—and especially families with preschool-aged children, and dual-military and single-parent families—reported that it is likely or very likely that child-care issues would compel them to leave the military. Surprisingly, users of DoD CDC child care—the most sought aft er and most heavily subsidized type of non- parental care—were more likely to report a high probability of leaving the military because of child-care issues. Policy Options Th e study fi ndings point to several policy options for the DoD to consider. Th e DoD should identify a clear set of goals for the military child-care system and establish the key outcomes of interest. Goals might include reducing the level of unmet preference, the level of unmet need, or the number of workdays lost by military personnel because of child-care problems. Th e DoD should consider creating additional policy levers, and encourage their fl exible application at the installation level. For example, in areas with limited on- base or near-base housing, the DoD might provide vouchers or subsidize care in civilian-operated centers in the com- munities where military families live. In communities with a low cost of living, families tend to prefer less-expensive civilian care, so the DoD may want to reduce the number of DoD-sponsored slots and instead subsidize wraparound civilian care. Th e DoD should collect additional data that will help improve the formula’s predictions and better target child- care resources. Validation studies are needed to ensure that the data used to assess potential child-care need are produc- ing the most accurate indicators possible. A DoD-wide role may be needed to help allocate child- care resources across installations. Currently, there is no mechanism for the centralized consideration of child-care need across installations. Such a systemwide perspective, provided by the DoD, combined with the use of a broader set of policy tools, could lead to more eff ective use of resources and better options for families and enhance the military’s ultimate goals: readiness and retention. ■ RAND Offi ces Santa Monica, CA • Washington, DC • Pittsburgh, PA • Jackson, MS • Cambridge, UK • Doha, QA w w w.rand.org RB-9218-OSD (2007) RAND Research Areas The Arts • Child Policy • Civil Justice • Education • Energy and Environment • Health and Health Care • International Affairs • National Security • Population and Aging • Public Safety • Science and Technology • Substance Abuse • Terrorism and Homeland Security • Transportation and Infrastructure • Workforce and Workplace This product is part of the RAND Corporation research brief series. RAND research briefs present policy-oriented summaries of individual published, peer-reviewed documents or of a body of published work. This research brief describes work done within the RAND National Defense Research Institute documented in Providing Child Care to Military Families: The Role of the Demand Formula in Defi ning Need and Informing Policy, by Joy S. Moini, Gail L. Zellman, and Susan M. Gates, MG-387-OSD, 2006, 138 pp., $25.00, ISBN: 978-0-8330-3927-9 (available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG387/). The RAND Corporation is a nonprofi t research organization providing objec- tive analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily refl ect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG387 http://www.rand.org This PDF document was made available from www.rand.org as a public service of the RAND Corporation. This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non- commercial use only. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. Limited Electronic Distribution Rights THE ARTS CHILD POLICY CIVIL JUSTICE EDUCATION ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS NATIONAL SECURITY POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SUBSTANCE ABUSE TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE This product is part of the RAND Corporation research brief series. RAND research briefs present policy-oriented summaries of individual published, peer- reviewed documents or of a body of published work. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. Support RAND Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore RAND National Defense Research Institute View document details http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/ http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/arts/ http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/children/ http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/children/ http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/civil_justice/ http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/education/ http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/energy_environment/ http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/health/ http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/international_affairs/ http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/national_security/ http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/population/ http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/public_safety/ http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/science_technology/ http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/science_technology/ http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/substance_abuse/ http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/substance_abuse/ http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/terrorism/ http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/terrorism/ http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/infrastructure/ http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/infrastructure/ http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/workforce/ http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/nsrd/ndri.html http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/publications/electronic/ http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/publications/electronic/ http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/giving/contribute.html http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/ http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/nsrd/ndri.html http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/pubs/research_briefs/RB9218/ << /ASCII85EncodePages false /AllowTransparency false /AutoPositionEPSFiles true /AutoRotatePages /None /Binding /Left /CalGrayProfile (Dot Gain 20%) /CalRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1) /CalCMYKProfile (U.S. Web Coated 50SWOP 51 v2) /sRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1) /CannotEmbedFontPolicy /Error /CompatibilityLevel 1.4 /CompressObjects /Tags /CompressPages true /ConvertImagesToIndexed true /PassThroughJPEGImages true /CreateJDFFile false /CreateJobTicket false /DefaultRenderingIntent /Default /DetectBlends true /DetectCurves 0.1000 /ColorConversionStrategy /LeaveColorUnchanged /DoThumbnails false /EmbedAllFonts true /EmbedOpenType false /ParseICCProfilesInComments true /EmbedJobOptions true /DSCReportingLevel 0 /EmitDSCWarnings false /EndPage -1 /ImageMemory 1048576 /LockDistillerParams false /MaxSubsetPct 100 /Optimize true /OPM 1 /ParseDSCComments true /ParseDSCCommentsForDocInfo true /PreserveCopyPage true /PreserveDICMYKValues true /PreserveEPSInfo true /PreserveFlatness true /PreserveHalftoneInfo false /PreserveOPIComments false /PreserveOverprintSettings true /StartPage 1 /SubsetFonts true /TransferFunctionInfo /Apply /UCRandBGInfo /Preserve /UsePrologue false /ColorSettingsFile (None) /AlwaysEmbed [ true ] /NeverEmbed [ true ] /AntiAliasColorImages false /CropColorImages true /ColorImageMinResolution 150 /ColorImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK /DownsampleColorImages true /ColorImageDownsampleType /Average /ColorImageResolution 150 /ColorImageDepth -1 /ColorImageMinDownsampleDepth 1 /ColorImageDownsampleThreshold 1.00000 /EncodeColorImages true /ColorImageFilter /DCTEncode /AutoFilterColorImages false /ColorImageAutoFilterStrategy /JPEG /ColorACSImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >>
/ColorImageDict << /QFactor 0.40 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >>
/JPEG2000ColorACSImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >>
/JPEG2000ColorImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >>
/AntiAliasGrayImages false
/CropGrayImages true
/GrayImageMinResolution 150
/GrayImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK
/DownsampleGrayImages true
/GrayImageDownsampleType /Average
/GrayImageResolution 150
/GrayImageDepth -1
/GrayImageMinDownsampleDepth 2
/GrayImageDownsampleThreshold 1.00000
/EncodeGrayImages true
/GrayImageFilter /DCTEncode
/AutoFilterGrayImages false
/GrayImageAutoFilterStrategy /JPEG
/GrayACSImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >>
/GrayImageDict << /QFactor 0.40 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >>
/JPEG2000GrayACSImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >>
/JPEG2000GrayImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >>
/AntiAliasMonoImages false
/CropMonoImages true
/MonoImageMinResolution 1200
/MonoImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK
/DownsampleMonoImages true
/MonoImageDownsampleType /Average
/MonoImageResolution 150
/MonoImageDepth -1
/MonoImageDownsampleThreshold 1.00000
/EncodeMonoImages true
/MonoImageFilter /CCITTFaxEncode
/MonoImageDict << /K -1 >>
/AllowPSXObjects false
/CheckCompliance [
/None
]
/PDFX1aCheck false
/PDFX3Check false
/PDFXCompliantPDFOnly false
/PDFXNoTrimBoxError true
/PDFXTrimBoxToMediaBoxOffset [
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
]
/PDFXSetBleedBoxToMediaBox true
/PDFXBleedBoxToTrimBoxOffset [
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
]
/PDFXOutputIntentProfile (None)
/PDFXOutputConditionIdentifier ()
/PDFXOutputCondition ()
/PDFXRegistryName (http://www.color.org)
/PDFXTrapped /Unknown

/SyntheticBoldness 1.000000
/Description << /JPN
/FRA
/DEU
/PTB
/DAN
/NLD
/ESP
/SUO
/ITA
/NOR
/SVE
/ENU
>>
>> setdistillerparams
<< /HWResolution [150 150] /PageSize [612.000 792.000] >> setpagedevice

AU/ACSC/016/1999-04

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

THE IMPACT OF PREGNANCY ON U.S. ARMY

READINESS

Merideth A. Bucher, Major, U.S. Army

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Advisor: Lt. Col. George Barr

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

April 1999

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author(s) and

do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of

Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the

property of the United States government.

iii

Contents

Page

DISCLAIMER…………………………………………………………………………………………………. ii

LIST OF TABLES…………………………………………………………………………………………… iv

PREFACE……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. v

ABSTRACT …………………………………………………………………………………………………… vi

THE IMPACT OF PREGNANCY ON U.S. ARMY READINESS …………………………… 1

ARMY READINESS………………………………………………………………………………………… 3
Conflicting Studies………………………………………………………………………………………. 4
The Army’s Position ……………………………………………………………………………………. 6
The Numbers Confirm the Problem………………………………………………………………… 7
Political Correctness…………………………………………………………………………………….. 9

TODAY’S PROGRAMS AND THE NEED FOR CHANGE …………………………………. 11
Impact on the Soldier …………………………………………………………………………………. 12
Impact on the Unit …………………………………………………………………………………….. 13
The Retention Issue……………………………………………………………………………………. 14
What it all Means ………………………………………………………………………………………. 15

MATERNAL LEAVE OF ABSENCE: TIME FOR THE NEXT STEP……………………. 17
The Maternity Leave of Absence………………………………………………………………….. 18
How it will Work ………………………………………………………………………………………. 18
Advantages of MLA…………………………………………………………………………………… 20

Advantages to the Army ………………………………………………………………………… 20
Advantages to the Pregnant Soldier …………………………………………………………. 21

Disadvantages of MLA ………………………………………………………………………………. 22
Disadvantages to the Army…………………………………………………………………….. 22
Disadvantages to the Pregnant Soldier ……………………………………………………… 24

RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUMMARY ………………………………………………………. 25
Summary………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 26

BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………………………………………… 28

Tables

Page

Table 1. Overall Percentages for Desert Shield/Desert Storm Non-deployability …………. 4

Table 2. Pregnant Non-Deployable Percentages …………………………………………………….. 8

Preface

The conflict between pregnancy and military service has always existed in the Army.

As a female soldier I have often felt the pressure to avoid having children for the sake of

my career. I have always placed the needs of the Army before my own but someday I too

hope to become a parent. And when I do, I hope to find a maternity leave program in

place that will support my absence from my unit. The Army’s readiness must come first

and that is why I felt compelled to research this subject. When I began I fully intended to

produce a document supporting a leave program similar to the Coast Guards Care of

Newborn Children program. Lt. Col. Linda Christ from the Army War College had

already done a similar paper so I decided to try the concept from a different angle. It was

my intention to provoke thought by offering a program much different from what exists

today.

I would like to thank my research advisor, Lt. Col. George Barr for giving me the

freedom to learn the research process and find my way to the end of this project. I would

also like to thank Lt. Col. Christ for providing me with valuable research information and

support.

AU/ACSC/016/1999-04

Abstract

The impact of pregnancy on U.S. Army readiness came to the forefront following the

Persian Gulf War and the large-scale deployment of military servicewomen. Some

deploying units reported that non-deployable rates for pregnancy among women were as

much as 30% of those assigned. Numerous studies were conducted to determine the

impact of pregnancy on Army readiness and different conclusions were drawn. From a

tactical perspective the numbers of non-deployable for pregnancy are more than 16% in

support units with a high concentration of female soldiers. Pregnancy in these units has a

great impact on readiness, as well as the experience of the pregnant soldier. The Army

should evaluate for implementation a one-year comprehensive Maternity Leave of

Absence program that takes place during the time the soldier is non-deployable for

pregnancy. A volunteer from the Reserve Component force will fill the pregnant

soldier’s vacancy as a deployable replacement, while gaining valuable active duty

training at the same time. The MLA program would benefit the Army by integrating

Reserve Component forces and by limiting the time lost from the pregnant soldier’s

active duty service obligation.

Chapter 1

The Impact of Pregnancy on U.S. Army Readiness

We have to take care of the readiness of the U.S. Army, and enhance the
war-fighting capability and combat readiness of the force.

—Lt. Gen. David H. Ohle
Army personnel chief1

The role of women in the military received unprecedented attention during the

deployment of U.S. forces to the Persian Gulf War. Pictures and news segments showing

tearful farewells and young children torn from their mother’s arms were etched into the

minds of Americans as we were faced, for the first time, with sending American women

to war. The issue of sending women into combat sparked debate on the roles of women

in the military and brought clearly into focus the social conflict of deploying mothers and

the impact of pregnancy on the readiness of military units.

A lot has changed in the military, the Army specifically, since the Persian Gulf War.

In the last decade the Army reduced its ranks by more than half a million soldiers and

civilians, closed over 700 installations and shifted from a forward-deployed force to a

power-projection, US based force. Yet while the Army’s active and reserve strength

authorizations have decreased, deployments have increased by nearly 300 percent, and

recruiting and retention rates have fallen.2 Our greatest challenge today is to remain

capable of sustaining this increased operations tempo, or OPTEMPO, with less people

and resources.

The Army plays a critical role in support of the National Military Strategy by

responding to a wide range of crises and missions both abroad and at home.3 The

readiness of our Army has never been more important. There are many components of

readiness and this paper will investigate the issue of personnel readiness; specifically, the

impact of pregnancy on the readiness of the Army and a need for a more comprehensive

maternity leave program to support readiness.

To adequately examine this topic, it is first necessary to demonstrate that pregnancy

does affect Army readiness. This paper will define readiness, how it is measured at each

level of command and the differences in each perspective. This paper will also

demonstrate that pregnancy has a greater impact at the tactical level than in the aggregate,

and describe the impact pregnancy has on the soldier’s unit and the soldier, herself.

Finally, this paper will address the current Army maternity policies and then recommend

a specific program to support the Army’s need for improved readiness and the soldiers’

need for a planned, stress-free pregnancy.

Notes

1 Tice, Jim, “New Personnel Chief: Readiness Top Priority”, Army Times, 4 January
1999, 22.

2 United States Army Posture Statement FY99, America’s Army—One Team, One
Fight, One Future, February 1998, vii.

3 Ibid.

Chapter 2

Army Readiness

Readiness remains the number one priority for the Army, and the key to
readiness is quality people.

—United States Army Posture Statement FY99

“Readiness is defined as the nation’s ability to have the right forces in the right place

at the right time to fight the right war.”1 Readiness is measured and reported at the

tactical, operational and strategic levels and consists of seven areas: people, equipment,

maintenance, training, tactics-techniques and procedures, transportation and

communication, and infrastructure. The Army’s fighting capability depends on units at

each level maintaining high levels of readiness in each of these seven areas.

One of the problems determining the impact of pregnancy on Army readiness

depends upon which level of command is collecting and analyzing the data. All Army

units from companies to major command headquarters (MACOM’s) submit their reports,

which are then consolidated and reported to the Department of the Army. Currently,

there is no system in place that aggregates readiness data from one level to the next. “For

example, to measure strategic readiness, tactical and operational readiness data must be

aggregated even further and combined with other data. At this stage, the data for the

force as a whole will often obscure the readiness of individual units, even if they are

experiencing significant readiness shortfalls.”2 Thus, the impact of pregnancy on unit

readiness becomes an issue of perspective, which can unfortunately lead to incorrect

conclusions.

Conflicting Studies

Many studies have examined the impact of pregnancy on military readiness but they

draw different conclusions. One of the first studies to address the issue was conducted by

a Presidential Commission that formed after the Persian Gulf War to research readiness

problems surrounding women in the military. According to testimony and survey

research presented to the commission, the pregnancy rate at the onset of the War

“significantly affected the deployability of some units.” A great deal of attention was

focused on pregnancy throughout the Commission’s tenure because of its impact on

readiness, deployability and cohesion in the Armed Forces. The Commission found that

the non-deployability rate for women was three times greater than that of men, largely

due to pregnancy. When pregnancy is taken into account women have nearly four times

as much lost time as men.

Table 1. Overall Percentages for Desert Shield/Desert Storm Non-deployability

% MALE %FEMALE COMPARISON
FACTOR

ARMY 2.7 9.0 3.3X

NAVY 1.5 5.6 3.7X

AIR FORCE 1.8 6.4 3.5X

MARINE CORPS 8.8 26.3 3.9X

Source: Presidential Commission on the assignment of women in the Armed Forces.3

As a result of their study, the Commission made recommendations regarding

pregnancy, deployment and family policies, among others. Specifically, they

recommended the Army develop a deployment-probability-designation coding system to

distinguish those areas where a pregnant woman can serve during pregnancy, and those

areas where her pregnancy would have an adverse affect on the unit.4 For example, if a

soldier became pregnant while assigned to a unit with a high deployment probability

designation code, she could be reassigned to a lower probability unit pending the

termination of her pregnancy.

Another study, conducted by the RAND Corporation, evaluated the impact of

integrating women on defense readiness and concluded that when units were

undermanned or had a disproportionate number of women, pregnancy or injuries among

the women tended to be noted as problem to commanders and co-workers. Conversely,

when units were fully staffed and the proportion of women was representative (of the

Army as a whole), pregnancy seemed to be of little concern. 5

Deployment figures from the Gulf War confirm that commanders of combat service

and combat service support units, like a Division Support Command (DISCOM) should

anticipate a higher rate of nondeployability among female soldiers. A report from the

Center for Army Lessons Learned states that in some units 18 to 20 percent of female

soldiers were nondeployable, primarily for disqualifying physical profiles and pregnancy.

One senior officer who commanded in the Gulf discussed the problems he had with

pregnancies stating 33% of the women in his battalion could not deploy because of

pregnancy or they were sent home early because of it.6

The Army’s Position

The Army has not developed a coding system as recommended by the Commission,

or any other program addressing females and readiness. One reason may be that there is

no consensus at the Army level that pregnancy does in fact impact personnel readiness.

The Army has no official position on the issue, but unofficially an Army readiness officer

says that pregnancy does not impact readiness in the aggregate since less than 1% of the

Army is non-deployable due to pregnancies at any point in time. However, he concedes

there are readiness issues in units with a high density of females assigned or in units

experiencing significant shortfalls. 7 A recent Air Command and Staff College (ACSC)

research paper also concluded that pregnancy does not impact military readiness but

qualified those results by acknowledging it is dependent upon what perspective you have.

8 Both the Army official and the ACSC research paper draw the same conclusion while

looking at readiness from the top down. As Admiral Prueher, United States Pacific

Command (PACOM) commander, noted “from this perspective the force as a whole can

obscure the data of individual units.”

All of these studies demonstrate the disparity of findings and disagreement regarding

the impact of pregnancy on Army readiness. The Army chooses to look at the problem

from a top-down, operational perspective. Admittedly, from this perspective pregnancy

has little impact on personnel readiness. This paper’s contention is that by looking at the

numbers from the top down the Army is ignoring the significant impact pregnancy is

having at the tactical level because “data for the force as a whole is obscuring the

readiness of individual units.”9 This tendency will be demonstrated by an analysis of the

numbers from the bottom up.

The Numbers Confirm the Problem

Until 1975, women in the Armed Forces could not serve once they became

pregnant; a ban seen as a measure to protect the health of the soldier and her baby.10

Today, it is common to see pregnant soldiers serving throughout the Army, including

assignments to deployable units within Forces Command (FORSCOM). Women are an

integral part of the Army today, comprising roughly 15% of the force and the impact

pregnancy has on the unit’s readiness will depend upon how many females are assigned

to that particular unit, and how many are pregnant and nondeployable at the same time.

According to the Army, the numbers are predictable because the pregnancy rate at any

one time averages 5-6% of assigned females, or less than 1% of the total force. Yet, as of

15 March 1998, 8% of females in FORSCOM were pregnant. The Army says the larger

percentage is due to the higher number of entry-level female soldiers assigned to

FORSCOM and its support units.11 For example, DISCOM units within FORSCOM

typically have a larger proportion of females assigned than is representative of the Army

due to the assignment policy restricting women from serving with units assigned a direct

combat mission.12 The Army acknowledges the numbers will be greater at this level

without acknowledging a corresponding impact to unit readiness.

Instead of trying to downplay the inconsistencies, the numbers should raise a red

flag. A sampling of FORSCOM’s III Corps show an even greater percentage of pregnant

and non-deployable females assigned.

Table 2. Pregnant Non-Deployable Percentages

Total

Assigned

Females

Assigned

Pregnant % of

Women

% of

Total

US ARMY 480,898 71,148 2,947 4% <1% FORSCOM 210,285 26,807 2,402 9% 1% 3RD CORPS 96,711 7,691 756 10% <1% 4TH ID MECH 11,990 1212 159 13 % 1% DISCOM 2,359 837 132 16 % 6% 704TH MSB 696 278 47 17% 7% Source: 4th ID numbers do not include the 3rd Brigade and support units that are geographically separated from the 4th ID and located at Fort Carson, CO. 13 14 15 16 Obviously, the impact of pregnancy on unit readiness is much more significant at lower levels of command than in the aggregate. It is not unexpected that the percentages of nondeployables increase as unit size decreases. What is important is the impact the numbers have on unit operations and readiness. The table shows that 6% of the assigned soldiers in the 4th ID DISCOM are unavailable to deploy and in most cases unable to work in their assigned specialties. We can assume that the 4th ID DISCOM is typical of the other nine active duty DISCOM’s in non-deployable percentages and that these numbers are relatively static. This being the case, there is a predictable and recurring personnel shortage in our deployable units that is not being addressed by the Army. 9 Political Correctness If pregnancy so obviously impacts readiness at the tactical level why hasn’t the Army addressed the problem? Army leadership is in a catch 22 position; they must maintain the fighting strength and readiness of the force while at the same time balancing the political issues of a dual-gender Army. It is considered “politically incorrect” or gender-biased to verbalize the problems pregnancies cause our Army, and as a result no one will admit there is a problem. The only way to develop a feasible solution is to acknowledge there is a problem. Only then will there be a solution that benefits both the Army and the pregnant soldier. There are three truths that must be stated before progressing further. First, pregnancy is a female issue. There is no bias in this statement, only fact, and women must bear the burdens associated with it. Second, pregnancy is preventable and therefore cannot be compared to the readiness problems caused by long-term illnesses or injuries. Those issues and possible solutions must be addressed separately. Finally, if pregnancy rates are static and relatively predictable, they can be planned for at the Army level. Obviously, from a tactical perspective the percentages of non-deployable are significantly higher than from an operational perspective. This being the case, the argument is even stronger to develop a plan compensating for the impact of pregnancy on unit readiness. Because our force depends on quality people, any plan must also support the soldier as well as the Army. Notes 1 Adm Joseph W. Prueher, “Measuring Readiness,” Armed Forces Journal International, January 1999, 16. 2 Ibid. 10 Notes 3 Presidential Commission, Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, Report to the President, November 15, 1992 (Washington D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office), iii,15,19. 4 Ibid. 5 Margaret C. Harrell and Laura L. Miller, New Opportunities for Military Women: Effects upon Readiness, Cohesion, and Morale,” RAND, National Defense Research Institute, (Santa Monica, Ca, 1997), xvii-xviii. 6 Katherine McIntire, “Women in the Army; Pregnancy Raises Questions of Deployability,” Army Times, 18 April 1994, 14. 7 <[email protected]>. “re: FW: PIWG Briefing.” Electronic mail
message to Merideth Bucher <[email protected]>. 24 November 1998.

8 Maj Kathleen P. Monsen, “Pregnancy in the U.S. Armed Services and its Impact on
Readiness”, Research Report no.97-0536 (Maxwell AFB, AL, Air Command and Staff
College, 1987), 2-31.

9 Prueher, 16.
10 Victoria Sherrow, Women and the Military: An Encyclopedia, 1. ABC-CLIO,

Santa Barbara, CA, 1996, 222.
11 Lt Col Kevin L. Watson, Chief, Distribution and Readiness Branch, Department of

the Army, Information Paper, 19 June 1998.
12 Army Regulation (AR) 600-1, Army Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers,

27 March 1992.
13 Spreadsheet of 4th Infantry Division (MECH) Pregnant Non-deployable, Lt.

Vaughn, 22 January 1999,
14 Watson, email.
15 Email message with information from III Corps, Lt. Col Christ, III Corps G1,
1 February 1999.
16 Telephone conversation, Lt. Jefferson, DISCOM S1, 1February 1999.

Chapter 3

Today’s Programs and the Need for Change

Not unexpectedly, the vast majority of military women are young enlisted women of

childbearing age. 1 So it is only natural to assume these young women will have children

at some point in their lives. Yet current Army maternity policy and programs do not take

this into account and plan for the lost time, nor do they address the personal needs of the

soldier, during and immediately after her pregnancy. The “lost time” for a pregnancy is

significant—once a soldier is medically confirmed pregnant she immediately becomes

“non-deployable” and will remain in this status for up to one year.

Current Army regulations authorize 6 weeks of post-partum convalescent leave after

a soldier has given birth, beginning when the soldier is discharged from the hospital. This

is often followed by several weeks of regular leave, which can be granted by the soldier’s

commander. Additionally, the Department of Defense (DOD) has issued a regulation

allowing military members who are new mothers or one member of a dual military family

who adopts a child, a 4-month period during which they are exempt from deployments. 2

By the time a soldier returns to a deployable status, she will have spent more than one

year as non-deployable and unable to carry out the terms of her contract.

From a personnel management perspective it is difficult to rationalize so much lost

time. The demands as they relate to the military mission require that military members

always be ready to meet the mission—along with the weapons systems and equipment.

Personnel readiness requires that each soldier be mentally and physically fit, disciplined,

immediately available and qualified to perform the mission. Therein lies the conflict

between pregnancy and military service.3 The Army must address the pregnancy-

readiness issue in this era of downsizing, increased OPTEMPO and personnel shortages,

Impact on the Soldier

An enlisted soldier has two options when she is medically diagnosed pregnant. She

can remain on active duty to complete her service obligation, or she can choose voluntary

separation if it is determined that parenthood interferes with her military responsibilities.

In either case, the unit and the Army will lose the manpower of the soldier for at least one

year. Her company commander formally presents the options in a counseling session

where she is also informed about Family Care Plan requirements. All dual-service

parents and single parents, male and female, with children under 18 must submit a written

Family Care Plan identifying who will serve as the children’s guardian if the soldier

deploys. Failure to develop and maintain a plan within a reasonable time is grounds for

involuntary separation.4

The soldier is also given a physical profile during the year she is nondeployable,

limiting her activities. Pregnant soldiers are exempt from participating in a physical

training program and many women, depending on the individual and her capabilities, will

only engage in limited physical activities. As a result, it will take time for many soldiers

to regain their physical condition once the pregnancy is over. They will have a total of

132 days from the termination of pregnancy to prepare for and complete an Army

physical fitness test and return to authorized weight limits.5

Impact on the Unit

Soldiers are also restricted from participating in most training events during

pregnancy. This includes marksmanship, field exercises, aircraft flying and riding in

tactical vehicles. Duties are mostly limited to indoor office work so soldiers working in

certain specialties or under hazardous conditions are reassigned for the duration of their

pregnancy to protect her health and the health of the unborn child. Consequently, the

presence of pregnant women in a unit is often seen as increasing the workload of

everyone else and brings with it the risk of causing resentment among co-workers. Any

perceived double standards (i.e., different performance expectations and responsibilities)

undermine women’s credibility and generate hostility from junior enlisted men, who feel

they are afforded the fewest privileges of anyone. 6

The emotional and psychological stress of pregnancy is compounded in the military

because “it is a uniquely female condition that can further isolate women from the

mainstream of the organization.” Coupled with active duty service demands and the

perceptions of other soldiers, the pregnant soldier can experience a high degree of

psychosocial stress which can negatively affect her morale, performance, and ultimately

her intentions to stay in the Army.

A report from the Defense Women’s Research Program agrees that job reassignment,

loss of manpower, and work redistribution may create a stressful, even hostile

environment for pregnant servicewomen. Peers and leaders may resent that pregnant

soldiers receive full pay and benefits but are exempt from some work, physical training,

field exercises, and most importantly, deployments. The result may be negative feelings,

reactions, and feedback toward pregnant soldiers.7 So while pregnancy may impact the

readiness of the Army and the soldier’s unit during the year that she is non-deployable,

the impact will be greater if she decides to leave because of the experience.

The Retention Issue

According to the aforementioned study on women in the military, a servicewoman’s

positive and negative work experiences during her pregnancy may play a major role in

her decision to reenlist. The study shows that men and women first-term soldiers attrit at

comparable rates when attrition related to pregnancy is controlled. “After pregnancy, the

primary reason females leave the service is voluntarily for incompatibility with military

lifestyle.” The study conducted on first term pregnant Marines concluded that the most

important predictor of attrition was poor supervisor and work group relationships.

Family and career orientation and management of stress were secondary predictors. The

results of the study suggest that the “work experiences of pregnant service members may

play a primary role in the decision to leave military service and may play an even greater

role than the pregnancy or family considerations.”

Another study conducted to determine why promotable female captains leave the

Army cited 67% of the respondents as having a conflict between their family and their

career, which influenced their decision to leave. Fifty-seven percent of those same

officers indicated that their experiences as a female soldier had influenced their decision.

The officers were asked what might have influenced them to stay and many offered

suggestions, including “provide longer maternity leave” and “show more concern for

soldiers’ welfare.” 8 Additionally, more than 80% of 330 individuals questioned in the

Defense Research study believe maternity leave should be extended.9 This same study

also found that junior enlisted participants were more likely to plan to leave the military

following a pregnancy. These studies indicate the majority of females leave the Army

because of family concerns and how they were treated as service members. The findings

also confirm the inadequacy of the current maternity program in retaining female service-

members.

What it all Means

The Army must acknowledge the short-term and long-term impact pregnancy has on

the soldier and her unit. Physiologically, a pregnant soldier is incapable of performing all

of her military responsibilities while she is non-deployable for that year. If her unit is

deployed she is unavailable to perform her job creating the reasonable perception that her

pregnancy increases the …

V O L . 0 6 / T H E I M P O R T A N C E O F C H I L D C A R E 1U . S . C H A M B E R O F C O M M E R C E F O U N D A T I O N

D E C E M B E R 2 0 2 0

PIECING TOGETHER SOLUTIONS:

The Importance
of Childcare to
U.S. Families and
Businesses

V O L . 0 6 / T H E I M P O R T A N C E O F C H I L D C A R E 1U . S . C H A M B E R O F C O M M E R C E F O U N D A T I O N

Working parents, employers, and childcare
providers need long-term, cross-sector solutions
to recover from COVID-19.

V O L . 0 6 / T H E I M P O R T A N C E O F C H I L D C A R E 2U . S . C H A M B E R O F C O M M E R C E F O U N D A T I O N

The first five years of a child’s life are critical to establishing the strong educational, mental, and
emotional foundation upon which future learning is built.1 Experiences during these formative years
can significantly influence future outcomes for children and families. Childcare is not only crucial
for the development of young children, but also essential for the 14 million working parents with
young children.2 Parents rely on childcare to help them enter, re-enter, or remain in the workforce,
but access to affordable, quality childcare is often a significant barrier for many.

Due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, families are experiencing additional challenges in
finding, maintaining, and affording childcare that meets their needs. The challenges they face are
persistent and complex, but solvable, given a willingness to work towards cross-sector solutions
that involve families, business leaders, childcare providers, and policymakers. Even prior to
COVID-19, parents dedicated significant energy and resources balancing their roles at home, in
the community, and in the workplace – a theme which has only been exacerbated by the physical,
mental, and emotional toll of the pandemic. Parents consider several factors in determining the
level and type of childcare solutions that best meet their needs. These factors make up what we
refer to as the “Childcare Equation.”

Every piece of the equation is vital to making the whole picture work. This equation results from
working parents navigating the following factors:

Work Responsibilities
including their hours, schedule, and
employer flexibility

Home Environment
including who in the home might be
available to care for young children
and the family’s physical proximity
to a childcare program

Finances
including balancing a family’s budget,
understanding tradeoffs and other expenses
and resources within the family

Community Options
including availability of childcare,
potential conflicting schedules
and needs of school-aged
children who are attending school
either in-person or remotely

Family Composition
including the work schedule
of a partner, spouse, extended
family member, or friend to share
caregiving responsibilities

Introduction
D E C E M B E R 2 0 2 0

1 Center on the Developing Child, Harvard University. What Is Early Childhood
Development? A Guide to the Science. https://developingchild.harvard.edu/
guide/what-is-early-childhood-development-a-guide-to-the-science/.

2 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. “Table 4. Families with own
children: Employment status of parents by age of youngest child
and family type.” https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/famee.
pdf.

V O L . 0 6 / T H E I M P O R T A N C E O F C H I L D C A R E 3U . S . C H A M B E R O F C O M M E R C E F O U N D A T I O N

As is true of much of 2020 and the COVID-19 pandemic, these variables are
dynamic and present constantly changing scenarios to working families. Yet,
working parents are not alone at the center of this tension: the public health
crisis of COVID-19 has had a devastating effect on the childcare industry.
According to a survey by the National Association for the Education of Young
Children (NAEYC), nearly half of childcare providers closed their facilities
during the COVID-19 shutdowns, and 18 percent of childcare centers remain
closed.3 Although many providers have re-opened, they are operating with
limited capacity. Eighty-six percent are serving significantly fewer children than
were enrolled prior to the pandemic; on average, enrollment is down by 67
percent.4 Such low enrollment means greatly reduced revenue, and childcare
providers are left scrambling to break even in an industry that was already
struggling for sustainability prior to the pandemic.

The reopening of childcare centers is essential to building back a healthy
economy and reducing the strain on those who stepped in to provide care
when centers had reduced capacity or closed entirely. Without viable childcare
solutions, working parents will have a difficult time returning to work, especially
as unemployment is concentrated in industries that provide in-person
services.5 As of October, the overall unemployment rate was still at an elevated
rate of 6.9 percent on average, and in some industries much higher than
that. Industries with the highest unemployment rates include accommodation
(24.6%) and food services and drinking establishments (14.8%).6 Conversely,
some industries have urgent staffing needs but are unable to fill positions. This
includes workplace software providers, manufacturing and food-distribution
suppliers, and customer-service companies among others. Some companies
report increasing compensation to fill more positions, and the time and
resources it takes to fill a position have increased significantly.7 To meet the
workforce demands in these and other industries, employers will need to seek
out new employees from among the 14 million working Americans with young
children. However, without viable childcare solutions, those working parents
could be unable to return to work.

I N T R O D U C T I O N

On average, enrollment in
childcare centers is down

of childcare centers are
serving significantly fewer
children than prior to the
pandemic

67%

86%

3 NAEYC. “Holding On Until Help Comes.” July 13, 2020. https://www.naeyc.org/
sites/default/files/globally-shared/downloads/PDFs/our-work/public-policy-
advocacy/holding_on_until_help_comes.survey_analysis_july_2020.pdf

4 Ibid.
5 Congressional Research Service. “Unemployment Rates During the COVID-19

Pandemic: In Brief.” November 6, 2020. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R46554.
pdf

6 Ibid.
7 The Wall Street Journal. “Millions of Jobs Have Been Lost, but

Hiring Is Booming At These Companies.” Oct. 15, 2020. https://
www.wsj.com/articles/millions-of-jobs-have-been-lost-but-hiring-
is-booming-at-these-companies-11602768600.

“Yet, working parents are not alone at the center of this
tension: the public health crisis of COVID-19 has had a
devastating effect on the childcare industry.”

V O L . 0 6 / T H E I M P O R T A N C E O F C H I L D C A R E 4U . S . C H A M B E R O F C O M M E R C E F O U N D A T I O N

In the fall of 2019, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Foundation surveyed working parents
in four states to better understand how childcare challenges affect parents’ participation in
the workforce, employers’ ability to recruit and retain skilled workers, and state economies.
These findings, highlighted in a series of reports referred to as Untapped Potential, estimated
the economic implications of limited childcare options. A major finding was that parents are
postponing school and training programs, declining promotions and (sometimes) leaving the
workforce entirely due to childcare challenges, such as breakdowns in care, affordability, or
limited access. In the four states studied, these childcare issues resulted in anywhere from $479
million to $3.47 billion in estimated annual losses for their economies. Employers in those states
face both specific, direct costs such as employee turnover, transition, and hiring, and indirect
impact through decreased productivity and challenges in balancing competing priorities.8 These
losses were significant to families, employers, and states when economies were strong and
unemployment was low, and likely have only been intensified by this year’s public health crisis.

This spring, following the dramatic changes resulting from the global COVID-19 pandemic, the
Chamber Foundation began an in-depth study to understand the implications for families, the
childcare industry, and employers. The report that follows, and its underlying research, serves
to address how the pandemic has impacted families’ priorities, needs, and behaviors in regards
to their Childcare Equation and their ability to participate in the workforce. Additionally, this
report explores how the childcare industry is adapting and navigating the evolving impact of
COVID-19, and how employers have and are responding to the increasing childcare needs of
their employees and communities.

I N T R O D U C T I O N

8 Federal Reserve. “The Beige Book: Summary of Commentary on Current
Economic Conditions.” October 21, 2020. https://www.federalreserve.gov/
monetarypolicy/files/BeigeBook_20201021.pdf.

In the four states studied, these childcare issues resulted
in anywhere from $479 million to $3.47 billion in estimated
annual losses for their economies.

$497M $3.47B

V O L . 0 6 / T H E I M P O R T A N C E O F C H I L D C A R E 5U . S . C H A M B E R O F C O M M E R C E F O U N D A T I O N

• In June, two out of three
parents had changed their
childcare arrangement
within the last three
months, and 60% of
parents expected to
change their arrangement
in the next year.

• That remained consistent
throughout the year; 63%
of parents in August and
62% of parents in October
reported needing to
change their arrangement
in the next year.

• As of October,
unemployed parents were
more likely to need to
change their childcare
arrangement within the
next year (65% compared
to 61% of employed
parents), primarily
because of the need to
return to work.

• Before COVID-19, 52%
of parents had children
under the age of six
staying at home with a
parent or guardian at least
part of the work week.

• In June, that number
jumped to 75% and
remained relatively stable
throughout the year, with
73% of parents reporting
having a child at home in
October.

• Before COVID-19, 25% of
parents used childcare
centers, but by June that
number had dropped to
11% and remained at 10%
in October.

• However, slightly more
parents are using family,
friends, or neighbors for
childcare than before
COVID-19.

• In June, 22% of parents
were unsure whether they
would return to work. By
October, that number had
dropped to 13%, although
it was significantly higher
for women than men
(17% vs. 6%). The primary
reason for not returning
to work is childcare
concerns.

• In June, 40% of
employers reported
being concerned that
some of their employees
would not fully return
to work. By September,
32% of employers had
seen employees leave
the workforce due to
COVID-19, primarily due
to childcare and health
concerns.

• In October, 20% of
parents reported being
likely to quit their job
if their school district
adopts a fully online
model, as they will need
to care for their children
at home.

Continuously
changing
childcare
arrangements

More children
staying at home
with family and
friends

Parents
leaving the
workforce

75% 40%
Two out of three working
parents have changed their
childcare arrangement
due to COVID-19, and the
majority have yet to find a
permanent solution.

Up to 75% of working
parents have children
under six years old
staying at home, and
only 10% are using
childcare centers.

In June, 40% of employers
were concerned that some of
their employees would not
fully return to work, and by
October, 32% of employers
had seen employees leave
the workforce.

2
3

Key Themes Over Time

V O L . 0 6 / T H E I M P O R T A N C E O F C H I L D C A R E 6U . S . C H A M B E R O F C O M M E R C E F O U N D A T I O N

Key Findings

Parents have continued to adjust their childcare arrangements
throughout the year

Prior to the pandemic, working parents had carefully constructed their Childcare Equation for their
young children. While families often adjust their Childcare Equation over time based on needs, these
are thoughtful decisions that take time and careful planning. However, due to a combination of childcare
provider closures, health and safety concerns, and workforce changes caused by COVID-19, the majority
of parents were forced to adjust quickly their childcare arrangement and look for alternative, temporary
solutions. In June, two-thirds of parents reported having to change their childcare arrangement since
March. Those arrangements were largely temporary – 60 percent of parents reported that they would
need to change their current arrangement sometime in the next 12 months. When parents were
surveyed again in August, most parents had yet to find a long-term solution, as 63 percent of parents
still expected to change their arrangement sometime in the next year. By October, the situation had
not changed, with 62 percent of parents reporting that they would need to change their arrangement
sometime in the next year. Due to the long-lasting effects of COVID-19, parents have found themselves
in a volatile situation around this most important decision about caring for young children.

At the beginning stages of the pandemic when most parents were quickly forced to find new childcare
arrangements, many parents opted to keep children at home, especially if they also transitioned to
working from home. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, 52 percent of working parents reported keeping
a child at home with a parent or guardian. In June, that number jumped to 75 percent, while the number
of parents with children at childcare centers dropped to 10 percent from 25 percent. Over the course of
the year, that trend continued.

F I G U R E 0 1
Percent of parents using each type of childcare arrangement

Child attended
a Head Start

program

Child attended
pre-K

Child stayed at
a licensed

childcare home

Child stayed
with a nanny/

au pair

Child attended
a childcare

center

Child stayed
with another

family member
or friend

Child stayed at
home with a

parent or
guardian

52%

75%

69%
73%

29% 28%

33%
30%

25%

11% 11% 10%
8% 7%

9% 9%

14%

9%
12%

9% 10%

2% 3%
5%

3% 2% 3%
4%

Pre- COVID-19 (n= 562)

Aug-20 (n = 550)

Jun-20 (n = 562)

Oct-20 (n = 515)

V O L . 0 6 / T H E I M P O R T A N C E O F C H I L D C A R E 7U . S . C H A M B E R O F C O M M E R C E F O U N D A T I O N

Childcare arrangements were changing in tandem with new work situations. By June, 79 percent
of employers reported shifting a significant part of the workforce to remote work. While this may
have made providing childcare easier for some, only a certain group of parents were afforded
this flexibility. High-income parents were much more likely to have transitioned to remote work; in
June, 73 percent of high-income parents reported working from home, compared to 24 percent
of low-income parents. Those parents who did not have the flexibility to work from home but still
had children at home explored alternatives such as taking unpaid leave or relying on extended
family members and friends. However, these solutions, which were intended to be temporary,
have become more permanent and less ideal as the pandemic drags on.

Working parents who have experienced unemployment are also struggling to find a long-term
solution. Of the working parents we surveyed that are currently unemployed, 80 percent have
children staying at home. Sixty-five percent report that they will likely need to change their
childcare arrangement in the next year, primarily because they will need to return to work.
However, lack of viable childcare solutions is impeding some parents from returning to work
altogether. One in four currently unemployed parents are unlikely to return to work, and three-
quarters of those parents cite childcare concerns as the reason they are unlikely to return.

For those parents who experienced unemployment and have now returned to work, many
have had to completely reconfigure their Childcare Equation due to a change in job demands.
Parents who worked in hard-hit industries such as retail or leisure and hospitality (where the
unemployment rate remains at 16.3% after a peak of 39.3% in April) 9 are now finding jobs in
new industries with a very different work environment. For example, many jobs added during
the pandemic, such as warehouse workers and customer service representatives,10 have non-
traditional hours that are often not conducive to typical childcare arrangements, especially for
single parents or dual-income homes that cannot alternate work hours.

of high-income parents
reported working from
home in June

of low-income parents
reported working from
home in June

73%
24%

9 Congressional Research Service. “Unemployment Rates During the
COVID-19 Pandemic: In Brief.” November 6, 2020. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/R46554.pdf

10 The Wall Street Journal. “Millions of Jobs Have Been Lost, but
Hiring Is Booming At These Companies.” Oct. 15, 2020. https://
www.wsj.com/articles/millions-of-jobs-have-been-lost-but-hiring-
is-booming-at-these-companies-11602768600.

V O L . 0 6 / T H E I M P O R T A N C E O F C H I L D C A R E 8U . S . C H A M B E R O F C O M M E R C E F O U N D A T I O N

Temporary changes are having long-lasting effects

Without long-term solutions for childcare arrangements, working parents are beginning to make
decisions that will have long-lasting effects on the workforce. As of October, 11 percent of parents
report declining a new opportunity, such as a promotion or a new job, to provide childcare in the last
three months, and six percent have left the workforce entirely. For those who have left the workforce
entirely, the primary reason was the inability to find childcare solutions that meet their needs (64%).
Twenty-nine percent reported not being able to afford childcare and 18 percent stated that they were
unable to find work.

Thirty-eight percent of working parents have yet to return to work, and 13 percent are either unlikely
or unsure whether they will return to work. While health and safety concerns are a factor in this
decision, the most common reason for those who are unlikely to return to work is childcare concerns.
For those that are unsure whether they will return, several factors may contribute to their decision,
including the decisions of their local school district. The majority of parents (58%) agree that the
decision of their local school district to adopt a remote learning model would influence their decision
to return to work. As of October, 20 percent of currently employed parents report that they will
likely quit their job if their school district adopts an online learning model. Thirty-four percent
report that they will need to reduce their hours, and 26 percent will need to find a new job.

Employers are also becoming increasingly concerned about their workforce’s ability to return fully to
work. In October, 32 percent of employers reported seeing employees leave the workforce due to
the effects of COVID-19. Additionally, 29 percent of employers reported seeing employees transition
to other employers. With so much volatility and uncertainty, 40 percent of employers are concerned
that some employees will not fully return to work (e.g. they will need or want to work less hours).
When asked what factors contribute to their employees leaving the workforce and seeking out other
employment, employers point to health concerns and childcare concerns as the primary factors,
which aligns with what parents themselves report.

“I am no longer able to work from home now
that I have four kids in three different schools.
My youngest is in pre-k and I have to do
school with him, as well as monitor the other
three. I am not able to work during the day as
I would have before the pandemic, where my
children were at school.”

– Single mother who has left the workforce

V O L . 0 6 / T H E I M P O R T A N C E O F C H I L D C A R E 9U . S . C H A M B E R O F C O M M E R C E F O U N D A T I O N

Industries are not impacted equally, as some of the most fundamental building blocks of the
U.S. economy are impacted at a greater rate than others – most notably education, healthcare,
and retail.11 Forty percent of employers in the education industry have seen employees leave
the workforce, and 61 percent of those education employers cite childcare concerns as a
contributing factor to that departure. Similarly, 41 percent of health care employers have seen
employees leave the workforce, and more than three-quarters of those employers point
to childcare concerns as a contributing factor. As might be expected, the majority of retail
employers have seen employees leave the workforce, primarily due to health/safety concerns
(68%), lack of desire to work (40%), and childcare concerns (28%).

F I G U R E 0 2
Percent of employers who have seen their employees do the
following due to COVID-19

F I G U R E 0 3
Percent of parents who report leaving the workforce for the
following reasons

11 IBIS World. Biggest Industries by Revenue in the US in 2020. https://www.
ibisworld.com/united-states/industry-trends/biggest-industries-by-revenue/.

Seek out other
employment

Leave the workforce

32%
29%

Cannot a�ord childcare

Desire to spend more time
with children

Health and safety concerns

Unable to find childcare
solutions that meet needs

58%

48%

35%

26%

V O L . 0 6 / T H E I M P O R T A N C E O F C H I L D C A R E 10U . S . C H A M B E R O F C O M M E R C E F O U N D A T I O N

Women are being disproportionately affected

Census data reported in August explained how the pandemic was disproportionately affecting women’s
current work situation,12 which is corroborated by our data. Women are more likely to have declined a
new job opportunity than men (13% vs. 7%) and more likely to have left the workforce (9% vs 2%). Among
women who have left the workforce, the majority report childcare concerns as their primary reason for
leaving. Only seven percent reported leaving because they no longer wanted to work. However, among
the two percent of men who left the workforce, zero reported childcare concerns as their reason for
leaving; instead, 100 percent left due to health and safety concerns.

In addition to the nine percent of women who have left the workforce, many more are at risk of leaving.
Seventeen percent of women are unsure or unlikely to return to work, compared to six percent of men.
Even for women who plan to return to work, their return is happening at a much slower rate than men. By
October, 77 percent of men had already returned to work, compared to 54 percent of women.

Trends among working parents follow the larger unemployment trends we have seen unfold throughout
the pandemic. Women are unemployed at a higher rate than men (9.5% vs. 8.6%), and the unemployment
rates for Black and Latina women are significantly higher (12.7% and 11.6%).13 Additionally, it is important
to note that 93 percent of childcare workers are women, and 45 percent are Black, Asian, or Latina.14
With two in five childcare centers certain they will close without additional public assistance,15 millions of
women are at risk of losing their jobs.

F I G U R E 0 4
Percent of working parents who have experienced the
following due to COVID-19

F I G U R E 0 5
Percent of working parents who have returned to work

12 U.S. Census Bureau. “Working Moms Bear Brunt of Home Schooling
While Working During COVID-19.” August 18, 2020. https://www.census.
gov/library/stories/2020/08/parents-juggle-work-and-child-care-during-
pandemic.html.

13 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Labor Force Statistics from the Current
Population Survey. E-16. “Unemployment rates by age, sex, race, and
Hispanic or Latino ethnicity.” https://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cpsee_e16.
html.

14 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Labor Force Statistics from the
Current Population Survey. E-11. “Employed persons by detailed
occupation, sex, race, and Hispanic or Latino ethnicity.” https://
www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat11.html.

15 NAEYC. “Holding On Until Help Comes.” July 13, 2020. https://
www.naeyc.org/sites/default/files/globally-shared/downloads/
PDFs/our-work/public-policy-advocacy/holding_on_until_help_
comes.survey_analysis_july_2020.pdf

Left the
workforce

Declined a new
opportunity

Laid o� or
furloughed

18%

13%

7%
9%

6%
Men

Women 54%

77%35%

Women

Men

V O L . 0 6 / T H E I M P O R T A N C E O F C H I L D C A R E 11U . S . C H A M B E R O F C O M M E R C E F O U N D A T I O N

Parents, providers, and employers are all looking for more
and better support

The effects of COVID-19 have left parents, childcare providers, and employers scrambling
and looking for solutions. However, the role that employers play in alleviating that burden is
still unclear. Seventy-one percent of employers feel that they provide adequate support for
employees with young children, primarily by adjusting workplace conditions such as flexible
work hours or remote work. However, just 38 percent of parents feel that their employer
provides any type of childcare assistance, benefits, or accommodations. One potential
reason for this discrepancy could be a difference in how benefits such as flexible work hours
or remote work are viewed. While many employers may see them as childcare supports,
that is not usually how they are communicated to employees or why they were originally
implemented. While it’s true that a large majority of employers shifted the workforce to
remote work in response to the effects of COVID-19, only 44 percent of those employers say
it was due in part to help with childcare assistance.

Employers and parents also differ on their perception of overall awareness of childcare
needs. Eighty-nine percent of employers feel that they are aware of the childcare needs of
their employees, compared to 73 percent of parents. Similarly, a lack of direct communication
could be a driving factor of this divergence. Most employers report gathering information
about childcare needs through informal feedback (62%); just 13 percent field surveys about
the topic and 11 percent hold formal feedback sessions. Additionally, nearly half of parents
report that their employer never talks about childcare or mentions it once or twice a year. This
creates an opportunity for employers who are becoming increasingly aware of their working
parents’ needs to create intentional systems for feedback.

F I G U R E 0 6
Percent of employers who agree with the following statement:
“I am willing to increase our organization’s investment in childcare needs.”

20%

Agree

Neither Agree,
Nor Disagree

45%

Disagree

35%

V O L . 0 6 / T H E I M P O R T A N C E O F C H I L D C A R E 12U . S . C H A M B E R O F C O M M E R C E F O U N D A T I O N

As the majority of employers feel that they are aware of childcare needs and providing adequate
support, they are largely hesitant to offer additional childcare assistance. Twenty percent of
employers are willing to increase their organization’s investment in childcare needs, while 45
percent are unsure about taking that approach, and 35 percent are unwilling. Employers who
are willing to expand their investment believe it helps them to retain a strong workforce, improve
employee productivity, and attract new employees. Those employers unwilling to invest more
in childcare are mostly constrained by funds or resources (72%). As employers consider their
options for providing childcare assistance, they should also consider the financial implications of
not meeting the childcare needs of their employees. With 13 percent of working parents unlikely
or unsure whether they will return to work primarily because of childcare concerns, employers
are facing significant costs related to employee turnover if those concerns are not resolved. By
seeking feedback from employees to understand specific needs, employers can make informed
decisions about the costs of providing and not providing additional childcare assistance.

However, there are a few scenarios in which employers would be willing to increase their
investment. Almost half (48%) of employers would be likely to offer additional childcare assistance
if the government provided additional incentives (e.g., tax benefits or subsidies). When the need
is greater and inclusive of more employees, employers are more willing to provide assistance.
Specifically, 37 percent of employers would be willing to offer additional assistance if more than 20
percent of their employees cannot return to work due to childcare concerns; the number of willing
employers drops to 27 percent when only 10-20 percent of their employees are kept from work
because of childcare accessibility.

When considering what additional assistance to provide, employers should survey their workforce
to better understand their unique needs. Generally, working parents have varied views on the most
important childcare benefits for an employer to offer. Thirty-six percent …

MILITARY MEDICINE, 180, 12:1247, 2015

Research on U.S. Military Women: Recruitment and Retention
Challenges and Strategies

CDR Lisa A. Braun, NC USN; COL Holly P. Kennedy, AN USA (Ret.);
Lois S. Sadler, PhD, PNP-BC, FAAN; Jane Dixon, PhD

ABSTRACT Objectives: To examine literature on recruitment and retention of military women in research studies as
an underrepresented, and potentially marginalized, population. Methods: A literature search was conducted to examine
challenges, identify potential barriers and facilitators, and to inform strategies for recruitment and retention of military
women in research studies. This search was supplemented by findings in military-specific databases and discussions with
Military Women’s Health Research Interest Group subject matter experts. Results: Ten articles addressed research recruit-
ment and retention challenges and strategies in marginalized/underrepresented populations, providing an effective context
to inform research recruitment and retention in military settings. Research with military women is often challenged by
logistical, cultural, social, ethical, and methodological issues, which may hinder exploration of potentially sensitive issues.
Discussion: Researchers must consider military-specific challenges to conducting research that include lengthy deployments,
unpredictable military exercises, and foreign assignments, in accessing research participants. A case example shows
strategies used in a military cervical cancer screening study. Conclusion: There are few published articles specific to
research recruitment and retention in female military populations. Available resources broadly address recruitment
challenges for Veterans, marginalized, hard-to-access, and transient research participants, which may provide guidance
and strategies for success when applied to military populations.

INTRODUCTION
Policy changes since 1975 have provided increased opportuni-
ties for women to serve in active duty (AD) military positions
previously closed to them. The transition to an all volunteer
U.S. Armed Forces, coupled with recent regulations lifting
the ban on women serving in combat positions, have resulted
in a significant increase in young females serving in opera-
tional positions where health care was initially designed for
male service members.1 In 1973, women represented approxi-
mately 1.6% of the U.S. AD military forces.2 Department of
Defense (DoD) data indicate that women currently represent
199,584, 15.16% (16.68% officers and 14.83% enlisted) of the
active military force.3 An additional 18.2% of 848,302 com-
prise Reserve and National Guard forces.4

Understanding women’s perceptions and challenges about
navigating and receiving gender-specific care in the military
health care system is important for the development of military
health policy. However, military women are underrepresented
in research and there are few such studies that examine their
unique health care needs.5 Methods for recruitment and reten-
tion of female military personnel in research are sparse in the
literature. Recruitment challenges may constrain researchers
from accessing this hard-to-reach population.

BACKGROUND
The U.S. military has made significant progress integrating
women into global operational positions over the past four
decades. However, this enhanced integration poses gender-
specific health care delivery challenges.5–8 The DoD and
Veteran’s Health Administration (VHA) have launched calls
to action to examine gaps and increase research efforts to
understand and improve military women’s health care services
across the life spectrum.5,6,9 The U.S. military has mandatory
regulations directing its members to maintain 100% medical
readiness at all times. This readiness includes routine health
care screenings (cervical cancer screening [CCS], mammograms,
and annual periodic health assessments) and recommended
follow-up care. Health care is provided at no charge to its
members; however, it can occur in remote, medically austere
areas by a diverse group of health care providers with vary-
ing levels of knowledge and experience, particularly with
women’s health issues. At times, the health care provider
may also be a coworker. Care delivered in areas with limited
privacy for confidential exchanges may hinder discussion of
sensitive, gender-specific concerns or screening test results.

Other factors related to the military health care experience
include rank differentiation between the provider and patient,
which may deter military members from questioning care;
cultural and health beliefs influencing access, understanding,
and health care experiences; lack of family and social support;
and lack of availability of resources to fully appreciate the
implication of diagnosed conditions or abnormal laboratory
test findings.10 Transient situations that are often encoun-
tered in military populations (military duty station reloca-
tions and deployments) may diminish health care access and
may inadvertently delay timely diagnosis notification, and

School of Nursing, Yale University, 400 West Campus Drive, Orange,
CT 06477.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors. The
information or content and conclusions do not necessarily reflect or
represent the official policy or position of, nor should any official
endorsement be inferred by the TriService Nursing Research Program, the
Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, the Department of
the Navy, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

doi: 10.7205/MILMED-D-14-00601

MILITARY MEDICINE, Vol. 180, December 2015 1247

D
ow

nloaded from
https://academ

ic.oup.com
/m

ilm
ed/article/180/12/1247/4160635 by guest on 09 Septem

ber 2020

follow-up care of preventive screening abnormalities.11

Research studies to understand and improve health care out-
comes, may prove challenging in military populations who are
deployed to foreign locations, who change duty stations, or
who are assigned to areas that lack adequate communication
capabilities. Factors that potentially impact research recruitment
and retention of study participants in military populations may
also present similar challenges for conducting research activ-
ities in other unique, underrepresented, and/or marginalized
populations who may feel unable or unwilling to participate
or who feel coerced to participate in research activities.

Military and Veteran women have been underrepresented
in research examining their health care delivery experiences
and military service effects on overall health.7,8 Yano et al12

examined published research in the Veterans population and
found women Veterans represent a small population of patients
receiving care in the VHA. Their small numbers may lead to
exclusion from studies that can improve their health care
experience and outcomes. Greater numbers of women trans-
itioning from AD service into the VHA will result in an
increased need for research examining gender-specific needs.
This literature review was conducted to examine the existing
evidence on recruitment and retention challenges and strate-
gies for involving U.S. military women in research.

METHODS
There are a few published articles discussing particular
methods for designing studies and conducting research with
U.S. military women. Acknowledging this deficit, the literature
search was expanded to include characteristics of underrepre-
sented or marginalized populations who are often: (1) hard-
to-access, (2) transitory, and (3) small in numbers.13 These
characteristics are not mutually exclusive, but many are
common to women serving in certain military settings.
Research involving women serving in remote locations or in
deployable positions (ship-based, war zones) may introduce
additional challenges.6 Methods used by researchers for
inclusion of women in research with Veterans were also
considered to inform strategies for research recruitment with
AD military women.

Literature Search Strategies
A search was conducted to retrieve publications from 2009
to 2015 in the following computerized databases: PubMed,
Ovid (MEDLINE), Google Scholar, PsycINFO, Embase, and
Scopus. The search was supplemented by findings in military-
specific databases containing military women’s health publica-
tions and discussions with Military Women’s Health Research
Interest Group subject matter experts. The key words used
during the search included: “women,” “female,” “vulnerable,”
“marginalized,” “military personnel,” “research,” and “recruit-
ment”. Vulnerable was used as a proxy for marginalized since
few studies were found using this specific term. Inclusion
criteria included articles in English, published in a peer-

reviewed journal, research conducted entirely in the United
States and described research that examined methods to
improve research recruitment and retention among women
generally underrepresented, marginalized, or military com-
munities in clinical studies.

RESULTS
The initial search returned 202 articles. Studies examining
research recruitment and retention techniques among elderly,
children, incarcerated, and physically and mentally incapaci-
tated were excluded from consideration, since the goal for
this was to mirror characteristics of AD military women.
Ten articles from military (1), Veterans (1), and nonmilitary
(8) populations specifically provided context to inform research
recruitment and retention in military settings. Two system-
atic reviews published in 2006 and 2011 summarized military
and Veteran women’s health research were also considered
for research recruitment and retention strategies.7,8

In 1994, a Congressional directive mandated that women
be included in DoD-sponsored research and the Defense
Women’s Health Research Center was created for “multi-
disciplinary and multi-institutional research” on military
women’s health issues.14 U.S. military women remain mar-
ginalized in research specifically examining health care deliv-
ery related to gender and service-related exposures/injuries.5

The 2011 and 2006 reviews on women Veterans’ health
research identified 377 studies over the last three decades
(195 in the 5-year period between 2004 and 2008). A major
theme of the studies centered on assessment and utilization
of care by women Veterans. A key finding was the need for
both gender-specific care and continuity of care at VHA and
other military health care delivery systems. The findings indi-
cated ongoing barriers to comprehensive health care access
throughout the VHA and DoD systems for military women
and the need for active and ongoing inclusion of military
women in health research. A number of researchers have
addressed the underrepresentation of women in military
and Veteran studies, which impact health care delivery and
quality outcomes.15–17 Although the authors acknowledged
the need for inclusion of military women in health research,
limited strategies were discussed on how to effectively recruit
and retain military women into research.

Ten relevant articles addressing research recruitment and
retention strategies within marginalized and/or underrepre-
sented populations were identified (Table I). Bush et al18

described recruitment and attrition issues in military clinical
trials and health care research and examined literature
reporting overall recruitment, retention, and attrition rates
among military personnel in research studies. The authors
also reviewed literature on successful strategies in general
population research as applied to military populations. They
identified certain strategies as simply not practical in tran-
sient military populations. In addition to the unpredictable
duty obligations, the DoD has strict guidance on both
compensation for and participation by military members

MILITARY MEDICINE, Vol. 180, December 20151248

Challenges in Research Recruitment of U.S. Military Women

D
ow

nloaded from
https://academ

ic.oup.com
/m

ilm
ed/article/180/12/1247/4160635 by guest on 09 Septem

ber 2020

TABLE I. Research Strategies for Recruitment and Retention of U.S. Military Women in Research Studies (2009–2015)

Year/Author(s) Purpose Demographics
Recruitment/Retention Strategies

and Barriers

2011/Bondurant et al32 Increase Recruitment of Rural
and Disparate Populations
With High Minority Populations
and Historically Low Participation
in Research Studies

Rural, Minority Populations
Requiring Access to
Breast Cancer Screenings

Vans to Rural Sites to Improve
Research Access

2013/Bush et al18 To Explore Literature on Military
Recruitment and Retention Issues

Military Populations Military Literature is Largely
Devoid of Analyses of
Service Member Recruitment
and Attrition Issues.

Military Less Likely to Seek Novel
Medical Research Interventions

Free Health care Leads to Less
Motivation to Participate in Research

Logistics Include Difficulties With
Transportation, Unpredictable
Work Hours, and Release From Duty

Highly Transient and Mobile Population
Service Members Considered
Vulnerable Population

Scrutiny About Incentives and
Coercion by Chain of Command

Frequent Service Mandated Health
Screening and Assessments Related
to War Zone Exposures Resulted
in Volunteer Burnout

2010/Cepeda and Valdez38 Improve Tracking and
Retention in a Longitudinal
Study in Marginalized Population

Mexican-American Noninjecting
Users of Heroin

Detailed Locator Form Documentation
for Follow-Up Visits and Interviews

Follow-Up Tracking Bulletin Boards.
Appointment, Thank You, and
Reminder Mailings

Birthday Card Mails
Project “Brown” Raffle (Incentives)
Personal Visits/Phone Calls.
Institutional Database Resources to
Locate Participants Lost to Research
Study Follow-Up

2014/Fouad et al22 Improve Retention and Adherence
of Women Randomized
Controlled Trial Abnormal CCS

Rural Low-Income
Minority Women

Use of Trained CHA

2013/Getrich et al30 Identify Strategies for Successfully
Recruiting and Retaining Diverse
Racial/Ethnic Communities Into
Practice-Based Research Networks
Research Studies

African American, Arab/Chaldean,
Chinese, Hispanic, and
Native American

Practice-Based Research Networks
Flexible Strategies
Engagement With Clinic and Community
Partners to Improve Participation

2012/Williams et al43 Describes Challenges With Conducting
Military-Funded Research Studies

N/A Delays in Military and Civilian
IRB Approvals,

Required Documents Unrelated to
Protection of Human Subjects

On-Site Study PIs,
Significant Resources Committed to
Nonstudy Training

2006/Yancey et al19a Explores Literature on Research
Recruitment Strategies in
Underrepresented Populations

African American, Latino/Hispanic,
American Indian/Native American

Distrust a Central Barrier to Participation
Community Involvement to Increase
Trust and Participant Enrollment

Retention Improved With Continued
Engagement With Population

Community Methods Costly Compared
to Conventional Approaches

Community Involvement
Incentives and Logistical Issues

(continued)

MILITARY MEDICINE, Vol. 180, December 2015 1249

Challenges in Research Recruitment of U.S. Military Women

D
ow

nloaded from
https://academ

ic.oup.com
/m

ilm
ed/article/180/12/1247/4160635 by guest on 09 Septem

ber 2020

during duty hours that can impact their contribution in
research. Challenges, strategies for recruitment and retention
are discussed below.

Recruitment and Retention Challenges
and Strategies
Marginalized groups can be hard-to-access, transitory, and
disempowered and/or disengaged from social situations, which
can impact their life trajectory and ability to engage in
research.13 Women, ethnic, and racial minorities serving in
the U.S. Armed Forces represent a smaller percentage of
military personnel. A number of military members come
from other countries where language and culture may further
complicate active research participation and complicate
recruitment efforts. In 2012, the ethnic composition of the
1,388,028 AD military personnel was non-Hispanic/white
(63%), black (16%), Hispanic (11%), Asian (4%), and other
ethnicities at smaller percentages including other/unknown
(6%). The military population is relatively young; 43% are
25 years or younger.4 Youth provides its own challenges
since most younger military service members live in military

barracks or aboard ships. These locations may prove difficult
for researchers to gain access and meet with potential partic-
ipants, without prior approval. In addition, the ability to par-
ticipate in research is potentially hampered by deployments,
change of duty stations (difficulty with longitudinal studies or
follow-up contact), and unpredictable obligations of military
duty (training exercises, duty watch).

The recruitment challenges that plague research efforts in
the general population may also present similar challenges
in the multicultural military environment. Learning the needs
of this population and developing a level of trust can encour-
age collaboration and ease fears among military commands,
researchers, and potential research participants.19 This strat-
egy is similar in scope to the community-engaged research
approach, which stresses early engagement in the research
process as partners, stakeholders, and key informants.20

Recruitment strategies should address: (1) use of peer research
advisors and development of collaborative relationship; (2) logis-
tical barriers (childcare, transportation, lost to follow-up, access,
and communication); (3) incentives; (4) Investigational Review
Board (IRB) issues; and (5) researcher-specific issues such as
power differential between researcher and participant, and

TABLE I. Continued

Year/Author(s) Purpose Demographics
Recruitment/Retention Strategies

and Barriers

Modification of Research Material to
Respond to Targeted Population

Mass Mailings
2010/Yano et al9 Strategies for Improving Recruitment

Among Women Veterans That
Historically Been Excluded
in Research

Women Veterans Exclusion of Women From Research
Initiatives due to Their Smaller Numbers

Incentives to Add Women to Projects
Ongoing Funding of Gender-Specific

Research—Research Access Hampered
by Work/Childcare Obligations.

Increase Hours for Participation
Childcare Provisions

2011/Reel42 Protection of the Safety and Dignity
of Vulnerable Research Participants

Vulnerable Research Participants Vulnerable Research Participants
Safeguards in Research Participation
Ethics Review in Vulnerable Populations
Participant Beliefs and Cultural Values as

a Source of Vulnerability
Less Obvious Vulnerabilities
Fluctuating Nature of Vulnerabilities
Informed Consent With

Vulnerable Populations
Study Designs in Vulnerable Populations
Research Participants’ Rights

2012/Cook33 Use of Email Interviewing in
Vulnerable Populations

Women With Viral Sexually
Transmitted Infections

Email Interviewing in Conducting
Research and Data Collection Where
Face-To-Face Participation is Difficult

Improves Inclusion of Others That may
be Excluded From Research due to
Geographical Distance, Clinician
Gate-Keeping, Desire for Anonymity,
and Incompatible Time Frames

aSystematic review outside literature review data inclusion.

MILITARY MEDICINE, Vol. 180, December 20151250

Challenges in Research Recruitment of U.S. Military Women

D
ow

nloaded from
https://academ

ic.oup.com
/m

ilm
ed/article/180/12/1247/4160635 by guest on 09 Septem

ber 2020

structural issues that contribute to military members being
defined by ethicists as a marginalized population.

Use of Peer Research Advisors and Development
of Collaborative Relationship

The use of trained peer research advisors has been effective
in recruitment, particularly in marginalized, underserved,
and hard-to-access populations that are generally mistrustful
of outside researchers. Abrams21 describes hard-to-access
populations as homeless, institutionalized, incarcerated, and
transient individuals, among others. Fouad et al22 trained
volunteer community health advisors (CHA) to recruit rural
low-income minority women into a randomized controlled
trial on abnormal CCS. Well-respected and trusted individ-
uals were identified in the community of interest. They were
trained on CHA activities and received compensation for
their volunteer time, as well as monetary compensation for
each study participant recruited into the study. The use of
CHAs proved beneficial in reaching recruitment goals. The
compensation, however, for military CHA equivalents would
need to be in compliance with DoD and IRB regulations.
Military personnel are also broadly defined as transient and
captive populations by virtue of being part of a defined and
proscribed military structure. Remote locations, such as
overseas/shipboard deployment, can often impede access to
recruitment of research participants. Examining recruitment
challenges and strategies to satisfy recruitment challenges
for difficult-to-access, hard-to-reach populations would best
inform military research recruitment strategies.

In addition to a military equivalent CHA (peer recruiter),
word-of-mouth recruitment and snowball sampling may also
help to identify, locate, and engage participants, but could also
introduce a degree of bias, threatening the generalizability of
findings.23–25 Involving peer recruiters as advisors who are
similar to military sample needed for the research study can
minimize challenges related to suspicion, mistrust, and aver-
sion to authority (particularly among military personnel) that
may jeopardize recruitment efforts.26 Previous negative health
care system experiences or research processes may hinder
recruitment.27,28 Recruitment posters, if used, should be
designed to provide concise information about the purpose
and aims of the study using easy to follow terms.29

The community-engaged research approach model stresses
identifying and working with community leaders has proven
successful in previous recruitment efforts.20,30 Getrich et al30

found that collaboration with community leaders and close
engagement with clinic and community partners lays a foun-
dation of trust that improves recruitment and leads to suc-
cessful research initiatives. This foundation of trust is best
supported by communication and discussions with command
leaders, senior military representatives, and enlisted members
who best match with potential participants. A full description
of the study purpose, aims, design, and any expected disrup-
tion to military unit activities is essential for gaining their sup-
port at the beginning of the research design, can potentially

avoid costly delays, and lead to successful research endeavors
that have the capacity to improve health outcomes and quality
of life among the military command’s members. Sharing of
findings with the participants and command leaders, while
maintaining confidentiality, demonstrates a level of sincerity
and may gain added confidence between the researcher, the
research setting, and the research participant.30,31

Logistics and Communication Barriers

These strategies should address issues of transportation, access,
childcare, and loss to follow-up (communication and inaccu-
rate contact data). Studies have examined the use of portable
vans to improve research access.32 The use of vans to reach
potential research participants has resulted in a greater inclu-
sion of racial minority populations. This may prove useful
for military members, particularly younger individuals with
no transportation and who are stationed in barracks or ship-
based quarters. The cost of obtaining a van, however, may
be prohibitive given research-funding constraints. The use of
email or telephone interviewing, social networking such as
Facebook, voice mail or texting may enhance communication
access.33–35Additionally, meeting potential participants in a
convenient location or use of workplace and practice-based
focus groups may circumvent transportation barriers.36,37

Use of focus groups, however, may not be feasible for more
sensitive issues.

The barriers to research participation associated with
childcare care can be addressed in several ways, which include
meeting the research participant in their home or other des-
ignated area(s). Yano et al12 discussed the extension of
hours for participation, as well as offering on-site childcare
for interested research participants.

Loss to follow-up is an area of concern in transient, hard-
to-access, and military populations (deployment or changing
of duty station issues), which can markedly constrain longitu-
dinal studies. Inadequate access to telephone and other com-
munication, as well as inaccurate contact information, may
jeopardize research endeavors.18,38 Successful retention of
research participants should include maintaining complete,
accurate, and confidential contact information and alternate
forms of contact for individuals who are remote, or/are
mobility challenged.34,39 The use of reminder mailings, bul-
letin boards, personal visits, institutional database resources,
and comprehensive and accurate locator information can pro-
mote adherence to study protocols.19,38 Newer methods and
resources for improving recruitment strategies draw on multi-
media approaches, such as telephone interviewing, anony-
mous online surveys, Facebook, and Twitter.34,35

Incentives

24 USC 30 provides guidance governing monetary compen-
sation for military participation in research studies while on
duty and are limited to blood donation with a maximum
compensation of $50 per blood draw.40 The compensation

MILITARY MEDICINE, Vol. 180, December 2015 1251

Challenges in Research Recruitment of U.S. Military Women

D
ow

nloaded from
https://academ

ic.oup.com
/m

ilm
ed/article/180/12/1247/4160635 by guest on 09 Septem

ber 2020

guidelines differ for military members on leave during the
time of participation.

Incentives, when permitted, have been a successful avenue
for improving recruitment.41 Incentives include both monetary
and nonmonetary compensation. Incentives may often provide
reimbursement for expenses and compensation for time and
effort to attract individuals that may not otherwise participate
in the research. However, the incentives should not in them-
selves act as a form of coercion (undue influence), particularly
among economically disadvantaged populations.42 For some
potential participants, the act of taking part in research is seen
as a way to help others, and may serve as a motivation for
participation, where they are contributing to something posi-
tive for future populations. The IRB at the research site can
provide further guidance on rules on research incentives.

Appropriate compensation should be determined locally
and within the context of the efforts required by the study
participants. The researcher should consult ethics boards and
community partners to determine compensation rates. Stake-
holders or military personnel reflective of the population to
be studied could serve as advisors, about types of incentives
that might be used within DoD parameters. Under and over
compensation can lead to selection bias depending on the
amount of the compensation offered.41 A particular concern
regarding the use of incentives is the added cost to the overall
budgeted research plan, which may not be feasible in many
unfunded or underfunded research endeavors.

IRB Oversight

Delays in military and civilian IRB approvals, including
documents unrelated to protection of human subjects, need
for an on-site principal investigator (PI), the significant cost
of resources committed to nonstudy training that falls out-
side IRB review, and human subject protection, can delay
research progress and lead to loss of study participants, par-
ticularly in longitudinal studies.43 The researcher should
have a clear awareness of the research site’s IRB processes,
particularly participant recruitment and retention policies.
Prior knowledge of these processes allows for development
of a realistic timeline and successful research progression.

Researcher-Specific Issues

Power and rank differences may inadvertently coerce potential
participants in military populations to engage in the research.44

Coercion is the inappropriate influence of one individual over
another, generally one in higher rank or power position that
unduly pressures another individual to act accordingly to a
request.45 Undue influence, also related to power/rank situa-
tions, has similar outcomes to coercion. Coercion to induce
participation in research is unethical. Participants may feel
pressured to participate if the researcher is within the partici-
pant’s chain of command or direct health care provider.42,46

The researcher can mitigate ethical challenges related to
coercion by providing full and honest disclosure of their
interest in the research, the role of the participant, and the

position held by the researcher. Communication style, knowl-
edge, and attitudes can play significant roles in whether an
individual chooses to become a research participant.47 The
researcher must fully and effectively disclose the purpose of
the study to potential participants and available to answer
questions about participation. Full disclosure is an ethical
and moral consideration.

The researcher should have a full awareness and appreci-
ation of the potential tensions in the researcher–participant
relationship. Power differentials between research participant
and researcher may arise in the course of the study.48 Effec-
tive communications can diffuse potential power differences.
The potential participant must be assured that participation
is voluntary and the decision to continue or not continue in
the study will not …

Report on the Impact of Deployment of Members of

the Armed Forces on Their Dependent Children

October 2010

Department of Defense

Departmen of Defense

The Impacts o the Armed
Forces on Their Dependent Children

Report to the Senate and ttees on Armed Services

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 Section 571

f Deployment of Deployed Members of

House Commi
Pursuant to

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS i

LIST OF TABLES ii

LIST OF FIGURES Ii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1

BACKGROUND 4

1. INTRODUCTION 4

2. PARENTAL DEPLOYMENT AND MILITARY CHILDREN —
DEMOGRAPHIC OVERVIEW

3. THE IMPACT OF PARENTAL DEPLOYMENTS ON CHILDREN

4. RETURNING WOUNDED WARRIOR PARENTS AND CHILDREN

5. DEATH OF DEPLOYED SERVICE MEMBER PARENTS AND
CHILDREN

6. PARENTAL DEPLOYMENT AND CHILDREN WITH
PREEXISTING PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS

7. PARENTAL DEPLOYMENT AND FAMILY RISK FACTORS

8. RECOMMENDATIONS 54

APPENDIX A: REFERENCES A-1

APPENDIX B: DMDC SURVEY RESULTS OF CHILDREN’S
BEHAVIORAL CHANGES DURING DEPLOYMENT

B-1

APPENDIX C: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS C-1

LIST OF TABLES

Page
Table 1. Child Outcomes in Recent Studies on the Impact of Deployment

on Children by Age Group
18

Table 2. Five Factors for Helping Children Cope with Parental
Deployment

Table 3. Large Scale Research Efforts to Study the Impact of
Deployment on Children

Table 4. Trend Data of Substantiated Child Abuse per 1,000 within DoD 48

LIST OF FIGURES

Page
Figure 1. Military Families with Children by Component (Active Duty &

Reserve Component)
11

Figure 2. Age Distribution of Military Children Age 18 or younger 12

Figure 3. Percentages of Dual-Military Couples and Single Parents
Trends: 2000-2009 by Service Component

Figure 4. Percentages of Single Parents by Gender and Service
Component

Figure 5. The Age Distribution of Children of the Deceased Service
Members

Figure 6. Age of Child Most Impacted by Service Member’s Recent
Deployment (Data from ADSS 2008 and RCSS 2008)

Figure 7. Children’s Coping with Deployment by Component (Data from
ADSS 2008 and RCSS 2008)

Figure 8. The number of Deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq of Service
Member Parents by Component

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since October 2001, the world in which American military children grow up has been
changed dramatically by unprecedented levels of deployment tempo and the increased
reliance on Reserve and Guard members. To date, a total of over 2.1 million American
men and women in uniform have deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Of those Service members, approximately
100,000 — 44 percent — are parents. Of those deployed Service member parents, 48
percent have served at least two tours in Iraq and Afghanistan. Not since the Vietnam
War have so many U.S. military families been affected by deployment-related family
separation, combat injury, and death. With the U.S. involvement in the conflicts in
Afghanistan and Iraq ongoing, there is a deep concern over parental deployment and its
impact on the well-being of military children. To better understand the current state of
how military children cope with parental deployment, the Department conducted a
comprehensive assessment of the impact of military deployment on children based on a
review of available studies and survey data from OEF/OIF. Research from previous
conflicts and relevant civilian literature were also included in the review.

Key Findings

Below are the key findings from available studies based on OEF/OIF data reviewed in
this report:

Children’s Coping with Parental Deployment:

• Children’s reactions to deployment-related parental absence vary by age,
developmental stage, and other individual and family factors. While young
children are likely to exhibit externalizing behavior such as anger and attention
difficulties, school-age children demonstrate more internalizing behaviors, such as
increased levels of anxiety and fear, sensitivity to media coverage, and reduced
school performance. While adolescents often take household responsibilities and
become more independent, they were more likely to experience declining
academic performance, depressive symptoms, and behavioral problems in
response to emotional stress.

• Though the focus of recent studies has shifted to older children’s adjustment to

parental deployment, young children (infants and preschoolers) are still most
impacted by parental deployment. Most recent studies have indicated that
adolescent girls were more likely to encounter more challenges overall than boys.

• The non-deployed parent/caregiver’s psychological health is positively associated

with children’s successful coping with deployment-related stress. This finding
suggests that programs for the non-deployed spouses may indirectly but

powerfully contribute to the well-being of children of the deployed Service
members.

• The majority of military children demonstrated a high level of resilience to
successfully cope with parental deployments. Despite strong support networks in
military and civilian communities, the knowledge and resources to promote
resiliency of military families and children are not centrally available.

• The literature on children of war veterans suggested that children of wounded

Service members are at risk for emotional and behavioral problems. Longitudinal
studies are needed to understand the long-term effects of living with the wounded
Service member parents.

• There is no published comprehensive research on the impact of parental death on
military children; civilian research on child bereavement has mixed results.
Future research is necessary to better understand the trajectory of military
children’s bereavement over the span of childhood using a longitudinal study
design.

• Though recent studies have found the linkage between parental deployment and

the increase in child maltreatment, the generalizability of the findings need to be
validated with more representative samples.

Family diversity and the impact of deployment on children:
• Despite their increasing presence in the U.S. military, children of dual-military

couples and single family parents have not been the primary subject of assessment
or research. More data analyses are necessary to understand the unique needs and
challenges that children of these subgroups of military families might experience
in face of parental deployment.

• There is no systematic research on how factors affecting child adjustment during
deployment (e.g., preexisting psychological conditions, single military parents,
children with disabilities) interact with deployment-related stress in the process of
child adjustment.

Recommendations

A set of recommendations derived from the research and data reviewed in this report are
summarized briefly below:

1. Increase the efficacy of research efforts pertaining to the impact of parental

deployment on children.

1.1 Coordinate among the Services, Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), other

federal agencies, and partnering universities doing similar research to reduce
duplication of research efforts and promote collaboration among researchers.

1.2 Create a communication channel or centralized repository for tracking
planned research projects, those in progress, and active research
solicitations.

2. Address the diversity in military families and other relevant family factors in

research to promote a more complete understanding of how military children
cope with deployment-related family separation.

2.1 Assess the needs, concerns, and challenges faced by children of non-

traditional military families, including single military parents, dual-military
couples, and blended families. The effects of maternal deployment should
be also investigated as well.

2.2 Systematic research is required to examine how family factors (e.g.,

children with preexisting psychological conditions, children with
disabilities), which were identified as potential risk factors in child
adjustment to parental deployments, affect children’s coping with
deployment-related stress.

Family separation due to deployment is a major life event, which could cause a great deal
of stress for military children. Though available published research relies heavily on
cross-sectional research, there are promising ongoing studies that will allow us to capture
the fluid process of child adjustment to parental deployment over time. The
recommendations provided in this report represents how future research in this field
should be guided to effectively inform us for the development of policies and programs
for the support of military families and children.

BACKGROUND

This report is pursuant to Section 571 of the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2010, which requires the Secretary of Defense to submit to
the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a
report on the result of a comprehensive assessment of the impacts of military deployment
on the dependent children of deployed members of the Armed Forces.

1. INTRODUCTION

As the U.S. involvement in the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan has stretched
into its ninth year, there is a deep concern about parental deployment and its impact on
the well-being of children in American society. In today’s U.S. military, as an all-
volunteer force, men and women in uniform are more likely to be married and have
children. Though there is extensive literature on the effects of parental absence due to
changes in the family such as parental divorce, illness, death, and incarceration, little is
known about the effects of parental absence created by work requirements. Among
work-related parental absence, military deployment stands out due to its unique
characteristics, including the frequency, duration, hazardous nature of deployment, and
special societal values attributed to military service.

DoD recognized the vulnerable position of military children facing parental deployments
and made it a top priority to help enhance their resiliency. To help us better address
military children’s needs, this report reviews research findings from over 170 studies on
the impact of parental deployment on military children and provides recommendations
drawn from the findings. To shed light on unique challenges posed by the current
conflicts, this report focuses on the recent studies examining the impact of deployment on
children whose Service members were deployed to or in support of OEF/OIF. This
report also draws upon family demographic data of deployed Service members and
relevant findings from the 2008 DoD Active Duty Spouse Survey, managed by Defense
Manpower Data Center (DMDC).

Approach to the Assessment

The DoD was tasked with conducting a comprehensive assessment of the impact of
military deployment on children and reporting the findings to Congress within 12
months. Within this time line, DoD conducted an assessment using the following three
secondary data sources:

• The peer-reviewed academic literature and relevant government reports on the
impact of military deployment on children in OEF/OIF.

• Attitudinal survey data from DMDC

• Ongoing research projects

The initial literature search was conducted to systematically understand what we know
about the impact of deployment on children by age group and by family composition.
The scope of the initial literature search was limited to peer-reviewed academic articles
examining the data from OEF/OIF, published between 2003 and 2010. The search was
carried out through searches in databases such as EBSCO, JSTOR, PubMed, ProQuest,
Ingenta, and other academic online databases, using combinations of the keywords such
as “(military) deployment,” “family separation,” “children of military personnel,” “the
impact of deployment,” “Traumatic Brain Injury,” “posttraumatic stress syndrome,”
“resilience,” “military children,” “adolescents,” “preschoolers,” “school-age children,”
and “psychological conditions.”

The initial search identified approximately 40 highly relevant studies published after
2001. Then, the search was expanded to literature with a high level of topical relevancy
from previous conflicts and to governmental reports and book chapters. These searches
identified approximately 70 articles and reports. The Office of Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Health Affairs) also conducted an independent literature search and review for
this report.

In addition to the initial search, through the DoD/Department of Agriculture (USDA)
Partnership, a team of researchers from the University of Arizona and Pennsylvania State
University conducted an additional literature search and literature review for this report.
Their search included academic literature and government publications from previous
conflicts. These researchers also scanned the grant databases and gathered information
about ongoing research in this field. In total, over 170 academic studies and government
reports have been reviewed in this assessment.

The assessment team also utilized demographic data and attitudinal survey data from
DMDC to provide current demographic data on deployed Service members and their
families as well as relevant large-scale attitudinal data drawn from both Active and
Reserve component members and their spouses. The demographic data include the
number of Service members deployed to OEF/OIF, the frequency and the length of
deployment, the age distribution of children of deployed Service members, and the
numbers of children of the wounded/injured/ill/fallen and their age distribution. Such
demographic data help us comprehend the magnitude of the issues regarding military
deployment and children. This report also examined DMDC survey data on special
populations of military families, such as single parents and dual-military couples, in
which the impacts of deployment on children may well be greater than in military-
civilian couples with children. Relevant survey items from the 2008 Active Duty Spouse
Survey and the November 2009 Status of Force Survey were analyzed to assess the
impact of deployment on children living in different family environments.

In addition to existing literature and demographic and survey data, this report also
incorporates on-going research studies to describe the current state of assessment efforts
driven by both civilian and military researchers.

Though there are a wide range of psychological health and family programs, which may
directly or indirectly mitigate the impact of deployment on military children, this report
focuses on a review of available survey data and peer-reviewed academic literature.
Assessing the effectiveness of those DoD programs that support the well-being of
military children is beyond the scope of this report.

The Organization of This Report

The chapters in this report are organized around the following six topics regarding the
impact of parental deployment on children as identified in NDAA 2010 Section 571:

(1) The impact that separation due to the deployment of a military parent or parents
has on children.

(2) The impact that multiple deployments of a military parent or parents have on
children.

(3) The impact that the return from deployment of a severely wounded or injured
military parent or parents has on children.

(4) The impact that the death of a military parent or parents in connection with a
deployment has on children.

(5) The impact that deployment of a military parent or parents has on children with
preexisting psychological conditions, such as anxiety and depression.

(6) The impact that deployment of a military parent or parents has on risk factors,
such as child abuse, child neglect, family violence, substance abuse by children, or
parental substance abuse.

Section 571 provides that the report separately addresses findings for each of the
following three age groups of dependent children: (a) preschool-age children, (b)
elementary-school age children, and (c) teenage or adolescent children. To avoid
unnecessary confusion for the readers, this report defines the three age groups as follows:

Age Group Age Range

Preschool‐age children 0 to 5 years old
Elementary‐school age children 6 to 12 years old
Teenage or adolescent children 13 to 18 years old

To allow us to include the impact of deployment on infants and toddlers, we expanded
the common definition of preschool age children, which usually ranges ages 2 to 5 or 3 to
5, to ages 0 to 5 for this assessment.

Family composition of Service members with children is another reporting element of
this report required by law. As required by Section 571, the report discusses findings
specific to the following three family compositions: (a) Service member-civilian couples,
(b) single parents, and (c) dual-military couples. These groups are defined as follows:

Family Composition Definition

Service member‐civilian couples Two‐parent families with only one parent in the Service
Single parents Service members who are single parents
Dual‐military couples Two‐parent families with both parents in the Service and

they are subject to dual deployments

This report concludes with general recommendations that are derived from the findings
from academic literature, government reports, and DoD survey data reviewed in the
following sections. The recommendations also include the need for future research and
assessment to address what is missing in the current research studies and evaluation
efforts.

2. Parental Deployment and Military Children: Demographic Overview

This report starts with an overview of the social and demographic characteristics of the
U.S. military and deployed Service members. This section also highlights distinctive
characteristics of OEF/OIF deployments in comparison with previous conflicts and non-
combat/routine deployments.

Characteristics of Military Family Life
Military family life is characterized by unique demands such as separation, risk of injury
or death of the Service member, long work hours and shift work, frequent relocation,
unique organizational culture and norms, and family separations due to military
deployments, unaccompanied assignments, field exercises, and training (Segal, 1986).
While overseas residency and frequent moves may bring positively unique experiences
into children’s lives, some aspects of military family life are also considered stressors that
are not often found in the civilian family life. Since Hill’s (1949) landmark study of post-
WWII family reintegration, family separation due to military deployment has been
recognized as a major stressor on family dynamics, parenting, and children’s well-being
and development (see Jensen, Martin, & Watanabe, 1996; Peebles-Kleiger & Kleiger,
1994; for more recent studies, see Chandra et al. 2010a; Cozza et al. 2005).
However, research on military families in previous conflicts has largely focused on
spouses, not children. Earlier studies on military children drew a stereotypical and
negative portrait of military families and children, with emphasis on higher rates of
psychological issues among them in comparison with civilian peers (LaGrone, 1978).
Later studies (Morris, 1981; Jensen et al. 1991) did not find any significant differences in
the prevalence of psychopathology between military children and civilian peers and
questioned the generalizability of the older studies.

Unique characteristics of OEF/OIF Deployment
Combat Deployments vs. Routine Deployments. Military deployments can be
categorized into normative/routine deployments and combat/combat support
deployments. The former is scheduled, non-combat deployment, which is most often
inevitable in the military career, including planned training exercises or missions,
peacekeeping operations, and unaccompanied overseas tours of duty. This type of
deployments is most likely to have a clear deployment plan, including duration and
location. The latter is either combat-support or combat missions, which often have
ambiguity and uncertainty in terms of duration, location, or both (Wiens & Boss, 2006).
This ambiguous nature of deployment can cause a high level of stress in the family (Boss
et al 2003). Consequently, the impact of deployment on children differs between combat
deployments and routine deployments.

Multiple and Prolonged Deployment. Through multiple waves of downsizing efforts, the
U.S. Military in 2000 was 31 percent smaller than 1990. To meet the sudden increased
demands for deployable Service members, the downsized U.S. Military has resulted in
sending Service members to Iraq and Afghanistan more often and for a longer period of
time. Of the approximately 1 million Service member parents who have ever deployed to
Iraq or Afghanistan, 48 percent served at least two tours. Generally, three phases are
identified in the course of deployment: pre-deployment, deployment, and post-
deployment. The decreased dwell-time and increased frequency of combat deployments,
however, led boundaries between the end of one deployment cycle and the beginning of
another to be blurred and overlapped. Each phase can cause stress in military families and
children, and there are a few widely used models such as “the emotional cycle of
deployment” (Pincus et al. 2005), in which the deployment cycle was broken down into
five phases to identify warning signs of deployment stress in the family, including
children’s possible reactions by age, corresponding to different challenges at each stage
of deployment.

Reliance on Guard and Reserve Members. The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have
also challenged the total force model, the force structure in the All-volunteer force era.
Unprecedented numbers of Reserve and National Guard members (called Reserve
Component members hereafter) have been activated in the past nine years. This reliance
on the Reserve component has shed light on the needs of the geographically dispersed
families, who live too far to access resources available on military installations. In
civilian communities, in which there is little or no military presence, children of deployed
Reserve component members can be physically or emotionally isolated.

Returning Service Members with Severe Wounds/injuries. Advanced medical
technologies and safety equipment have made it possible to save wounded Service
members’ lives that would not have been saved in previous conflicts. Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) are two invisible injuries that
characterize the complexity of contemporary combat wounds. For military children,
another significant issue associated with OEF/OIF is how these invisible injuries from
which returning deployed Service member parents might suffer impact children’s
psychological and physical well-being and life trajectories in the long-term.

Continuous Family Communication. Thanks to innovations in network/internet
communications technology, Service members and their families back home can make
more frequent and instant contacts. Though military families welcomed this change,
some researchers have warned that continuous family communication between the
deployed Service member and family back home may not always bring positive outcomes
in family functioning and job performance of the Service member. Constant exposure to
daily family problems could be a source of significant stress and distraction for a Service
member in a combat zone (see Ender, 1997; 1998).

In addition to these unique characteristics of deployment in OIF/OEF, social issues
surrounding today’s American children, such as substance abuse, poverty, and family
violence, also come into the equation when addressing the impact of deployment on
children. Taken together, findings from studies of previous conflicts and routine
deployments should be discussed with caution because they may not be fully generalized
to children’s adjustment and coping with parental deployment in support of OEF/OIF.

Available DoD Family Programs to Support Military Children
To help families cope with deployment-related challenges, DoD provides a wide array of
family support programs and services that address life challenges and promote the
readiness of Service members and their families. The majority of programs and services
are provided through the Military Services at approximately 300 worldwide installations,
tailoring the program to the unique needs of their members.

For example, high quality, affordable military child care programs meet the demands of
increased deployments and high operational tempo. There are child development centers
worldwide that provide childcare to the approximately 200,000 children (ages 0 to 12) of
military personnel who may need child care services. The military Services also offer a
wide variety of high quality, age-appropriate school-age and youth programs on and off
the military installation. At every U.S. military installation worldwide where the
command officially sponsors, Family Advocacy Program (FAP) sponsors and coordinates
activities to promote better parenting and child safety and prevent child abuse. As a
program to prevent child abuse and neglect in military families, FAP also offers the New
Parent Support Program (NPSP), which is a home visitation program for high-risk
parents.

Additionally, the military Services have established on-going partnerships with nationally
recognized youth development organizations such as the Boys & Girls Clubs of America,
USDA 4-H Youth Development, the YMCA and the National Military Family
Association. These community-based organizations offer well-established, research-
based programs that are affordable and easily accessible for Service members and their
families. Partnerships with local school systems also provide support to children and
youth with a deployed family member.

Other programs and services ─ addressing broader issues and including those that address
the needs of members and families of the geographically dispersed ─ are supported by
the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) and other partners. One of the OSD programs
for military children is the Child and Youth Behavioral/Military and Family Life
Consultant (CYB-MFLC). DoD provides military children with non-medical counseling
services through the CYB-MFLC Program, in which licensed child and youth behavioral
specialists help military children cope with their normal reactions to stressful/adverse
situations associated with deployment and reintegration. In 2010, CYB-MFLCs

osiri
Highlight

supported 424 summer camps; in addition, 263 CYB-MFLCs supported military children
attending DoD Child Development and Youth Centers in the U.S. and overseas. CYB-
MFLCs also supported military children in 295 military connected schools during the
2009-2010 school …

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law
as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic
representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-
commercial use only. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or
reuse in another form, any of our research documents.

Limited Electronic Distribution Rights

Visit RAND at www.rand.org

Explore RAND National Defense

Research Institute

View document details

For More Information

This PDF document was made available

from www.rand.org as a public service of

the RAND Corporation.

6Jump down to document

THE ARTS

CHILD POLICY

CIVIL JUSTICE

EDUCATION

ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT

HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

NATIONAL SECURITY

POPULATION AND AGING

PUBLIC SAFETY

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

SUBSTANCE ABUSE

TERRORISM AND
HOMELAND SECURITY

TRANSPORTATION AND
INFRASTRUCTURE

WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit
research organization providing
objective analysis and effective
solutions that address the challenges
facing the public and private sectors
around the world.

Purchase this document

Browse Books & Publications

Make a charitable contribution

Support RAND

http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/

http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/nsrd/ndri.html

http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/pubs/monographs/MG387/

http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/

http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/arts/

http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/children/

http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/civil_justice/

http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/education/

http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/energy_environment/

http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/health/

http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/international_affairs/

http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/national_security/

http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/population/

http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/public_safety/

http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/science_technology/

http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/substance_abuse/

http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/terrorism/

http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/infrastructure/

http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/research_areas/workforce/

http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/pubs/monographs/MG387/

http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/publications/electronic/

http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/giving/contribute.html

http://www.rand.org/pdfrd/nsrd/ndri.html

This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series.

RAND monographs present major research findings that address the

challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono-

graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for

research quality and objectivity.

Joy S. Moini, Gail L. Zellman, Susan M. Gates

Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

Providing Child Care
to Military Families
The Role of the Demand Formula in
Defining Need and Informing Policy

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing
objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges
facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s
publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients
and sponsors.

R® is a registered trademark.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any
form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying,
recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in
writing from RAND.

Published 2006 by the RAND Corporation
1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138

1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050
4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665

RAND URL: http://www.rand.org/
To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact

Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002;
Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected]

The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD). The research was conducted in the RAND
National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and
development center sponsored by the OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified
Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps,
the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under
Contract DASW01-01-C-0004.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Providing child care to military families : the role of the demand formula in defining
need and informing policy / Joy S. Moini, Gail L. Zellman, Susan M. Gates.

p. cm.
“MG-387.”
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 0-8330-3927-X (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Children of military personnel—Care—United States. 2. United States. Dept.

of Defense—Officials and employees—Salaries, etc. 3. Employer-supported day
care—United States. 4. Day care centers—United States. I. Moini, Joy S. II.
Zelman, Gail. III. Gates, Susan M., 1968– .

UB403.P768 2006
362.71’202435500973—dc22

2006018408

iii

Preface

The Office of the Secretary of Defense asked the RAND Corporation
to assess the Department of Defense (DoD) child-care demand for-
mula and recommend improvements to it. RAND’s recommendations,
which are presented in this document, are based on the results of a
survey of military families conducted in 2004 and focus groups con-
vened with military parents in 2003.

This monograph is intended to provide DoD policymakers and
managers of the military child-care system with information on the
validity of the DoD formula, to improve the understanding of the fac-
tors that influence key child-care outcomes, and to address the broader
issue of how DoD might refine its goals for military child care.

This monograph is the sixth in a series of RAND reports on mili-
tary child care. The first, Improving the Delivery of Military Child Care:
An Analysis of Current Operations and New Approaches (R-4145-FMP,
1992), examined military child-care operations prior to the implemen-
tation of the Military Child Care Act (MCCA) of 1989. The second,
Examining the Effects of Accreditation on Military Child Development
Center Operations and Outcomes (MR-524-OSD, 1994), analyzed a key
aspect of the MCCA: accreditation of child-care centers. The third,
Examining the Implementation and Outcomes of the Military Child Care
Act of 1989 (MR-665-OSD, 1998), analyzed the many changes that
the MCCA brought about. The fourth, Examining the Cost of Military
Child Care (MR-1415-OSD, 2002), determined the cost of provid-
ing care in military child-development centers and family child-care
homes. A fifth report, Examining Child Care Need Among Military
Families (TR-279-OSD, 2006), is a companion technical report to this

iv Providing Child Care to Military Families: The Role of the Demand Formula

monograph. It provides an analysis of unmet need for care, unmet pref-
erence for care, and several other child-care outcomes. For those who
are interested in the analytic techniques used in this study, the tech-
nical report provides a description of the study’s focus groups, survey
methodology, and survey results.

This research was sponsored by the Department of Defense
Office of Children and Youth and was conducted within the Forces
and Resources Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research
Institute (NDRI). NDRI, a division of the RAND Corporation, is
a federally funded research and development center sponsored by
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified
Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine
Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.

Comments and questions on this document may be directed to
the authors—Joy Moini at [email protected] and Gail Zellman and
Susan Gates at the RAND Corporation, 1776 Main Street, Santa
Monica, CA 90407-2138. For more information on RAND’s Forces
and Resources Policy Center, contact the Director, James Hosek. He
can be reached by email at [email protected]; by phone at 310-
393-0411, extension 7183; or by mail at the RAND Corporation, 1776
Main Street, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138. More information about
RAND is available at http://www.rand.org.

Contents

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxiii
Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxv

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Military Child-Care System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

The System Provides Significant Subsidies for CDC Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
The System Provides Special Preference for Dual-Military and Single-

Parent Families . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
The DoD Child-Care Demand Formula. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Measures of Child-Care Need. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Child-Care Use. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Unmet Need for Care . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Unmet Preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Child Care and Military Readiness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Likelihood of Leaving the Military Due to Child-Care Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

The DoD Formula and Child-Care Outcomes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Organization of This Monograph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

vi Providing Child Care to Military Families: The Role of the Demand Formula

CHAPTER TWO

Examining DoD Child-Care Demand Formula Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . 19
Data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Factors Not Included in Formula . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Issues Examined in This Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

CHAPTER THREE

Accuracy of the DoD Child-Care Formula Estimate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Accuracy of Family Status Indicators in DEERS Data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Fraction of Children Who Live with Their Parents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Fraction of Civilian Spouses Who Work or Attend School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

CHAPTER FOUR

Evaluating How the Current Child-Care System Is Serving Military
Families . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Child-Care Use. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Single-Parent Families. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Dual-Military Families. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Military-Member-Married-to-Civilian Families . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Child-Care Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Decision to Use Parental Child Care . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Decision to Use Non-Parental Child Care. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Use of Multiple Arrangements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
All Family Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Single Parents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Dual-Military Families. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Military-Married-to-Civilian Families . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Unmet Need . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Unmet Preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Child Care and Military Readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Reporting for Duty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Contents vii

Late to Work or Missed Work. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Deployments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Likelihood of Leaving the Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Although Rare, Unmet Need for Child Care Is an Issue for Certain
Military Families. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Unmet Preference Is More Common than Unmet Need . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Child-Care Issues Impact the Readiness of Military Members . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Single and Dual-Military Parents Favor CDCs but Use Multiple

Arrangements to Satisfy Child-Care Need . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Local Market Conditions Are Related to the Child-Care Choices

that DoD Families Make . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Although Formal Civilian Child-Care Options Are Used Widely

for School-Age Children, They May Not Be Preferred . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Families Living Off Base Are Less Likely to Use DoD-Sponsored

Care. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
DoD CDC Users Appear to Have a Weaker Attachment to the

Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

CHAPTER FIVE

Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Unmet Child-Care Need Is Not Prevalent Among Military Families . . . 70
Unmet Preference Is More Common than Unmet Need . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Child-Care Concerns May Influence Retention Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Dual-Military and Single-Parent Families Face Greater Challenges . . . . . 71
Families Living Off Base Are Less Likely to Use DoD-Sponsored

Care. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
DoD CDC Users Appear to Have a Weaker Attachment to the

Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Local Market Conditions Are Related to the Child-Care Choices that

DoD Families Make. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

viii Providing Child Care to Military Families: The Role of the Demand Formula

APPENDIX

A. Components of the Child-Care Need Formula: DoD and the
Military Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

B. Military Child Care Survey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

Figures

S.1. Child-Care Outcomes and Potential Policy Responses . . . . . . . . xix
1.1. Family, Installation, and Policy Characteristics that Affect

Child-Care Outcomes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.1. Family Status Reported in RAND Child-Care Survey for

Families Identified in the DEERS Data File . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Tables

1.1. Number of Survey Respondents, by Child Age, Family Type,
and Service. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

2.1. DoD Child-Care Demand Formula for Children Age 0–5 . . . 21
2.2. DoD Child-Care Demand Formula for Children Age 6–12. . 22
3.1. Comparison of DoD Formula and RAND Child-Care

Survey: Percentage of Children Living with Their Parents . . . . 30
3.2. Comparison of DoD Formula and RAND Child-Care

Survey: Percentage of Civilian Spouses Working Outside
the Home . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

4.1. Percentage of Children Age 0–5 in Each Child-Care
Arrangement, by Family Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

4.2. Percentage of Children Age 6–12 in Each Child-Care
Arrangement, by Family Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

4.3. Factors Related to the Probability of Families Using
Parental Care for Preschool-Age and School-Age Children . . . 42

4.4. Factors Related to the Probability of Families Using
Various Child-Care Options, Families Using Non-Parental
Care for Preschool-Age Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

4.5. Factors Related to the Probability of Families Using
Various Child-Care Options, Families Using Non-Parental
Care for School-Age Children. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

4.6. Percentage of Families with Children Age 0–5 Using
Multiple Child-Care Arrangements, by Family Type . . . . . . . . . . 48

4.7. Percentage of Families with Children Age 6–12 Using
Multiple Child-Care Arrangements, by Family Type . . . . . . . . . . 49

xii Providing Child Care to Military Families: The Role of the Demand Formula

4.8. Number of Hours the Secondary Child-Care Arrangement
Was Used in the Past Week, by Primary Arrangement and
Family Type, Families with Children Age 0–5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

4.9. Number of Hours the Secondary Child-Care Arrangement
Was Used in the Past Week, by Primary Arrangement and
Family Type, by Families with Children Age 6–12 . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

4.10. Type of Care Preferred by Parents Who Expressed Unmet
Preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

4.11. Families with Children Age 0–5 Responding that Lack of
Child Care Prevented a Parent from Reporting for Military
Duty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

4.12. Families Reporting that Child Care Changed Due to
Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

A.1. Child-Care Demand Formulas Used by the Services . . . . . . . . . . 82

xiii

Summary

The Department of Defense (DoD) is committed to meeting the
need for child care among military families. DoD supports the largest
employer-sponsored system of high-quality child care in the country.
Through accredited child development centers (CDCs), family child
care (FCC) homes,1 youth centers, and other after-school programs,
DoD currently provides approximately 176,000 child-care spaces for
military children 0–12 years old and plans to expand this capacity to
215,412 spaces by fiscal year 2007.2

DoD recognizes that high-quality child care is both a readiness
issue and a retention issue. Difficulty in obtaining child care creates
conflicts between parental obligations and mission responsibilities, and
if parents have no child care, they may fail to report for duty in order to
care for their children. If parents are forced to make informal child-care
arrangements, they may perceive that care to be of low quality and may
be distracted from their work as a result. For families with an employed
civilian spouse, inadequate child care may affect the spouse’s career
options and ultimately the family’s decision to stay in the military.

To estimate the magnitude of child-care need among military
service personnel, DoD uses a formula incorporating installation-level
and other demographic data, including a combination of national

1 FCC is child care provided in a person’s home. A CDC is a dedicated facility. All U.S.
states license child-care providers (both CDCs and FCCs). A DoD FCC is an FCC that has
been approved by DoD.
2 There are approximately 1.2 million children of military parents, according to DoD
estimates. See the Military HOMEFRONT Web site (http://www.mfrc-dodqol.org/MCY/
mm_cdc.htm, last accessed August 11, 2005).

xiv Providing Child Care to Military Families: The Role of the Demand Formula

and military statistical trends. Because the formula is based solely on
demographic data, DoD was concerned that the formula might not be
addressing all relevant aspects of child-care need.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense asked the RAND
Corporation to assess the validity of the DoD formula as a tool for
translating information on military families into measures of potential
child-care need and to suggest ways that the tool might be improved.
RAND was also asked to clarify the role of the formula in DoD child-
care policy decisions and to improve understanding of the factors that
influence key child-care outcomes of interest to aid DoD in refining
its goals for military child care. To perform this assessment, research-
ers conducted focus groups on eight installations and developed a
survey to assess parental preferences and other factors that might affect
child-care need. The survey was sent to a sample of 3,000 families of
active-duty military members, including activated reservists, stationed
in the United States who reported having dependent children age 12
or younger as of September 2003. The survey asked military parents
about their child-care arrangements, unmet needs for care, unmet pref-
erences for care, and the effect of child-care issues on their readiness
and intention to remain in the military.

Some Aspects of the DoD Child-Care Demand Formula
Deserve Attention

The RAND analyses indicate that some aspects of the formula deserve
attention and revision. The DoD child-care “demand formula” is actu-
ally a formula for determining potential need for child care among mili-
tary families. The formula relies on data from the Defense Manpower
Data Center (DMDC), Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting
System (DEERS), and from the services, and assumptions about the
fraction of dependent children living with their parents in different
family types (single parent, dual military, military member with civil-
ian spouse) to estimate potential need. The estimate derived from the
formula represents an upper bound on the number of DoD-sponsored
child-care spaces required to meet the needs of military families. This

Summary xv

number is then considered in light of available resources and compet-
ing demands to arrive at a goal for the amount of child-care spaces
the system should provide. Because some families will choose to use
non-DoD care (including parental and family care), the actual need
for child care will be less than the potential need calculated by the
formula.

The results of the RAND survey suggest that there may be prob-
lems with the accuracy of inputs to the formula, particularly some of
the DEERS data inputs. Because the child-care formula makes fun-
damentally different assumptions about the potential need for child
care among families of different types, accurate estimates of the family
status of military members with minor dependents are critical to deter-
mining child-care need, but, as we found, they are often flawed. This
study found substantial differences between family status reported in
DEERS and family status reported by survey respondents. Of those
families identified by DEERS as a “single-parent family,” only 51 per-
cent reported single-parent status. Similarly, only 83 percent of those
identified by DEERS as “military married to civilian” families and 90
percent identified as “dual-military” families reported having the same
status as in the DEERS data. In addition, because DEERS no longer
includes a flag denoting dual-military families, identifying this family
type proved to be quite challenging.

The survey results also raise questions about some of the formula’s
assumptions regarding use of child care among different family types.
Specifically, the assumptions made by the formula about the fraction
of children living with military parents and about spousal employment
rates differed substantially from what was found from the survey.

Multiple Child-Care Indicators Provide Important Insights
into How Well the System Is Working

There are other important child-care indicators besides potential need
that the DoD should consider as “intermediate” child-care system out-
comes. They include child-care use and the need for multiple sources
of care, unmet need for care, and unmet preference for care (i.e., a

xvi Providing Child Care to Military Families: The Role of the Demand Formula

family is not using its preferred type of care). Ultimately, the DoD
child-care system must be assessed in terms of the support it provides
to desired outcomes for the military. Readiness, particularly time lost
to duty because of child-care problems, and the degree to which child
care plays a role in a military member’s …

THE MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY

COMMUNICATIONS STYLE GUIDE
THIRTEENTH EDITION

ONLINE

A PUBLICATION OF THE LEADERSHIP COMMUNICATION SKILLS CENTER

How to Use This Guide

The Marine Corps University Communications Style Guide serves as a reference for students

attending the university and service members in the operating forces. The principles of writing

described in this guide extend beyond academic writing; readers may apply them to military and

professional writing contexts as well.

This edition of the MCU Communications Style Guide consists of three main sections: Part One, The

Writing Process; Part Two, Research and Documentation; and Part Three, Grammar, Mechanics, and

Style.

Part One: The Writing Process presents writing as a series of stages you will progress through as

you develop academic and professional papers of all lengths and for all purposes. At each stage of the

process, you will employ particular writing strategies, some of which will be more effective for you

than others.

Part Two: Research and Documentation provides strategies for performing a literature review,

narrowing a research topic, and incorporating research into your writing. It explains the Chicago

Manual of Style citation and documentation process and provides endnote and bibliography formats

for the most commonly cited source types.

Part Three: Grammar, Mechanics, and Style explains proper use of punctuation, mechanics, and

grammar and presents common conventions of academic writing. Readers may use this section to

review or study basic rules of grammar and mechanics; in addition, Part Three may be of particular

interest to those who need to quickly reference a grammatical principle while writing professionally in

the operating forces or in garrison.

THE MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY

COMMUNICATIONS STYLE GUIDE

THIRTEENTH EDITION

ANDREA L. HAMLEN-RIDGELY, M.ED

STASE L. WELLS

BRANDY LYN G. BROWN, PHD

LEADERSHIP COMMUNICATION SKILLS CENTER

MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY
MCB QUANTICO, VIRGINIA

https://www.usmcu.edu/Academic-Programs/Leadership-Communications-Skills-Center/

[This page is intentionally left blank.]

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Ctrl Click to access

TABLE OF CONTENTS III

LIST OF FIGURES, TABLES, AND WORKSHEETS VI

FOREWORD IX

PREFACE X

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS XI

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMUNICATION PROCESS 1

1.1 Communication at Marine Corps University 1

1.2 Taking Your Writing and Speaking beyond the Classroom 2

1.3 Professional Military Communication 3

PART ONE: THE WRITING PROCESS 4

CHAPTER TWO: INVENTION 5

2.1 Understanding the Rhetorical Situation 5

2.2 Analyzing Your Audience 7

2.3 Identifying Key Words and Understanding Common Academic Writing Tasks 8

2.4 Invention Strategies 13

CHAPTER THREE: DRAFTING 23

3.1 Strategies for Approaching the Drafting Process 23

3.2 Parts of the Paper 23

CHAPTER FOUR: THE REVISION PROCESS 40

4.1 Overview of the Revision Process 40

4.2 Global-Level Revisions 41

4.3 Surface-Level Revisions 48

4.4 Ordering of Elements in a Research Paper 52

PART TWO: RESEARCH AND DOCUMENTATION 57

CHAPTER FIVE: THE RESEARCH PROCESS 58

5.1 Overview of the Research Process 58

5.2 Finding a Topic and Collecting Background Information 60

5.3 Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary Sources 61

5.4 Working with Sources: Reading Critically and Actively 63

CHAPTER SIX: DEVELOPING A RESEARCH QUESTION 70

6.1 Reviewing the Literature on Your Topic 71

6.2 Writing a Literature Review 72

6.3 Evaluating Your Sources 79

6.4 Varying (Triangulating) Your Sources 81

6.5 Primary Research 82

6.6 Organizing Your Research Data 89

6.7 Connecting Your Research Data to Your Research Question 90

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONSTRUCTING AN ARGUMENT 92

7.1 Characteristics of Effective Thesis Statements 92

7.2 How to Begin Constructing a Working Thesis Statement 93

CHAPTER EIGHT: WRITING WITH SOURCES 95

8.1 Why Use Sources in Your Writing? 95

8.2 Plagiarism 97

8.3 Using Direct Quotations 98

8.4 Paraphrasing 106

8.5 Summarizing 108

8.6 Overview of CMOS Citation and Documentation 110

8.7 Substantiating a Claim with Multiple Citations 111

8.8 Substantive (Discursive) Notes and Notes with Commentary 112

8.9 Endnotes versus Footnotes 113

8.10 Shortened Citations 113

8.11 Bibliography 114

CHAPTER NINE: ENDNOTE AND BIBLIOGRAPHY FORMATS 115

9.1 Books 117

9.2 Periodicals 123

9.3 Book Reviews 127

9.4 Interviews and Personal Communications 128

9.5 Student Theses and Other Unofficially Published Material 130

9.6 Lectures, Speeches, Reports, and Papers Presented at Meetings 131

9.7 Encyclopedias and Dictionaries 134

9.8 Audiovisual Materials 134

9.9 Government and Military Documents 136

9.10 Digital Sources 141

9.11 Sample Bibliography 144

PART THREE: GRAMMAR, MECHANICS, AND STYLE 146

CHAPTER TEN: GRAMMAR, PUNCTUATION, AND MECHANICS 147

10.1 Grammar Basics: Parts of Speech and Sentence Components 147

10.2 Punctuation Marks: Commas, Semicolons, Colons, Question Marks, Hyphens, 150

Dashes, Parentheses, Ellipses, and Apostrophes 150

10.3 Italics, Abbreviations, Capitalization, and Numerals 161

10.4 Pronoun Usage 167

10.5 Prepositions 169

10.6 Adjective Order 170

CHAPTER ELEVEN: SENTENCE STYLE 173

11.1 Parallel Construction 173

11.2 Active Voice and Passive Voice 174

11.3 Point of View 176

11.4 Singular They 177

11.5 Split Infinitives and Misplaced Modifiers 178

11.6 Articles 180

11.7 Frequently Asked Grammar Questions 181

APPENDIX A: ANSWERS TO NOW YOU TRY IT! QUIZZES 184

APPENDIX B: FORMATTING AND PAGE DESIGN 187

B.1 Document Setup and Microsoft Word Formatting 187

B.2 Using Visuals in Academic Writing 196

APPENDIX C: ARTICLE SUBMISSION GUIDELINES FOR SELECTED MILITARY

AND DEFENSE PERIODICALS AND ESSAY CONTESTS 200

ENDNOTES 204

BIBLIOGRAPHY 208

QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE 213

LIST OF FIGURES, TABLES, AND WORKSHEETS

Figure 1: Writing as a Form of Conversation 1

Figure 2: The Writing Process 4

Figure 3: Rhetorical Triangle 6

Figure 4: Tailoring Writing to Needs of Intended Audience 8

Figure 5: Reconstruction of Japan Mind Map Example 14

Figure 6: Sicily Campaign Mind Map Example 15

Figure 7: Two-Level Traditional Outline Example 16

Figure 8: Three-Level Traditional Outline Example 17

Figure 9: Listing Approach Example 17

Figure 10: Venn Diagram Model 19

Figure 11: Assignment Prompt for Innovation Essay 25

Figure 12: Sample Student Introductory Paragraph for Innovation Essay 25

Figure 13: Sample Student Introduction Showcasing Pitfalls 26

Figure 14: Effective Sample Student Introduction 26

Figure 15: Sample Outline Developing Paper Topic 30

Figure 16: Mind Map of Thesis and Supporting Points 30

Figure 17: Example Topic Sentence Outline 31

Figure 18: Sample Fully Developed Paragraph on Wilsonian Idealism 32

Figure 19: Sample Fully Developed Paragraph on the Civil War 33

Figure 20: Incorporating and Addressing Counterarguments 37

Figure 21: Sample Introduction and Conclusion: “Preventing Chaos: Conditionality of

Nuclear Proliferation”

Figure 22: Sample Introduction and Conclusion: “Wilsonian Idealism: An American

Tradition”

Figure 23: Sample Paragraph with Repetitive Sentence Structures 51

Figure 24: Sample Paragraph with Varied Sentence Structures 52

Figure 25: Sample Executive Summary 54

Figure 26: Research and Writing Processes 57

Figure 27: The Research Process 59

Figure 28: Examples of Primary and Secondary Research 63

Figure 29: Cornell Note Taking Method 66

Figure 30: Triangulation of Data to Support a Claim 82

Figure 31: Annotated Bibliography Entry Example 89

Figure 32: Post-it Note Examples 90

Figure 33: Example of Run-in Quote 99

Figure 34: Example of Block Quote 100

Figure 35: Levels of Headings Example 196

Figure 36: American Attitudes towards Cyber Threats 198

Table 1: Textual Relevance Matrix 18

Table 2: US Foreign Policy Trends and Shifts since 1914 Matrix 19

vii

Table 3: Sample Invention Template 21

Table 4: How to Develop a Working Thesis Statement 29

Table 5: Transition Examples 33

Table 6: Literature Review: Theories of Creativity Development 78

Table 7: Determining the Relevance and Veracity of a Source 81

Table 8: Differences between CMOS, APA, and MLA Citation Styles 116

Table 9: Sample Bibliography References and Notes for Books 118

Table 10: Sample Bibliography References and Notes for Periodicals 124

Table 11: Sample Bibliography References and Notes for Book Reviews 127

Table 12: Sample Bibliography References and Notes for Interviews and Personal

Communications

128

Table 13: Sample Bibliography References and Notes for Unofficially Published

Material

130

Table 14: Sample Bibliography References and Notes for Lectures, Speeches, Reports,

and Papers Presented at Meetings

132

Table 15: Sample Bibliography References and Notes for Encyclopedias and

Dictionaries

134

Table 16: Sample Bibliography References and Notes for Audiovisual Materials 134

Table 17: Sample Bibliography References and Notes for Government and Military

Documents

Table 18: Sample Bibliography References and Notes for Digital Sources

136

142

Table 19: Parts of Speech 148

Table 20: Verb Tenses 149

Table 21: Comma Usage 151

Table 22: Semicolon Usage 153

Table 23: Colon Usage 154

Table 24: Question Mark Usage 155

Table 25: Hyphen Usage 156

Table 26: Em Dash Usage 157

Table 27: Parentheses Usage 158

Table 28: Ellipses Usage 159

Table 29: Rules for Forming Singular and Plural Possessive Nouns 160

Table 30: Italics Usage 162

Table 31: Rules for Using Abbreviations 162

Table 32: Capitalization Guidelines 164

Table 33: Using Numerals in Academic Writing 166

Table 34: When to Spell Out Numbers in Academic Writing 166

Table 35: Pronoun Usage 167

Table 36: Prepositions 169

Table 37: Adjective Order 171

Table 38: Parallel Construction 173

Table 39: Active and Passive Voice 176

Table 40: Point of View Examples 176

Table 41: Article Use 181

Table 42: How to Adjust Line Spacing 187

viii

Table 43: Text Alignment 188

Table 44: Formatting Page Numbers 189

Table 45: Creating a Section Break to Separate Front Matter from the Main Text 190

Table 46: Generating Endnotes 193

Table 47: How to Create a Section Break between the Endnotes and the Bibliography 194

Table 48: Using Data to Develop a Figure: Most Common Driving Violations in Union,

VA, May 2014-May 2015

198

Table 49: Example of a Table: LCSC Recorded Visits Academic Year 2017-2018 199

Table 50: List of Selected Military and Defense Periodicals 200

Table 51: List of Selected Military and Academic Essay Contests 202

Worksheet 1: Audience Analysis 7

Worksheet 2: Blank Invention Template 22

Worksheet 3: Ordering of Elements in a Research Paper 53

Worksheet 4: Critical Reading 68

Worksheet 5: Blank Three-Column Journal Template 68

Worksheet 6: Checklist for Using Your Sources Effectively 109

Worksheet 7: Checklist for Avoiding Plagiarism 109

Worksheet 8: Now You Try It! Verb Tense Quiz 150

Worksheet 9: Now You Try It! Commas Quiz 153

Worksheet 10: Now You Try It! Semicolons Quiz 154

Worksheet 11: Now You Try It! Colons Quiz 155

Worksheet 12: Now You Try It! Question Marks Quiz 155

Worksheet 13: Now You Try It! Hyphens Quiz 156

Worksheet 14: Now You Try It! Dashes Quiz 157

Worksheet 15: Now You Try It! Parentheses Quiz 158

Worksheet 16: Now You Try It! Ellipses Quiz 159

Worksheet 17: Now You Try It! Apostrophes Quiz 161

Worksheet 18: Now You Try It! Prepositions Quiz 170

Worksheet 19: Now You Try It! Article Use Quiz 181

FOREWORD

Effective written and oral communication skills are

essential in both professional military education and in

leadership development. As military and civilian

interagency leaders, you need strong communication

skills to brief, instruct, persuade, counsel, and motivate

others. At Marine Corps University, you will use these

skills to engage in critical debate with colleagues and to

demonstrate your ability to understand and apply course

material in written assignments. The Marine Corps

University Communications Style Guide is a key

communication resource that will provide you with the

skills necessary to succeed both in the schoolhouse and

upon return to your professional endeavors. Given the

increasing complexities of the global security

environment, effective communication is of paramount

importance. A seminal work on military leadership, The Armed Forces Officer, acknowledges

that military success in battle rests on officers’ ability “to express concrete ideas in clear and

unmistakable language” and “to make their thoughts articulate and available to others.” The

increasing reliance on text as a way of moving policy forward makes these words as relevant

today as they were when the manual was first published in 1950.

The thirteenth edition of the Marine Corps University Communications Style Guide establishes a

consistent style of writing adapted from the Chicago Manual of Style (CMOS), 17th edition. In

the guide, you will find information regarding CMOS citation practices, grammar and

punctuation rules, and appropriate formatting of charts, graphs, and tables. This condensed,

user-friendly reference also provides you with guidance on the use of civilian academic and

professional military styles in research and writing, which makes the guide an asset to students

and faculty university-wide.

The use of the Marine Corps University Communications Style Guide is in keeping with Marine

Corps University’s commitment to leadership communication throughout its academic programs,

and I am pleased to provide you with this excellent resource. Best wishes for a successful

academic year.

Brigadier General Jay M. Bargeron

President/Commanding General

Marine Corps University

PREFACE

The Marine Corps University Communications Style Guide was written and developed by the

faculty in the Leadership Communication Skills Center (LCSC), an instructional communication

support center for Marine Corps University (MCU) students, faculty, and staff. The LCSC

mission is to help strengthen students’ leadership by developing their written and oral

communication skills through classroom instruction, written guidance, and one-on-one

mentoring.

We intend this style guide to be a user-friendly resource to assist students in meeting coursework

requirements and in completing written tasks and assignments upon their return to the operating

forces. The guide is a condensed, simplified compilation of information from the Chicago

Manual of Style, 17th edition; the Journal of Strategic Intelligence Submission and Style Guide

for the National Intelligence University; Naval Correspondence Manual guidelines; and

guidance from Marine Corps University faculty, students, and staff. Examples in the guide are

adapted from consenting MCU students’ written products. Although the LCSC publication is not

a replacement for the Chicago Manual of Style or other military writing guides, our use of MCU

student examples and military citation references makes the guide more approachable for its

intended readership.

It is our hope that our students gain valuable insight about how to convey important messages

that change the way we approach warfighting in an increasingly complex global security

environment. We are honored to serve the finest men and women from all branches of the

United States Military, Department of Defense, government agencies, and foreign military allies

and partners around the globe. We are here to support your goals this academic year and

beyond, and we hope you find our guide useful in your writing and speaking endeavors.

Sincerely,

Andrea L. Hamlen-Ridgely, M.Ed
Communications Assistant Professor, Leadership Communication Skills Center

Stase L. Wells
Communications Instructor, Leadership Communication Skills Center

Brandy Lyn G. Brown, PhD
Director, Leadership Communication Skills Center

https://www.usmcu.edu/Academic-Programs/Leadership-Communications-Skills-Center/

https://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/book/ed17/frontmatter/toc.html

https://ni-u.edu/wp/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/JSI-Submission-and-Style-Guide.pdf

https://www.marines.mil/portals/1/Publications/SECNAV%20M%205216.5%20%20CH-1.pdf?ver=2019-05-13-081642-243

mailto:[email protected]

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors of the Marine Corps University Communications Style Guide would like to thank

Dr. Linda Di Desidero, former director, Leadership Communication Skills Center, for her

knowledge, insight, and direction under which the center and the style guide evolved into what

they are today.

Additionally, the authors are grateful to the following individuals for their contributions to the

thirteenth edition of this manual:

 Marine Corps University students, faculty, and staff
 The Gray Research Center Reference Librarians—Deborah Rexon, Reference Librarian,

MLS; Christi A. Bayha, Reference Librarian, MLS, Graduate, DEPCSC; and Winston A.

Gould, Lt Col, USAF (Ret), Reference Librarian, MLIS

 Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps
 Dr. Jerre Wilson and Dr. James Anderson, former Vice Presidents of Academic Affairs
 Dr. Rebecca Johnson, Vice President of Academic Affairs
 Mr. Richard Jaques, Director, Academic Support Division
 Mr. Cesar Olson, Events and Operations Coordinator, Marine Corps University
 Ms. Kathleen Kuehn, Director of Institutional Research, Assessment, and Planning
 BrigGen Thomas Draude (USMC, Ret), former President and Chief Operating Officer of

the Marine Corps University Foundation

 LtCol John Hales (USMC, Ret), former Secretary and Chief Operating Officer of the
Marine Corps University Foundation

 LtGen Richard P. Mills (USMC, Ret), President and Chief Executive Officer, Marine
Corps University Foundation

 Col Jon Sachrison (USMC, Ret), Chief Operating Officer, Marine Corps University
Foundation

 Lisa Voss, MFA, former adjunct faculty, Leadership Communication Skills Center
 Ginger Seip-Nuño, former adjunct faculty, Leadership Communication Skills Center
 Members of the Writing Center Consortium for Graduate-level PME

Finally, the authors want to thank Ambassador Anthony D. Marshall for sponsoring the

Leadership Communication Skills Center. The opportunity to work with MCU students and

develop their leadership skills through written and oral communication instruction is an honor.

Without the Ambassador’s sponsorship, the LCSC and the MCU Communications Style Guide

would not exist.

Respectfully,

Andrea L. Hamlen-Ridgely, M.Ed, Communications Assistant Professor

Stase L. Wells, Communications Instructor

Brandy Lyn G. Brown, PhD, Director, LCSC

https://grc-usmcu.libguides.com/library

https://www.usmcu.edu/Research/Marine-Corps-History-Division/About-the-History-Division/Archives-Branch/#:~:text=The%20Historical%20Resources%20Branch%20(formerly,Marine%20Corps%2C%20and%20civilian%20researchers.

https://www.usmcu.edu/Faculty-Staff/Operations-and-Plans/IRAP/

Home

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMUNICATION PROCESS

Communication is one of the most important components of leadership. As a leader, the

responsibility to mentor and inspire the people who work with you directly correlates with the

need to effectively communicate your vision and goals. Developing strong written and oral

communication skills will help you to convey your innovative ideas in a logical, coherent

manner in order to put them into action or influence your leaders or subordinates to do so.

In both writing and speaking, it is important to analyze your audience and the context of the

conversation to which you are contributing. Writing can be thought of as engaging in

conversation with those in your academic community. Before you write about a topic, it is first

important to read what others have said about your topic—you will want to write confidently and

contribute new information to the conversation, which is similar to generating solutions to

problems in your unit or command through spoken communication. Figure 1 depicts writing as a

form of conversation.

Figure 1: Writing as a Form of Conversation

Source: Mike Palmquist, The Bedford Researcher, 6th ed. (Boston: Macmillan Learning, 2018), 5.

1.1 Communication at Marine Corps University

Throughout Marine Corps University’s degree-granting and affiliated non-degree-granting

schools, academic programs focus heavily on developing communication skills. Students

attending the Command and Staff College (CSC), School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW), and

Marine Corps War College (MCWAR) will write a variety of papers throughout the course of the

academic year—from bullet background papers, to argumentative essays, to an academic

research paper that presents the findings of a year-long research project. Through these

assignments, students learn not only how to structure academic and professional arguments but

Begin by reading
about a topic or an
issue, just as you’d
listen for a while
before speaking.

Think carefully
about what you’ve
read, just as you’d

think carefully
about what you’d

just heard.

Look for
something new to

share with the other
participants in the

conversation.

Draft and share
your contribution to

the conversation.

also about how writing can stimulate critical and creative thinking processes through its role in

knowledge creation.

The importance of communication resounds in the College of Enlisted Military Education

(CEME) as well. Students attending CEME courses write short essays and professional papers

that must present well-structured, supported arguments. As communication is a critical aspect of

leadership and decision-making, the academic writing component present in the courses helps to

build on this necessary skill for enlisted military service members. Further, Marines who wish to

serve as curriculum developers for the enlisted force or as faculty advisors for the regional

SNCO academies are required to have solid communication skills—the Senior Enlisted Course at

Marine Corps University includes thirty-six hours of professional communications instruction.1

1.2 Taking Your Writing and Speaking beyond the Classroom

Communication skills—written, verbal, and non-verbal—play a vital role in leadership

development. Current theories of leadership emphasize the ways in which leadership is

constituted by language. A leader’s communication style—spoken, written, and non-verbal—

will determine whether his or her strategic vision is adopted or ignored.

Writing is one form of communication that is essential to your development as a leader,

especially as we increasingly communicate through email and as leadership policies are codified

in writing. As such, the writing you do is important not only to your success as a student but also

to your professional growth.

One way to hone and develop your written communication skills is to write often and to take the

writing you do seriously. Your experience at MCU provides you with time and space for writing

that you will be unlikely to have once you return to the operating forces. Use your time wisely,

and consider taking your writing beyond the classroom by submitting your work for publication

or entering an essay competition.

Two competitions we would like to highlight are the Secretary of Defense National Security

Essay Competition and the CJCS National Defense and Military Strategy Essay Competition.

These competitions are meant to “stimulate thinking about national defense and military strategy,

promote well-written research, and contribute to a broader security debate among

professionals.”2 Submitting an essay to one of these competitions allows you to enter into a

conversation about the most pressing issues facing national defense professionals today, and

winning papers are published in Joint Force Quarterly. Though these JPME essay competitions

occur each spring, you might want to start thinking about the contests early in the academic year.

For more information or to read last year’s winning essays, visit:

https://ndupress.ndu.edu/About/Essay-Competitions/. If the writing you wish to publish does not

fit the requirements of the NDU essay contest, there are other military and history journals you

might consider submitting to. Tables 50 and 51 provide an extensive list of publication and

contest opportunities where you may submit your written work.

https://ndupress.ndu.edu/About/Essay-Competitions/Essay-Rules/#topics

https://ndupress.ndu.edu/About/Essay-Competitions/CJCS-Competition/#:~:text=The%20purpose%20of%20this%20competition,broader%20security%20debate%20among%20professionals.

https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/

https://ndupress.ndu.edu/About/Essay-Competitions/

1.3 Professional Military Communication

During your time at the university, you will hone your writing skills, not just in hopes of

attaining an award or publication but also to improve your professional communication skills.

Communication skills are needed in the operating forces to write orders, deliver inspiring

speeches, brief superiors, and send emails. In the operating forces, there are few chances to

develop these skills, which is why they are so heavily emphasized in the schoolhouses.

The following chapters present a process for approaching written communication tasks, both

professional and academic. Because these written tasks will likely require you to use outside

resources to substantiate your claims, the text addresses the process of scholarly research. You

will find a more in-depth discussion of the research process in Chapters Five and Six.

PART ONE: THE WRITING PROCESS

Good writing is rarely produced in one sitting. Writing involves multiple stages, and the best

writing is often a result of a successful writing process. Though the amount of time you spend

on each step of the process may change depending on the length, scope, and purpose of your

assignment, the steps in the process are essentially the same, whether you are writing a standard

operating procedure for your supervisor or a 30-page academic research paper. The following

chapters provide you with guidance for approaching the writing process.

CHAPTER TWO: INVENTION

CHAPTER THREE: DRAFTING

CHAPTER FOUR: THE REVISION PROCESS

Figure 2: The Writing Process

It is no accident that writing is depicted as a recursive, cyclical process in figure 2. Though it

seems logical that a writer will go through the invention stage before drafting or revising, the

writing process does not follow a linear, step-by-step model. In fact, most writers frequently

shift back and forth between different phases of the writing process. As you write, your ideas

about your topic may begin to change; this may require you to change the focus of your paper

and move back to an earlier stage of the writing process. For instance, your thesis statement

might change as you read more about your topic. You may then find yourself needing to remove

some paragraphs that no longer support your new thesis statement, which is part of the revision

process. At the same time, you will likely need to draft text to substantiate your new argument,

which means you will enter into the drafting stage again. Further, different sections of the paper

may be in different phases of the writing process. For example, the first few paragraphs might

be in the polishing stage, while the last few paragraphs are still undergoing conceptual

development. These are only a few examples of how you may cycle through the stages of the

writing process multiple times before finalizing your document.

Invention

DraftingRevising

CHAPTER TWO: INVENTION

Because writing is an extension of thinking, you will need to examine your topic thoroughly

before you write a complete first draft. This process of thinking about your topic …

Picking Up the Pieces 1

childcareaware.org

FALL 2020

Homepage

Child Care Aware® of America is our nation’s leading voice for child
care. Our vision is that every family in the United States has access
to high-quality, affordable child care. We advance a child care
system that effectively serves all children and supports children’s
growth, development and educational advancement and creates
positive economic impact for families and communities.

To learn more about our mission,
visit childcareaware.org

Your support makes reports like these possible!

or—without prior written permission from Child Care Aware® of America.

Child Care Aware® of America

1515 N. Courthouse Road, 3rd Floor, Arlington, VA 22201

(703) 341-4100 childcareaware.org

@childcareaware

#PICKINGUPTHEPIECES

Homepage

https://www.facebook.com/ChildCareAware/

Tweets by ChildCareAware

https://www.linkedin.com/company/632761/

https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCeaTKlEpRfc00TJ537v0RZg

Picking Up the Pieces 3

For over 30 years, Child Care Aware® of America (CCAoA) has kept the nation informed
and advocated for affordable, quality child care for all families. This year, in response to
COVID-19, we focus our efforts on documenting the devastating impact of the pandemic on
the child care system.

Picking Up the Pieces: Building a Better Child Care System Post COVID-19 combines our annual
report, The U.S. and the High Price of Child Care and State Fact Sheets into one report, along
with additional data gathered from Child Care Resource and Referral agencies and other
sources as recently as July 2020. In addition, the report features information about CCAoA’s
new Child Care Data Center that includes child care data and stories for six pilot states:
Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, Oregon, Washington and Wisconsin.

When COVID-19 was layered onto the already fragile child care system, it shattered. Among
the report’s main findings on the pandemic’s impact on child care:

• As of July 2020, 35% of child care centers and 21% of family child care
programs remain closed nationwide.

• Child care attendance and enrollment remain significantly lower than they
were at the start of 2020. Seventeen of 32 states that submitted data for July
2020 lost more than 25% of their child care capacity.

• The cost to provide quality child care is also likely to increase due to lower
provider-child ratios and increased costs for personal protective equipment
(PPE) and cleaning supplies. Quality may suffer as child care providers focus
on ways to stay in business.

• Without significant public investment in our child care system, providers will
likely have to pass along extra costs related to COVID-19 to parents who are
already struggling to stay afloat during this economic downturn.

Picking Up the Pieces outlines three key components to build a better child care system after
COVID-19:

1. Public investment. With the additional stresses the pandemic has put
on an already fragile child care system, $50 billion in dedicated funding is
needed to stabilize the system. This significant funding level is necessary to
support families as they return to school or the workforce, save thousands
of child care jobs and businesses and ensure that we have a child care
system to return to when COVID-19 subsides.

2. A solid data foundation. Data is fundamental to an equitable child
care system, but it’s extremely hard to get data from all states in a timely,
standardized, systematic and efficient manner. CCAoA encourages the
development of automated, interoperable systems with common standards
to ensure that data collection, management, and dissemination is more
efficient and functional for stakeholders.

3. Resources and supports for families, children and child care
providers. Child Care Resource and Referral agencies (CCR&Rs) in nearly
every state and other intermediaries are positioned to help families
navigate complicated child care systems by providing consumer education
products and referrals to affordable, quality child care programs. Over
75% of CCR&Rs have plans to help child care providers reopen, including
providing information, helping providers secure PPE and cleaning supplies,
and working to recruit child care providers to repopulate local supply. E

X
E

C
U

T
IV

E
S

U
M

M
A

R
Y

Picking Up the Pieces 4

The COVID-19 pandemic has put a strain on most aspects of American life, including our
child care system. Long before COVID-19, the system was in trouble. Child Care Aware® of
America (CCAoA) examined this broken system in our report last year, The U.S. and the High
Price of Child Care.

It was:

• Fragmented. Funding streams for child care come from different sources
with different requirements. And each state has a different set of child care
policies – some differences even exist within a state.

• Inequitable. Children of color and children from low-income families are
less likely to be enrolled in high-quality, structured child care programs.

• Inaccessible. For many families in the U.S., access to affordable, high-
quality child care is not an option. Year after year, providers are leaving
the field, restricting parental choice even further. This is particularly true
for families of color, families living in rural areas and children with special
needs.

• Underfunded. When compared to other developed countries, the U.S. lags
behind in public spending for child care. Currently, the U.S. only spends less
than 0.5% of GDP on child care.1

When COVID-19 was layered onto the already fragile child care system, it shattered. Many
providers are in danger of closing because their attendance and enrollment (and therefore
their income) plunged and/or their expenses skyrocketed due to pandemic-related costs.
Based on the findings of a child care provider survey in July, the National Association for
the Education of Young Children (NAEYC) estimates that only 18% of providers can expect
to survive past the next year if they do not receive any financial support.2 We’re already
seeing the consequences: Parents are struggling to find child care arrangements that will
allow them to work productively, either from home or back in their workplaces. Without a
reliable, steady workforce, this country will not recover economically from the pandemic-
related shutdown. And a reliable workforce requires a functioning child care system. Simply
put – no child care, no recovery.

IN
T

R
O

D
U

C
T

IO
N

Picking Up the Pieces

Child Care Shattered Due to Covid-19

The US and the High Price of Child Care: 2019

Picking Up the Pieces 5

WHY PICKING UP THE PIECES?
In past years, CCAoA has released two annual reports examining the child care landscape. State Fact Sheets
explored child care supply, child care resource and referral agency (CCR&R) activities and quality initiatives in
each state. The U.S. and the High Price of Child Care compared child care affordability among states. Both reports
relied on data from the previous year gathered from CCR&Rs across the country.

However, the 2019 data we gathered does not fully reflect the reality of the massive changes in the child care
system as a result of COVID-19. So this year, we decided to combine the State Fact Sheets and the U.S. and the
High Price of Child Care into one report along with additional data we gathered from CCR&Rs and other sources
as recently as July 2020. The result is Picking Up the Pieces: Building a Better Child Care System Post COVID-19.
It features data, analysis and stories about how COVID-19 has affected the child care system.

Picking Up the Pieces is organized into three sections that explore the impact of COVID-19 on child care: Access,
Affordability and Quality. Each section features:

• Key findings of our 2019 survey of states about child care, as well as updated child care supply
data from July 2020. We were able to make child care supply comparisons pre-pandemic and
mid-pandemic.

• Case studies featuring different aspects of this crisis and how families and child care providers
are struggling.

Additionally, we release this report in conjunction with our new Child Care Data Center (CCDC). Please see our
interactive website and more information about CCDC in the Access section. Support for the CCDC was provided
by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect the view of the
Foundation.

Finally, we shared our data with economists who gave their impressions on the state of child care and the
consequences of not supporting families and child care providers.

For the sake of continuity, we still offer users the Child Care Affordability Appendices, which feature detailed
2019 child care price data.

Child Care Data Center

https://www.childcareaware.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/PUTP-Appendices-FINAL-9-18-20.pdf

Picking Up the Pieces 6

A
C

C
E

S
S

According to an expert panel convened by Child Trends and funded by the federal Office of
Planning, Research, and Evaluation (OPRE), access to child care ‘…means that parents, with
reasonable efforts and affordability, can enroll their child in an arrangement that supports
the child’s development and meets parents’ needs’.3 CCAoA measures access through the
change in the number of licensed child care providers over time.

2019 DATA
Even before the outbreak of COVID-19 and the associated closures of child care programs,
the supply of child care was decreasing. Results from our 2019 survey results show that
between 2018 and 2019, 53% of states reported a decline in the number of child care centers.
More alarmingly, 79% of states reported a decline in family child care (FCC) providers. While
more research is needed to identify the reasons for these declines, two theories are that the
aging child care workforce is retiring in greater numbers, and that there are few incentives
for new child care providers to enter the field.

Our data clearly shows that child care supply was significantly decreasing before the start of
this pandemic. New data and anecdotes from providers and families indicate the situation
has worsened since the beginning of 2020.

SINCE THE START OF THE PANDEMIC
While most states have allowed child care providers to reopen, barriers to access still exist.
Some child care providers are serving fewer children due to changes in licensing regulations
designed to prevent the spread of COVID-19. For example, many states have changed child
care licensing rules to only allow a maximum of 10 children per classroom. Table 1 shows
an example of the maximum ratios for children in centers in January 2020 compared to July
2020 for the state of Washington.

For further information about how provider group sizes have changed as a result of
COVID-19, please see CCAoA’s recent state-by-state analysis.

Although it may take a year or more to fully understand the extent of the impact of COVID-19
on our child care system, some worrying trends are emerging. As of July 2020, we found
that 35% of centers and 21% of family child care programs remain closed nationwide. Time
will tell if these closures become permanent. If they do, this will pose a serious problem
as our nation works to rebuild the economy. As the economy recovers and unemployed

Time Period Age Group Maximum Number of Children in Classroom

January 2020

Infant 8

Toddler 14

Preschooler 60 (20 per classroom)

July 2020

Infant 8

Toddler 9

Preschooler 27 (9 per classroom)

Table 1: Pre Covid-19 Child Care Ratios in Centers

State Policies and Ratio Changes during COVID-19

Picking Up the Pieces 7

parents find work, they will need child care for their young children. So will many parents currently working
remotely who are called back to the office. For our economy to regain strength, we must have a steady, reliable
workforce who aren’t distracted by child care worries. There is no economic recovery without child care.

CCDC
CCAoA has built the Child Care Data Center (CCDC), a data warehouse and
website which allows users to explore child care data at a deeper level. We
piloted the CCDC with six states: Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, Oregon, Wisconsin
and Washington. In December 2019, these states submitted data for the 2019
calendar year related to child care access and affordability. Support for the CCDC
was provided by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. The views expressed
here do not necessarily reflect the view of the Foundation.

In order to capture the change in child care supply during the initial months of
the pandemic, CCAoA requested the same data elements from these states as
of mid-July 2020. Four of the six pilot states were able to provide these datasets:
Missouri, Oregon, Wisconsin, and Washington. By comparing the 2019 numbers
to those from 2020, users can see the effect of the pandemic on child care in
these states, down to the county level.

Please use the interactive map to explore all of the CCDC data.

Mapping Work
Since March 2020, CCAoA’s research team has worked with multiple states to create maps that track the supply
of child care on a biweekly basis. We have eight states that have consistently provided data to us since the
beginning of COVID-19: Alaska, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, New Hampshire, Oklahoma and Washington.
We have used the maps here to analyze child care supply trends from April to July 2020. Figure 1 shows that a
significant percentage of providers in these states – between 20% and 40% – remain closed as of July 2020. We
found that in these states, family child care providers have reopened at a faster rate than centers. This may be
because family child care providers serve a smaller number of children and require less staff. Child care centers
that had to furlough their staff members during the period they were closed likely require more time to regain
or replace their staff.

Figure 1: Average Percent of Programs Closed by Month

Child Care Data Center

Picking Up the Pieces 8

Other Data Sources
Many researchers have been studying the effects of the pandemic on working families and child care providers.
The Urban Institute compiled a table of 88 surveys related to child care during the pandemic. Table 2 summarizes
the findings of some of these studies. Several common themes emerged from the survey findings:

• Parents are afraid to send their children back to child care

• Child care providers fear that they will not be able to survive without financial support

• In general, parents are struggling to find a child care situation that allows them to work

• Parents are unsure if they will be able to send their child back to their prior child care arrangements

In summary, multiple data sources show that child care supply was dramatically reduced as a result of COVID-19.
This is putting a strain on both parents and child care providers.

State Organization Timeframe Respondents Findings

Nationwide Bipartisan Policy Center April

National sample
of 800 working
parents with
children under
age 5 and paid
for child care in
the past 3
months

47% reported concerns about their
ability to afford child care once they
can return.
46% reported concerns that their child
care providers will not reopen.
Among parents who needed child
care during the pandemic, 63% found it
difficult to find quality, affordable child
care.
Nearly 20% of respondents reported
that they are working less hours during
the pandemic in order to provide child
care.

Nationwide Care.com May

2,000 parents of
children under
age 16 who
report that they
pay for child
care services

63% of parents are not comfortable
with returning their children to child
care settings as states reopen.
35% of these parents are considering
in-home child care.
Over 50% of parents believe that child
care prices will rise as a result of
COVID-19.
Nearly half are more concerned
about child care prices now than they
were pre-pandemic.

Nationwide

National
Association for

the Education of
Young Children

(NAEYC)

March

6,000 child
care providers
across the
country

Nearly 50% of providers reported
losing income due to lack of
attendance.
30% would not survive a closure of
more than 2 weeks.

Nationwide

National
Association for

the Education of
Young Children

(NAEYC)

June
5,344 child
care providers
nationwide

86% of providers report serving fewer
children compared to pre-pandemic
attendance.
70% of providers report additional
expenditures on staff, cleaning
supplies, and personal protective
equipment (PPE).

Nationwide Procare Solutions July

Based on child
care attendance
data from over
30,000 providers
who use the
Procare system

Based on data from this group of
providers, child care attendance is
on average 49% of what is was pre-
pandemic.

Table 2: Summary of Survey Findings – Child Care and COVID-19

https://www.urban.org/policy-centers/center-labor-human-services-and-population/projects/list-covid-19-child-care-surveys-and-data-analyses

https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/nationwide-survey-child-care-in-the-time-of-coronavirus/

https://www.care.com/c/stories/2423/how-much-does-child-care-cost/

https://www.naeyc.org/sites/default/files/globally-shared/downloads/PDFs/our-work/public-policy-advocacy/effects_of_coronavirus_on_child_care.final.pdf

https://www.naeyc.org/sites/default/files/globally-shared/downloads/PDFs/our-work/public-policy-advocacy/holding_on_until_help_comes.survey_analysis_july_2020.pdf

New Report Shows Child Care Centers Slowly Recovering after COVID-19 Closures

Picking Up the Pieces 9

CHILD CARE ATTENDANCE AND ENROLLMENT DATA
DURING COVID-19
CCAoA encourages the development of automated, interoperable systems that include all the critical pieces of
the child care data landscape. These technologies ensure that data collection, management, and dissemination
is more efficient and functional for stakeholders. Two critical pieces of the child care data landscape are
attendance and enrollment. Knowing the maximum number of child care slots only reveals one part of the
child care supply picture. We must also understand how many of those slots are filled or at least how many
children are attending child care to know how much additional capacity may be needed. However, this data
point is not consistently tracked across states. CCAoA worked with multiple organizations that have developed
software programs that help child care providers track attendance, payment and other administrative tasks.
These organizations include: brightwheel, Early Learning Ventures, Procare Solutions and Wonderschool. CCAoA
does not endorse any particular data management system.

Because these organizations generously provided attendance or enrollment data to CCAoA, we have been able
to explore child care trends before and during COVID-19.

Brightwheel is a leading technology platform serving child care providers of all sizes in all 50 states. The platform
saves administrative time and reduces costs with product areas such as licensing and compliance with new
COVID-19 requirements, automated invoicing and billing, messaging and communications, online learning and
lesson planning and enrollment management.

Brightwheel was able to provide CCAoA with weekly child care provider data from March to August 2020. The
dataset was categorized into four regions as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau: Midwest, Northeast, South and
West. As seen in Figure 2, the Northeast states had the lowest percentage of brightwheel child care providers
that remained open during Spring 2020, compared to other regions.

During the week of March 30th, 24% of child care programs using brightwheel in the Northeast were open. By
August 10th, that number had risen to 80%. In contrast, 64% of brightwheel providers in the Midwest remained
open throughout the Spring and as of August 2020, 95% of providers were open.

Figure 2: Percentage of Providers Open March to August 2020,
Brightwheel Participants

Home

Picking Up the Pieces 10

The same regional trends were seen in child attendance among providers using brightwheel. Figure 3 shows
the percentage of attendance compared to early March 2020. In early April 2020, attendance at brightwheel
providers in Northeastern states was 5% of what attendance was in early March. As of August 2020, attendance
for brightwheel providers in the Northeast had recovered to 49% of what it was in early March. As we saw with
providers using other child care management systems, attendance dropped dramatically in March through May,
with a gradual rise beginning in early June. Additionally, when examining provider and attendance data from
all of these platforms, we found that attendance has not fully recovered as of July and August 2020. Whether
attendance fully recovers to pre-pandemic levels remains to be seen.

Early Learning Ventures (ELV) is a nonprofit organization based in Colorado that is dedicated to helping child care
providers around the state develop the infrastructure and obtain the resources that they need to serve children
effectively and efficiently. ELV offers child care programs a range of services including a records management
system to track attendance, an online platform that helps providers find the resources they need to optimize
their business operations, a billing module and member support. The main base of ELV is small centers with a
licensed capacity between 15 and 30 children.

The ELV team provided CCAoA with weekly attendance data from 212 providers across the state of Colorado
from January 1 – July 31, 2020. To protect the privacy of these providers, ELV’s dataset did not include provider
name, address, or other identifying information. As seen in Figure 4, center-based providers have seen a sharper
decrease in weekly enrollment than FCC providers. For example, during the pre-pandemic week of January 10th,
centers reported an average attendance of 37 children and FCCs reported an average attendance of 6 children.
Centers saw the lowest average enrollment during the first three weeks in April. Attendance started to recover
for centers in June, but progress has been slow. As of July 31st, an average of 30 children were attending centers
while the number of children attending FCCs remained steady (5 children).

These findings are similar to our data, which showed that center-based child care has been harder hit by the
pandemic than home-based care. Parents may not need child care at this time or may fear sending their children
back. However, providers are struggling to stay in business with low attendance, a decrease in enrollment and
low revenue.

Figure 3: Attendance Percentage March to August 2020, Brightwheel
Participants

https://www.earlylearningventures.org/

Picking Up the Pieces 11

Wonderschool is an organization for child care providers whose mission is to ensure that every child has access
to early education that helps them realize their potential. All programs that participate in Wonderschool must
meet certain quality and safety standards that go beyond minimum state licensing requirements.

As of August 2020, 833 child care providers were participating in Wonderschool across 15 states. Nearly 75% of
Wonderschool providers are in California, while 20% are in New York. The remainder of Wonderschool providers
are located in Texas, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Colorado and several other states.

For most of its history, Wonderschool has served family child care providers. Recently, the team has started
working with center-based programs. As a result of COVID-19, there has also been a strong interest in other
types of child care such as nannying and micro schools – small ‘pods’ of children that gather to learn in a family
home with a teacher leading the lessons.

At the start of COVID-19, Wonderschool programmers added an option allowing providers to pause enrollments.
This allows a parent to hold their child’s spot until a specified end date without having to pay tuition. In May,
30% of student enrollments were paused. As of August, 15% of the children served by these providers still have
a paused enrollment status. Figure 5 shows the trends in paused enrollments from April to August 2020.

Figure 5: Percent of Paused Enrollments, March to July 2020,
Wonderschool

Figure 4: Average Weekly Attendance,January to July 2020, Early
Learning Ventures, Colorado Providers

https://www.wonderschool.com/

Picking Up the Pieces 12

Furthermore, for providers that continued to collect tuition through the Wonderschool platform, the average
drop in collected tuition was around 23% due to paused enrollments.

Procare Solutions provides management solutions for child care owners, administrators, educators and
parents. Its products help child care providers manage their records, communicate with parents and handle
tuition payments. In July 2020, Procare released a report detailing how COVID-19 has impacted its users. The
report includes a state-by-state analysis that tracks weekly child care attendance and program closures. Procare
provided CCAoA with an updated dataset so that we could examine how the providers that use its platform have
recovered as of August 2020.

Figure 6 shows the nationwide percentage of programs that use Procare that were open on a weekly basis from
March 2nd to August 31st. The numbers from March 9th onwards are a percentage of providers that are open
compared to the number open on March 2nd. As with our other case studies, we saw a downward trend in
March and April, with a slow recovery beginning in May.

Figure 7 shows that as of August 24th, nationwide child attendance is only 49% of what it was during the week
of March 2nd. Although attendance among programs that use ProCare has risen significantly compared to late
March and early April, it is still well below attendance levels seen before the start of COVID-19.

Figure 6: Number of Open Providers as Percent of Number Open on 2
March 2020, Procare Solutions

Figure 7: Percent of Child Attendance as Percent Attendance on 2 March
2020, Procare Solutions

Login Portal

New Report Shows Child Care Centers Slowly Recovering after COVID-19 Closures

Picking Up the Pieces 13

Overall Findings
Although these three platforms serve different types of child care providers in geographically diverse locations,
some trends are apparent. Child care providers using these platforms generally saw a sharp decrease in
attendance or enrollment beginning in March. By June, enrollment and attendance started picking up, but
providers remain below the average enrollment/attendance levels seen at the beginning of 2020.

These findings are further evidence that child care providers are struggling financially and many programs may
not survive COVID-19. Once providers permanently leave the field, parents who were already struggling to find
affordable child care that works for them will be at an even bigger disadvantage. Without financial support for
child care providers, supply gaps will widen across the country.

WHY CHILD CARE MATTERS TO BUSINESSES
Access to quality child care options makes it possible for parents to work, and
businesses benefit from their …

Final RepoRt

From representation
to inclusion:

Diversity leadership for
the 21st-Century Military

Final RepoRt

From representation
to inclusion:

Diversity leadership for
the 21st-Century Military

MILITARY LEADERSHIP DIVERSITY COMMISSION
1851 South Bell Street

Arlington, VA 22202

March 15, 2011

The Honorable Barack Obama, President of the United States
The 112th United States Congress

Mr. President and Members of Congress:

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 established the Military
Leadership Diversity Commission. The Commission was asked to conduct a comprehen-
sive evaluation and assessment of policies and practices that shape diversity among mili-
tary leaders. Sixteen interrelated tasks, given by Congress, informed the Commission’s
enclosed final report, From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-
Century Military. As chairman of this Commission, I am proud to present this report for
your consideration.

The Commission held itself to high standards of openness and transparency in all
deliberations. Moreover, we modeled inclusiveness by inviting those with diverse back-
grounds, expertise, and experience to have a say in our independent analysis. The Com-
mission sought extensive input for our deliberations from the Department of Defense and
the Services as well as the private sector. We hosted 13 public hearings, meeting in loca-
tions across the country where many active-duty servicemembers and veterans reside. We
heard public testimony from top military leaders, subject matter experts, and diversity
officers from leading corporations known for their diversity practices. In addition, we con-
ducted interviews with servicemembers.

The Commission believes that the diversity of our servicemembers is the unique
strength of our military. Current and future challenges can be better met by broadening
our understanding of diversity and by effectively leading our uniformed men and women
in ways that fully leverage their differences. While we find the promotion policies and
practices of the Department of Defense and the Services to be fair, we find also that there
are some barriers to improving demographic representation among military leaders.

Among the 20 recommendations given in this report is a new definition of diversity
for the 21st century. We offer ways to remove barriers that are affecting the demographic

makeup of military leadership, and we suggest approaches to leadership, education, and
assessment that can enable the Department of Defense and the Services to fully benefit
from the increased diversity of military leadership. We are confident that these recom-
mendations will positively shape our military leadership in ways that meet the unique
challenges of this century. However, the Commission recognizes that presidential and
congressional guidance and support are necessary if success is to be realized.

It has been both an honor and privilege for this Commission to support the U.S.
military’s continuing journey of becoming a preeminently inclusive institution.

Sincerely,

Lester L. Lyles, Chairman
Military Leadership Diversity Commission

COMMISSIONER SIgNATuRES

Current Commissioners

From representation to inclusion: Diversity leaDership For the 21st-century military

Former Commissioners

vii

PREFACE

The U.S. Armed Forces became a deliberately inclusive organization in 1948, when
President Harry S. Truman issued his historic Executive Order 9981 that called for
“equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services” (The
White House, 1948). Since then, the U.S. military force has endeavored to become
an inclusive organization dedicated to the equality of all its members, regardless of
their background. Its dedication to equal opportunity has resulted in increased rep-
resentation of racial/ethnic minorities and women among the top military leaders in
recent decades. Despite undeniable successes, however, the Armed Forces have not
yet succeeded in developing a continuing stream of leaders who are as diverse as the
Nation they serve. Racial/ethnic minorities and women still lag behind non-Hispanic
white men in terms of representative percentage of military leadership positions held.
Marked changes in the demographic makeup of the United States will throw existing
disparities into sharp relief, creating a recruiting pool that looks very different from the
pool of 30–40 years ago, from which today’s leaders were drawn.

Recognizing existing disparities and seeking to look ahead, Congress, in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Section 596, mandated the
creation of the Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC). The Commis-
sion was tasked to “conduct a comprehensive evaluation and assessment of policies
that provide opportunities for the promotion and advancement of minority members
of the Armed Forces, including minority members who are senior officers.” Its charter
required that a final report be delivered directly to the President and Congress one year
after its first meeting.

An independent deliberative body, the Commission was itself an inclusive orga-
nization. Military Commissioners were active-duty and retired officers and senior
enlisted personnel from both the Active and Reserve Components of all the Armed
Forces, including the Coast Guard, as well as civilians. They included those who served
in major armed conflicts from World War II to Iraq and Afghanistan. Civilian Com-
missioners included senior executives of major corporations, civil servants, and a law
school chancellor.

The Commission’s charter listed 16 specific tasks. To address these tasks, the
Commission was divided into ten subcommittees, each supported by a research team.
Each subcommittee produced issue papers on specific topics and a decision paper that
reports the subcommittee’s findings, conclusions, and recommendations.1

1 The Legal Implications Subcommittee did not produce a decision paper because the Commission made no
recommendations specific to the subcommittee’s findings. Rather, those findings served to inform all of the
Commission’s recommendations.

From representation to inclusion: Diversity leaDership For the 21st-century military

viii

This final report, founded on rigorous research and enhanced by serious and open
deliberation, presents the Commission’s main findings and recommends policies and
practices to develop future military leaders who represent the face of America.

CONTENTS

Commissioner Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Figures and Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxi

SECTION I: INTRODuCTION
Chapter One: About the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Chapter Two: Defining Diversity for a New Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

SECTION II: BuILDINg THE FOuNDATION FOR CHANgE
Chapter Three: Ensuring Leadership Commitment to Diversity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

SECTION III: DEVELOPINg FuTuRE LEADERS
Chapter Four: The Demographic Composition of Today’s Military Leadership . . . . . . . . . . 39
Chapter Five: The Eligible Pool of Candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Chapter Six: Outreach and Recruiting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Chapter Seven: Branching and Assignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Chapter Eight: Promotion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Chapter Nine: Retention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Chapter Ten: Going Beyond Race/Ethnicity and Gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

SECTION IV: ENSuRINg CONTINuED PROgRESS
Chapter Eleven: Managing and Sustaining Diversity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Chapter Twelve: Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

APPENDIxES
A. The Military Leadership Diversity Commission Charter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
B. Commission Members . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
C. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
D. Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

FIguRES AND TABLE

Figures
2.1. 21st-Century Inclusion Builds on the Foundation of 20th-Century

Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.1. Best Practices for Managing Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2. The 1998 DoD Human Goals Charter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.1. Racial/Ethnic Minority and Female Shares of Officers and Enlisted

Personnel, by Component, September 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.2. Racial/Ethnic Minority Shares of Enlisted Personnel, by Service and

Rank, September 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.3. Female Shares of Enlisted Personnel, by Service and Rank,

September 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.4. Racial/Ethnic Minority Shares of Officers, by Service and Grade,

September 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.5. Female Shares of Officers, by Service and Grade, September 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.6. All Stages of the Military Personnel Life Cycle Affect the Demographic

Composition of Military Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.1. The Cumulative Effect of Individual Requirements on the Demographic

Composition of the Eligible Enlisted Population, Marine Corps, 2009 . . . . . 48
5.2. The Cumulative Effect of Individual Requirements on the Demographic

Composition of the Eligible Officer Population, Marine Corps, 2009 . . . . . . . 48
6.1. Comparison of Air Force ROTC Host Locations and Student Body

Demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
7.1. Percentage of AC Officers in Tactical/Operational Occupations,

December 2008, by Pay Grade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
7.2. Percentage in Nontactical/Nonoperational and Tactical/Operational

Occupations Who Were White Men, December 2008, by Service . . . . . . . . . . . 65
11.1. The Centrality of the CDO Within the Proposed Diversity Management

System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

Table
11.1. Court Martial Cases, by Race/Ethnicity Group, 2008. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

xiii

SuMMARY

Th is report presents the fi ndings and recommendations of the MLDC. Under the pro-
visions of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Section 596,
Congress asked the Commission to “conduct a comprehensive evaluation and assess-
ment of policies that provide opportunities for the promotion and advancement of
minority members of the Armed Forces, including minority members who are senior
offi cers.” Congress charged the Commission to carry out 16 interrelated tasks. Th e
nonpartisan, deliberative body of military and civilian leaders researched, refl ected on,
and recommended improvements to existing diversity-related policies and off ered new
initiatives designed to be supportive of the missions and goals of the Department of
Defense (DoD).

Th e Commission’s recommendations support two overriding and related objec-
tives: (1) that the Armed Forces systematically develop a demographically diverse lead-
ership that refl ects the public it serves and the forces it leads and (2) that the Services
pursue a broader approach to diversity that includes the range of backgrounds, skill
sets, and personal attributes that are necessary to enhancing military performance.

Th e Commission acknowledges that the Services have been leaders in providing
opportunities for all servicemembers, regardless of their racial/ethnic background or
gender. Today’s mission-eff ective force is a living testament to progress in the areas
of military equal opportunity policies and
related recruiting and management tactics.
However, more needs to be done to address
21st-century challenges.

Th e Armed Forces have not yet suc-
ceeded in developing a continuing stream of
leaders who are as demographically diverse
as the Nation they serve. Current projections suggest that the proportion of racial/ethnic
minority youth will increase in this century, while the proportion of non- Hispanic
white youth will decline. More importantly, racial/ethnic minorities and women are
still underrepresented among the Armed Forces’ top leadership, compared with the
servicemembers they lead. Th is disparity will become starkly obvious without the suc-
cessful recruitment, promotion, and retention of racial/ethnic minorities among the
enlisted force. Without sustained attention, this problem will only become more acute
as the racial/ethnic and cultural makeup of the United States continues to change.

Th e Armed Forces must also acknowledge that diversity encompasses more than
demographics, and they must take action to harness the range of knowledge, skills,
and backgrounds needed to prevail in the rapidly changing operational environment.
Leaders will need to address complex and uncertain emergent threats. For example,

[D]espite our progress today, too many people
still suff er from what I call the illusion of inclu-
sion, which is a condition you get when you
rest on past laurels.

—The Honorable Claiborne Haughton, Jr.,
remarks to the Commission, 2010

From representation to inclusion: Diversity leaDership For the 21st-century military

xiv

U.S. military and civilian cyber systems
are becoming more complex to defend and
utilize, and enemy techniques blur the line
between combat and noncombat situations
on the ground. Th e ability to work collab-
oratively with many stakeholders, including
international partners, will also be critical

in meeting such challenges and will require greater foreign-language, regional, and
cultural skills. In that vein, expert testimony comes from General James Mattis, then–
Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command. Closing out the 2010 Joint Warfi ghting
Conference, he stated,

In this age, I don’t care how tactically or operationally brilliant you are, if you
cannot create harmony—even vicious harmony—on the battlefi eld based on
trust across service lines, across coalition and national lines, and across civilian/
military lines, you really need to go home, because your leadership in today’s
age is obsolete. We have got to have offi cers who can create harmony across all
those lines. (quoted in Boyer, 2010)

To address these challenges, the Commission proposes 20 recommendations to

• establish a defi nition of diversity that addresses the complexity of today’s
environment

• build a foundation for change by ensuring leadership commitment to diversity
• develop and maintain a qualifi ed and demographically diverse military leadership
• ensure continued progress through policy goals and metrics that allow DoD to

manage and sustain diversity.

Defi ne Diversity for a New Era
Currently, each Service defi nes diversity diff erently. Developing a uniform defi nition of
diversity to be used throughout DoD can inspire a common vision and elicit the needed
changes. Th e Commission’s recommended defi nition, presented below, brings together
DoD’s core values and the core values of each Service, and it addresses today’s unique
mission and demographic challenges:

Diversity is all the diff erent characteristics and attributes of individuals that are con-
sistent with Department of Defense core values, integral to overall readiness and mis-
sion accomplishment, and refl ective of the Nation we serve.

Th e defi nition acknowledges that individuals come to the military not only with
diff erent cultural backgrounds but also with diff erent skills, experiences, and talents. It
also acknowledges that these diff erences are operationally relevant. With proper lead-
ership, diversity can increase military agility and responsiveness.

And the issue that we’re talking about here
today—diversity—is a readiness issue. Sus-
taining our all-volunteer force is a readiness
issue.

—The Honorable Cliff ord Stanley,
remarks to the Commission, 2010

summary

Th e defi nition is consistent with equal opportunity policies and practices. If poli-
cies resulting from the new defi nition are properly communicated, implemented, and
assessed, the new concept will help to further eliminate discrimination and guide DoD
along a path of inclusion.

Build the Foundation for Change
Leveraging diversity as a vital strategic military resource will require the commitment,
vision, and know-how of leaders at every level. Without this commitment to instill
respect for diversity as a core value, the needed cultural change may not take place.

Ensure Leadership Commitment to Diversity
Diversity leadership must become a core competency at all levels of the Armed Forces,
and respect for diversity should be made an explicit core value of DoD and the Services.
An eff ective leader promotes fairness and equity in his or her organization or work-
group and knows how to focus a broadly diverse group to use its members’ diff erences
in ways that benefi t the mission. Getting a diverse group to work together in ways that
improve mission capabilities is a learned skill. Th e Services should provide diversity
leadership education and training, distinct
from traditional forms of general diversity
training, to servicemembers at every level.

Th is requires a fundamental shift in
institutional thinking about diversity. One
clear message comes from both the litera-
ture on diversity management and the expe-
rience of organizations with a strong repu-
tation for diversity: Such a shift requires
the personal and visible commitment of top
leaders. Th e Secretary of Defense, Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , Service
Secretaries and Chiefs, and senior enlisted leaders will be critical to implementing the
kind of change needed to inspire and manage reform.

To meet emerging operational challenges, the Services need to identify and reward
the range of skills required for mission success. To endure, the new understanding of
diversity as a way to enhance mission eff ectiveness must become inherent in military
culture and in the military’s way of doing business.

Commitment to change is expressed fully by national leaders when new goals
and values are made into law. Consistent with this insight, the Commission recom-
mends that Congress revise Title 10, Section 113, to require the Secretary of Defense
to report annually on the status and progress of DoD’s diversity eff orts.

Secretaries and Chiefs, and senior enlisted leaders will be critical to implementing the

I’ve always considered myself, in addition
to being the commander, a safety offi cer of
every organization I led. That was something
I couldn’t hand off to anybody else. And the
second thing that I always considered myself
as being was the diversity offi cer . . . . Yes, there
are other people who had staff responsibilities
for all of this, but ultimately, those two respon-
sibilities I saw as my own, because they are
consequential of good and strong leadership.

—The Honorable Eric Shinseki,
remarks to the Commission, 2010

From representation to inclusion: Diversity leaDership For the 21st-century military

xvi

Develop Future Leaders
The Commission found that top military leaders are representative neither of the popu-
lation they serve nor of the forces they lead. The extent to which racial/ethnic minori-
ties and women are underrepresented varies across the Services, but the Commission
found, on average, low racial/ethnic minority and female representation among senior
military officers.

During the Vietnam War, the lack of diversity in military leadership led to prob-
lems that threatened the integrity and performance of the Nation’s military (Becton et
al., 2003). This is because servicemembers’ vision of what is possible for their career is
shaped by whether they see individuals with similar backgrounds excelling and being
recognized in their Service. The performance of the Nation’s military is tied to the indi-
vidual’s belief that he or she will be treated fairly regardless of his or her background.

The Commission found four explanations for discrepancies in representation
among senior military leaders: low racial/ethnic minority and female presence among
initial officer accessions, lower representation of racial/ethnic minority and female offi-
cers in career fields associated with advancement to flag/general officer rank, lower
retention of midlevel female servicemembers across the enlisted and officer spectrum,
and lower rates of advancement among racial/ethnic minority and female officers. To
address these issues, the Commission recommends the actions summarized below.

Increase the Pool of Eligible Candidates
Recent statistics from the Pentagon show that three out of four young people ages
17–24 are not eligible to enlist in the military (Gilroy, 2009). Many fail to meet entry
requirements related to education, test scores, citizenship, health status, and past crim-
inal history. Further, racial/ethnic minorities are less likely to meet eligibility require-
ments than are non-Hispanic whites, and that gap is widening. This is a national secu-
rity issue requiring the attention and collected effort of top public officials, such as
the President, members of Congress, and State and local leaders, all of whom can
turn the tide by developing and executing strong, united, action-oriented programs
to improve eligibility among the youth population. Together, these officials and other
stakeholders, such as DoD, the Department of Education, the Department of Health
and Human Services, and the Department of Homeland Security, can and should
improve educational and physical readiness among American youth and foster new
interest in military service.

Improve Outreach and Recruiting Strategies
In the military’s closed personnel system, tomorrow’s leaders are developed and selected
from today’s recruits. Recognizing this constraint, the Services employ a variety of
strategies to attract qualified youth to enlist or join officer commissioning programs,
such as the Service academies, the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps, and Officer Can-
didate School/Officer Training School programs. The Commission’s review of recent
accessions revealed that, in each Service, at least one racial/ethnic minority group was
underrepresented. The review also revealed that women were underrepresented across

summary

xvii

all the Services. The Commission’s recommendations include that DoD and the Ser-
vices explore untapped recruiting markets, require accountability for recruiting from
underrepresented demographic groups, and develop a common application for Service
academies and the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps.

Eliminate Barriers to Career Advancement
Increasing the racial/ethnic and gender diversity of senior leadership requires elimi-
nating barriers that disproportionately affect the advancement of racial/ethnic minori-
ties and women. This can be done on two levels. First, the Services should ensure
that all servicemembers are equally well prepared to manage their own career pro-
gression. Related preparation steps include educating all servicemembers about the
promotion process early in their careers and mentoring them at all stages of the career
process. Multiple occasions for preparation can help servicemembers recognize career-
enhancing opportunities and make choices that further their professional and personal
goals.

Second, DoD and the Services must remove institutional barriers in order to open
traditionally closed doors, especially those relating to assignments—both the initial
career field assignment and subsequent assignments to key positions. An important
step in this direction is that DoD and the Services eliminate combat exclusion policies
for women, including removing barriers and inconsistencies, to create a level playing
field for all servicemembers who meet the qualifications.

Ensure Continued Progress
The changes recommended by the Commission cannot be managed or sustained with-
out developing a stronger organizational structure and a system of accountability,
monitoring, and enforcement.

Realign the Organizational Structure
Currently, responsibility for DoD diversity management falls under the Office of
Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity. This office is understaffed, isolated
from top leadership, and unable to set the agenda or drive progress. The central feature
of the new accountability system proposed by the Commission is the Chief Diversity
Officer. This new position will report directly to the Secretary of Defense to ensure
that diversity management is embraced as a “line” rather than “staff” responsibility. The
second key feature of this system is a set of mutually reinforcing elements that work
together to provide effective, consistent implementation and persistent accountability
for achieving the goals of diversity and inclusion. Supported by the existing Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) Research & Analysis office,
which will be enhanced to deal with diversity-related issues, the Chief Diversity Offi-
cer will monitor and advise on all facets of the system for the Secretary of Defense.

From representation to inclusion: Diversity leaDership For the 21st-century military

xviii

Institute a System of Accountability
The Secretary of Defense will oversee the diversity effort of DoD and the Services
through annual accountability reviews with the Service Secretaries, Chiefs, and senior
enlisted leaders. In parallel, the Deputy Secretary of Defense will convene biannually
the Deputy’s Advisory Working Group to discuss the status and progress of diversity
efforts throughout the Armed Forces. Finally, to ensure consistent implementation of
the new diversity vision, each of the Service Chiefs will hold internal accountability
reviews prior to meeting with the Secretary of Defense. Reviews will be conversations
that focus on progress and areas for improvement. They will enable military leader-
ship not only to see evidence about demographics but also to take stock of the diversity
awareness and leadership of those in line to succeed current leaders. In particular, the
reviews …

AR Paper Rubric

Sample AR Thesis and Outline
Thesis Statement: Because the company accounts for resiliency, survivability, and capability when planning
operations in degraded environments, the Marine Corps should incorporate Waffle House’s emergency
operating procedures to supply chain processes when executing the EABO concept.

I. Problems with the current supply models in degraded environments
a. Problem #1: Current supply chains maintain a preponderance of supplies within close proximity

at limited geographical locations.
i. The EABO concept deploys small elements to temporary locations as part of a structure

of shooters and sensors integrated with naval assets.1
ii. However, the Commandant’s Planning Guidance describes “actively contested”

battlefield actions throughout all warfighting domains.2
iii. As such, practices used for the last seventeen years in Afghanistan and Iraq will not stand

up to a peer adversary with capabilities in all warfighting domains.

b. Problem #2: Resupplying small units throughout distributed operations (DO) in isolated cells
conducting simultaneous distributed operations will challenge the linear supply chain system and
planning for inventory.

i. Fires, aviation, and logistical support will not be guaranteed as the struggle of wills
occurs.3

1. This can lead to lack of sufficient inventory in areas where resources are needed
most.

2. Adversaries will contest all supply transportation, particularly class I, III, and V
supplies.

ii. Units will not be able to rely on a single supplier or supply chain to receive requirements
within a necessary timeline.

II. Solutions to Problems: Waffle House successfully implemented a supply chain in support of
natural disaster recovery that focused on staging known requirements and inventory
management. These strategies can also improve the EABO concept in the FOE.

a. Solution to Problem #1: Staging

i. Waffle House stages key assets, such as generators, recreational vehicles for worker
billeting, and larger supply stocks, at locations immediately outside the forecasted path of
the storm.4

1. Each of these creates resiliency in operations immediately following the passing
of the storm by enabling location’s capabilities to serve customers in a degraded
environment until they are back to full capacity

2. This effect of decentralizing and flattening the supply chain ultimately allows for
the rapid and flexible aggregation of supplies and equipment to a desired location
or unit.5

ii. Expeditionary advanced bases should be viewed as staging areas for supplies and all
operating units should have the enduring task of conducting resupply missions if
necessary.

iii. EABO concept can employ similar strategies. Instead of having a small number of large
supply nodes, each smaller unit or base would serve as a staging area.

b. Solution to Problem #2: Inventory

i. Waffle House streamlines supplies/inventory required to maintain operations
immediately after a storm.

1. Restaurants in affected areas typically shift to a limited menu in order to resume
operations as soon as possible. Doing so allows maximum use of grill space,
available power, and fuel resources.

2. Locations are able to focus on maintaining higher volumes of a reduced quantity
of ingredients and supplies.6

ii. Using a non-linear supply chain with supplies/inventory dispersed throughout the
battlefield would minimize the amount of loss from an enemy attack on a single location
and better enable overall supply chain survivability.

III. Counterarguments
a. Counter #1: Implementing new supply chain practices would create a burden on current

operations.
i. In the case of Waffle House, commitment to mitigate disruption risk from natural

disasters increases overall operating costs due to the significant resources dedicated
toward storm preparedness.

ii. This process, however, ensures the company is best able to perform under extremely
degraded environments.7

b. Counter #2: The possible monetary cost to establish non-linear supply chains during exercises
and begin streamlining consumables and repair parts throughout the fleet is substantial.

1 Headquarters US Marine Corps, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, last modified December 9, 2018,
http://www.candp.marines.mil/Concepts/Subordinate-Operating-Concepts/Expeditionary-Advanced-Base-
Operations/.

2 David H. Berger, Commandant’s Planning Guidance: 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps (Washington,
DC: Headquarters, US Marine Corps, July 2019), 1.

3 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1976), 75.

4 Ozlem Ergun et al., “Waffle House Restaurants hurricane response: A case study,” International Journal of
Production Economics 126 (2010): 119, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/46487174.

5 Ori Brafman and Rod A. Beckstrom, The Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of Leaderless
Organizations (New York: Penguin Group, 2006), 201-202, 207-208

6 Ozlem Ergun et al., “Waffle House Restaurants hurricane response: A case study,” 117.

7 Ozlem Ergun et al., “Waffle House Restaurants hurricane response: A case study,” 114.

AR Thesis and Outline Checklist
Overall Structure

� Thesis Statement
� Problem Section
� Solution Section
� Counterarguments

Thesis Statement � Advocates for a specific position/change
� Clear and concise

General format: “The USMC should/must (action verb) (specific change).”

Common Mistakes
Observations

Poor example: The MQ-9 Reaper is the best hunter-killer UAV available.
(That’s good. But what should the USMC do?)
Fix: The USMC should invest in the MQ-9 Reaper.

Indictments

Poor Example: Marine Corps PME needs to change to educate a better force.
(How? This just recognizes a problem, not what needs to change.)
Fix: All Marine Corps PME should include a community service component in order to
strengthen students’ bonds to their local municipalities.

Questions

Poor example: We must ask, should the USMC establish promotion quotas for protected
groups based on race, gender, and intellect?
(Rephrase this. Make a firm statement to avoid confusion.)
Fix: The USMC should establish promotion quotas for protected groups based on race,
gender, and intellect.

Problems � Identify 2-3 specific harms of the status quo

� Sourcing to validate the harms
� Impacts of the harms
� Exists within DoD scope of affect

Ex. Identifying a problem with Congress is not “solvable” from the DoD purview
Solutions � Objective explanation of the solution (if topic is a policy or doctrine change)

� Clearly solves the specific problems from the “Problems” section
� Sourcing to prove the solution works/can work
� Positive impacts of implementing the change
� Parallel structure to “Problems” section (Solution A solves Problem A, etc…)

Counterarguments � Presents opposing opinions that extend the information covered in the paper
� Doesn’t repeat points already made in the paper
� REFUTES counterarguments with logic and reasoning

Sample AR Paper

Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations with a Side of Bacon:

How Waffle House Can Inform the Marine Corps Supply Chain

Captain Student Sample

USMC

Major Faculty Advisor – CG17

January 29, 2021

Civilian companies in the United States often find themselves conducting business during

and immediately after natural disasters. Several companies, particularly in the American

Southeast, develop standard operating procedures and techniques to expedite the return to

providing essential services after a natural disaster occurs. One company–Waffle House–

developed such an efficient and effective model that the Federal Emergency Management

Agency (FEMA) informally uses a “Waffle House test” to gauge how well an effected area is

faring following a storm.1 From unpredictable weather to operating in contested and degraded

environments, Waffle House’s emergency operating procedures contain helpful strategies that

can inform the development of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations

(EABO) concept. Because the company accounts for resiliency, survivability, and capability

when planning operations in degraded environments, the Marine Corps should incorporate

Waffle House’s emergency operating procedures to supply chain processes when executing the

EABO concept.

Currently, the Marine Corps is ill-prepared to face two distinct challenges concerning the

supply system in the future operating environment: supply proximity and resupply operations.

First, current supply practices rely on the outdated concept of large, centralized supply hubs,

commonly known as an “iron mountain.” Creating a small number of large operating

bases/supply hubs, such as Camp Leatherneck in Afghanistan, allows a for well-stocked supply

chain. This model, however, incurs risk by maintaining a preponderance of supplies within close

proximity at limited geographic locations that can experience difficulty “distributing supplies to

highly dispersed units.”2 In contrast to the supply approach in Afghanistan, the EABO concept

calls for small elements to deploy to temporary locations as part of a structure of shooters and

sensors integrated with naval assets.3 While the iron mountain creates a large bank of supplies at

a few locations, the EABO concept calls for targeted supplies at many, temporary locations.

Practices used for the last seventeen years in Afghanistan and Iraq will not stand up to a peer

adversary with capabilities in all warfighting domains, because large supply centers will become

easy targets.

Second, because of the current iron mountain approach, dispersed units in the future

operating environment (FOE) will experience resupply problems. The Commandant’s Planning

Guidance suggests an “actively contested” nature of future maritime spaces.4 Commanders

should assume there will be combat losses in future peer fights, as a struggle of wills does not

guarantee fires, aviation, and logistical support.5 Resupplying small, isolated units will challenge

the current supply chain system, because adversaries will contest transportation of all supplies—

particularly class I, III, and V supplies. In this environment, units will not be able to rely on a

single supplier or supply chain—like the iron mountain—to receive requirements within a

necessary timeline.

A final problem concerns available technology required to execute the EABO concept.

Operations often look toward the future to address how logistics and supply chain functions will

occur. Advanced technologies—unmanned vehicles, surface connectors, and transport

supplies—and personnel fill many of the capability gaps required to implement the EABO

concept. The Marine Corps, however, faces a substantial challenge to successfully implement

this concept until it fully develops these assets. As described in Marine Corps Hybrid Logistics,

the Marine Corps must remain capable with current technologies while researching and

developing capabilities for the future.6 Because supply chain problems in the FOE will come to

fruition before the Marine Corps can implement new supply technology, failure to utilize current

supply chain assets and technologies will lead to vulnerabilities when implementing the EABO

concept.

Without a change, supply chain problems will impact operations in the FOE. Civilian

companies, however, exemplify applicable logistics solutions the Marine Corps should adopt. In

particular, Waffle House operates through the degraded environment of natural disasters and

utilizes key strategies that can provide resiliency, survivability, and capability to the Marine

Corps operating within the confines of the EABO concept. These ideas include managing non-

linear supply availability throughout a dispersed environment, streamlining required equipment

and supplies to expediently recover from disruption, and operating in a degraded environment.

Implementing these strategies in the current supply chain system increases the Marine Corps’

ability to implement the EABO concept in both the near and distant future.

Waffle House successfully implemented a supply chain in support of natural disaster

recovery (primarily in response to hurricanes) that focuses on inventory management and staging

known requirements. As the path of a hurricane becomes more defined and known, Waffle

House stages key assets—generators, recreational vehicles for worker billeting, and larger supply

stocks—at locations immediately outside the forecasted path of the storm.7 Each of these creates

resiliency in operations immediately following the storm’s passing by enabling locations’

capabilities to serve customers in a degraded environment until those sites are back to full

capacity. The EABO concept can utilize the same strategy by staging supplies and equipment at

multiple bases just outside the suspected engagement area. Instead of having a small number of

large supply nodes, each smaller unit or expeditionary advanced base would serve as a staging

area. This starfish effect—an organizational theory showcasing the power of decentralized

components in an organization’s infrastructure—allows rapid and flexible aggregation of

supplies and equipment to a desired location or unit.8 Expeditionary advanced bases can function

as staging areas for supplies, and all operating units should have the enduring task of conducting

resupply missions if necessary. Using a non-linear supply chain with supplies dispersed

throughout the battlefield would minimize the amount of loss that would occur from an enemy

attack on a single location and enable overall supply chain resiliency and survivability.9

Implementing such changes requires little new technology and only requires each unit in an area

of operations to carry a larger supply stock.

In addition to staging supplies, Waffle House streamlines the types of supplies required to

maintain operations immediately after a storm. Restaurants in affected areas typically shift to a

limited menu to resume operations as soon as possible. Doing so allows maximum use of grill

space, available power, and fuel resources.10 Locations can focus on maintaining higher volumes

of a reduced quantity of ingredients and supplies. Using similar logic, the FOE supply chain

would benefit from implementing similar parts and standardizing consumables to increase

survivability. For example, the Marine Corps plans to implement the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle

(JLTV) in lieu of the Humvee.11 In addition to the JLTV, the EABO concept would continue to

include Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacements (MTVR), multiple High Mobility Multipurpose

Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) variants, and some form of Material Handling Equipment (MHE).

Few, if any, parts between these vehicle variants are interchangeable, and the addition of the

JLTV in the following years will only increase strain on the supply chain. Something as simple

as a single type of tire, oil filter, or tool set places less strain on the supply chain and increases

the likelihood that multiple operating bases in the vicinity could provide resupply to the end user.

Reducing variances within all Table of Authorized Material Control Number (TAMCN) classes

decreases overall packaging and bed space requirements, thus increasing the effectiveness of

transportation. The overall effect of streamlining supply requirements reduces the weight of the

Marine Corps and creates a more agile force.

Finally, Waffle House expects natural disasters to disrupt its supply chain. Preparation for

a natural disaster isn’t viewed as mere response task; it’s viewed as a planned and anticipated

event necessary for normal business operations.12 The Marine Corps should, at a minimum,

implement non-linear supply chain practices into scenarios and training exercises preparing units

to implement the EABO concept. Exercises that implement varying supply chains nodes can

prepare staffs and planners to creatively construct ways to support the end user regardless of

scenario or opposing force action. For example, an exercise using multiple small Combat Service

Support Areas (CSSAs) to support an infantry battalion would face a training scenario impeding

resupply of a particular company from the closest CSSA. Resources could be diverted from

alternate CSSAs to complete resupply. Resilient organizations operate “under the assumption

that uncertainty is irreducible.”13 By accepting the necessity of operating in a degraded

environment, the Marine Corps can establish proficiency in supply chain management required

by the EABO concept.

Many may argue the changes to supply chain practices would create a burden on current

training operations, because adjusted training shifts focus away from completing the infantry

company’s mission-essential tasks. Aligning training objectives to reflect non-linear supply

chain environments, however, allows the supporting logistical unit to increase competency and

ensures the company can perform in extremely degraded environments.14 Updated training

exercises, such as the alternate CSSA scenario, enable Marine forces to train for the complex

environments outlined in the Commandant’s Planning Guidance and build resiliency within all

levels of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). Failure to do so leaves the Marine Corps

vulnerable when operating in the FOE against a peer competitor.

Another counterargument revolves around the cost of increased training. In the case of

Waffle House, their commitment to mitigate disruption risk from natural disasters increases

overall operating costs due to the significant resources dedicated to storm preparedness. The

Marine Corps, however, can mitigate its long-term cost by implementing updated training

practices adaptable to emerging technology. Next Generation Logistics (NEXLOG), such as

additive manufacturing, smart logistics, and unmanned capabilities, are already in the works.15

The Marine Corps will eventually need to update its training anyway. Thus, it can save time and

money in the long run by updating training now that accounts for current non-linear supply

practices and can facilitate future emergent technology.

The future EABO concept brings with it a host of challenges that stress current supply

chain practices. The Marine Corps can look to private industry for guidance on how to adapt to

operating in degraded environments. The Marine Corps should apply Waffle House’s practices

to counter natural disasters, such as the use of staged non-linear supply chains, streamlined and

simplified supply requirements, and the implementation of training regarding those two concepts

to increase success and lethality on the FOE battlefield. Implementation in standard operation

procedures using current resources and technologies ensures the Marine Corps is prepared to

fight in support of naval operations.

Notes

1 Dan Stoneking, “News of the Day – What do Waffle Houses Have to Do with Risk Management?”
Federal Emergency Management Agency, last modified on January 5, 2019,
https://www.fema.gov/blog/2011-07-07/news-day-what-do-waffle-houses-have-do-risk-management.

2 Miguel A. Cruz, Jr., “Dawn of Hybrid Logistics,” Marine Corps Gazette 101, no. 8 (2017): 25.

3 Headquarters US Marine Corps, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, last modified December 9,
2018, http://www.candp.marines.mil/Concepts/Subordinate-Operating-Concepts/Expeditionary-
Advanced-Base-Operations/.

4 David H. Berger, Commandant’s Planning Guidance: 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps
(Washington, DC: Headquarters, US Marine Corps, July 2019), 1.

5 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1976), 75.

6 Headquarters US Marine Corps, Marine Corps Hybrid Logistics: A Blend of Old and New, (Washington,
DC: US Marine Corps, 2016).

7 Ozlem Ergun et al., “Waffle House Restaurants hurricane response: A case study,” International Journal
of Production Economics 126 (2010): 119, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/46487174.

8 Ori Brafman and Rod A. Beckstrom, The Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of Leaderless
Organizations (New York: Penguin Group, 2006), 201-202, 207-208.

9 Jason H. Fincher, “Distributed Operational Logistics,” Marine Corps Gazette 103, no. 10 (2019): 56.

10 Ozlem Ergun et al., “Waffle House Restaurants hurricane response: A case study,” 117.

11 Alison Dostie, “Marines in California are getting introduced to the Humvee’s replacement,” Business
Insider, November 13, 2019, https://www.businessinsider.com/camp-pendleton-marines-training-on-the-
humvees-replacement-the-jltv-2019-11

12 Ibid., 115.

13 Karl Weick and Kathleen Sutcliffe, Managing the Unexpected: Resiliency Performance in an Age of
Uncertainty (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2007), 80.

14 Ozlem Ergun et al., “Waffle House Restaurants hurricane response: A case study,” 114.

15 Headquarters US Marine Corps, “Next Generation Logistics (NEXLOG) Capabilities,” US Marine
Corps Concepts & Programs 2019, November 2, 2018, https://www.candp.marines.mil/Programs/Focus-
Area-4-Modernization-Technology/Part-6-Hybrid-Logistics/Hybrid-Log-Vision/Next-Generation-
Logistics-Capabilities/.

Bibliography

Berger, David H. Commandant’s Planning Guidance: 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Washington, DC: Headquarters, US Marine Corps, July 2019.

Brafman, Ori and Rod A. Beckstrom. The Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of
Leaderless Organizations. New York: Penguin Group, 2006.

Clausewitz, Carl Von. On War. Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1976.

Cruz, Jr., Miguel A. “Dawn of Hybrid Logistics.” Marine Corps Gazette 101, no. 8 (2017): 24-
28.

Dostie, Alison. “Marines in California are getting introduced to the Humvee’s replacement.”
Business Insider. November 13, 2019. https://www.businessinsider.com/camp-pendleton-
marines-training-on-the-humvees-replacement-the-jltv-2019-11

Ergun, Ozlem, Jessica L. Heier Stamm, Pinar Keskinocak, and Julie L. Swann. “Waffle House
Restaurants hurricane response: A case study.” International Journal of Production
Economics 126, no. 1 (2010): 111-120.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/46487174.

Fincher, Jason H. “Distributed Operational Logistics.” Marine Corps Gazette 103, no. 10 (2019):
54-57.

Headquarters US Marine Corps. Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations. Last modified
December 9, 2018. http://www.candp.marines.mil/Concepts/Subordinate-Operating-
Concepts/Expeditionary-Advanced-Base-Operations/.

Headquarters US Marine Corps. Marine Corps Hybrid Logistics: a blend of old and new.
Washington, DC: US Marine Corps, 2016.

Headquarters US Marine Corps. “Next Generation Logistics (NEXLOG) Capabilities.” US
Marine Corps Concepts & Programs 2019. November 2, 2018.
https://www.candp.marines.mil/Programs/Focus-Area-4-Modernization-
Technology/Part-6-Hybrid-Logistics/Hybrid-Log-Vision/Next-Generation-Logistics-
Capabilities/.

Stoneking, Dan. Federal Emergency Management Agency. “News of the Day – What do Waffle
Houses Have to Do with Risk Management?” Last modified on January 5, 2019.
https://www.fema.gov/blog/2011-07-07/news-day-what-do-waffle-houses-have-do-risk-
management.

Weick, Karl, and Kathleen Sutcliffe. Managing the Unexpected: Resiliency Performance in an
Age of Uncertainty. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2007.

Annotated AR Paper

Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations with a Side of Bacon:

How Waffle House Can Inform the Marine Corps Supply Chain

Captain Student Sample

USMC

Major Faculty Advisor – CG17

January 29, 2021

Use this sample cover page as a guide for creating your
own. It should all be in 12 pt. Times New Roman.
Nothing in bold or underlined, no fun graphics or
images, and it should include all of the information
presented on this sample.

The margins on this model have been shifted to
allow for annotation. Your margins should be

one inch top, bottom, and sides.

Civilian companies in the United States often find themselves conducting

business during and immediately after natural disasters. Several companies, particularly

in the American Southeast, develop standard operating procedures and techniques to

expedite the return to providing essential services after a natural disaster occurs. One

company–Waffle House–developed such an efficient and effective model that the Federal

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) informally uses a “Waffle House test” to

gauge how well an effected area is faring following a storm.1

1 From unpredictable weather to operating in contested and degraded environments,

Waffle House’s emergency operating procedures contain helpful strategies that can

inform the development of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations

(EABO) concept. Because the company accounts for resiliency, survivability, and

capability when planning operations in degraded environments, the Marine Corps should

incorporate Waffle House’s emergency operating procedures to supply chain processes

when executing the EABO concept.

Currently, the Marine Corps is ill-prepared to face two distinct challenges

concerning the supply system in the future operating environment: supply proximity and

resupply operations. First, current supply practices rely on the outdated concept of large,

centralized supply hubs, commonly known as an “iron mountain.” Creating a small

number of large operating bases/supply hubs, such as Camp Leatherneck in Afghanistan,

allows a for well-stocked supply chain. This model, however, incurs risk by maintaining

a preponderance of supplies within close proximity at limited geographic locations that

can experience difficulty “distributing supplies to highly dispersed units.”2 In contrast to

the supply approach in Afghanistan, the EABO concept calls for small elements to deploy

to temporary locations as part of a structure of shooters and sensors integrated with naval

assets.3 While the iron mountain creates a large bank of supplies at a few locations, the

The first sentence
should grab our
attention and makes
us curious about
what is going to be
in the rest of the
paper.

Establish a gap or harm in
the status quo just before
launching into your thesis
statement so the reader
knows there is a need for
change.

Clear, concise thesis
statement that shows
explicitly what this student
“wants.” The whole paper
boiled down to a sentence.

Clear topic sentence. It
makes the first claim and

tells readers what argument
you will make in this

paragraph.

EABO concept calls for targeted supplies at many, temporary locations. Practices used

for the last seventeen years in Afghanistan and Iraq will not stand up to a peer adversary

with capabilities in all warfighting domains, because large supply centers will become

easy targets.

Second, because of the current iron mountain approach, dispersed units in the

future operating environment (FOE) will experience resupply problems. The

Commandant’s Planning Guidance suggests an “actively contested” nature of future

maritime spaces.4 Commanders should assume there will be combat losses in future peer

fights, as a struggle of wills does not guarantee fires, aviation, and logistical support.5

Resupplying small, isolated units will challenge the current supply chain system, because

adversaries will contest transportation of all supplies—particularly class I, III, and V

supplies. In this environment, units will not be able to rely on a single supplier or supply

chain—like the iron mountain—to receive requirements within a necessary timeline.

A final problem concerns available technology required to execute the EABO

concept. Operations often look toward the future to address how logistics and supply

chain functions will occur. Advanced technologies—unmanned vehicles, surface

connectors, and transport supplies—and personnel fill many of the capability gaps

required to implement the EABO concept. The Marine Corps, however, faces a

substantial challenge to successfully implement this concept until it fully develops these

assets. As described in Marine Corps Hybrid Logistics, …

Argumentative Research Paper

Personal Title: TBD

Capt Osiris Dominguez
USA

Major Clinton Sovie – CG 12
20 December 2020

With rise of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), a global pandemic that has impacted society since December 2019, the United States Military is presented with the challenge of mitigating the spread among the ranks and adjusting to the new normal. From employing more telework platforms, managing who isdetermining mission essential and who is not personnel, and deciding which training exercises to plan for and which ones to push to the right, it has been a balancing act for many military leaders. COVID-19’s unprecedented disruption in childcare services, including schools, daycare facilities, babysitters, and family care plans, exposed the vulnerability that military readiness is highly dependent on available childcare. Both childcare policy and culture needs to shift to support servicemembersservice members and their families. Comment by Sovie MAJ Clinton US: This would need some sort of citation. This shows research to back your assertion. Comment by Sovie MAJ Clinton US: Rough transition. You might say that COVID-19 has even impacted service members of lower ranks in areas such as…Or, you might make the focus of the beginning of this paragraph more about child care, and the increasing number of military children in the system (I don’t know this to be a fact, but would be interesting to find out).Prior to reading the rest of this paper, I expect to read supporting paragraphs about Policy Culture
COVID-19 temporarily, but indefinitely, paused many of the available Department of Defense (DoD) programs in place to support military families. Over 40% of Aactive Dduty members (43.7) and the Rreserve component (42.8) have children.1 As of 2010, the average was two children per family. As of 2010, the active duty component of the military had 1,75,955 children. The reserve component had 65, 549 children. In total there were 1.8 million children of military personnel. 1 On average, 44 percent of active duty children are between the ages of zero to five. 40 percent of children of service members in the reserve component are between the ages of six and 12. 2 These numbers allude to the importance of reliable and affordable childcare to support a large population of service members. The military, similarly to the civilian sector, has multiple different relationship dynamics. Dual-military couples with children account for 2.8 percent of the active duty component. 2 As of 2008, there were approximately 146,000 single parents, which, which account for about 6.6 percent of the total force. 3 In order to support these statistics, the DoD had many family programs aimed to support military families. Among those programs are high quality and affordable military childcare programs. The intent of the programs was to meet the requirements brought upon families due to increased deployments and high operational tempo. Childcares centers are available worldwide and serviced approximately 200,000 (children 0-12 years of age) prior to COVID-19. 4 Comment by Sovie MAJ Clinton US: Contrasting words. Do you mean to say they had to impose both temporary and indefinite closures of various programs? Comment by Sovie MAJ Clinton US: cite Comment by Sovie MAJ Clinton US: cite Comment by Sovie MAJ Clinton US: cite Comment by Sovie MAJ Clinton US: Good paragraph with a lot of good facts; however, it is very choppy. Some of these sentences could be combined for better flow. Provide a little synthesis to the information provided, in many instances the numbers speak for themselves, but why does it matter to us as a service?
Many military parents rely on military childcare, off-post facilities, and schools to help them remain in the workforce. However, during the time of COVID-19, access to affordable, quality childcare has proven as an incredibly significant barrier for many servicemembersservice members. In order to choose the correct type of childcare, many working parents consider the childcare equation.5 The first factor is work responsibilities which includes, employer flexibility and schedule. 5 Home environment, including who in the home can is available to take care of the children and the proximity to the childcare program. 5 Finances which includes the balancing the childcare budget to other family expenses. Community options including childcare availability in the community, schedule deconfliction, and needs of school aged children. 5 Lasty, family composition including the work schedule of partner, extended family member, or any other caregiver willing to share responsibilities. These factors are normally considered but COVID-19 complicated the already hard to balance equation. 5 Comment by Sovie MAJ Clinton US: This must be backed by a source. It cannot be your observation or personal struggle. I agree with your premise, but you have got to support with an article or something. One source is enough to back a fact. Comment by Sovie MAJ Clinton US: You could sum this up in one sentence. Parents consider the childcare equation which includes a, b, c, d, and e.
Prior to COVID-19, working parents carefully construction a childcare equation that works for them. However, due to the long-lasting effects of the pandemic, parents find themselves in volatile situations around what many may consider the most important decision which is caring for ones’ children.7 As a result of the unpredictable nature of a pandemic, two out of three working parents have had to change their childcare arrangement and have yet to find a permanent solution.5 86% of childcare centers serve far fewer children.6 More children are also staying at home with family and friends. This can be particularly daunting for servicemembersservice members who are teleworking. Teleworking and managing small children can be incompatible for many. Dual-military couples have switched off days when one stays home and the other works in order to stay with children with unpredicted COVID-19 related classroom closures. Comment by Sovie MAJ Clinton US: Don’t start a sentence with a number. Comment by Sovie MAJ Clinton US: Good statement to follow a factual statement. Comment by Sovie MAJ Clinton US: This has to be backed by an article.
Majority of child developmental centers (CDC) are operating at below 50 percent capacity and will only provide childcare to service members with mission-essential designation, single-parents, dual military parents, and DoD civilian healthcare workers.8 Service members who are not able to telework have to look for off-post childcare centers. CDCs base their rates off yearly income, while off-post centers base it off area. Off-post childcare is still susceptible to closures as a result of COVID-19, so service members require multiple levels of childcare, such as a back-up nanny to pick up children in case of closures. This is can put many service members in a financial strain. Service members opting for low quality childcare in absence of high-quality military childcare can result in distracted service members on duty.9 Comment by Sovie MAJ Clinton US: Back with fact. Comment by Sovie MAJ Clinton US: Base off area?Needs to be backed by a statement and defined a little better. Off-post childcare facilities derive their monthly fees from local supply and demand requirements, or local wage averages..? Comment by Sovie MAJ Clinton US: Must back with fact. Comment by Sovie MAJ Clinton US: Very good fact, Check the page number on the doc. I found it, but it is on page xiii.These are the facts you need to back your assertions.
During this uniquely challenging times childcare situation, multiple levels of childcare are required for reasons ranging from to cover all bases, including random closures, to a chold demonstrating COVID-19 symptoms which can be as simple as a such as a stuffy nose, among many more. Consistent back up childcare is extremely costly and it is in addition to normal childcare. A stipend for childcare similar to BAH can be a potential solution. Comment by Sovie MAJ Clinton US: Great proposal, but expand on this. Show an example of how this idea has been successful for either corporate America, or the military. I would go as far as saying that all service members should be provided additional $ only if the CDC is not available, and they must provide a quote for the one they intend to go to.This could be abused, but that is a start to the idea.
The second problem to be addressed is that service members should not be chaptered out of the Army for lack of a feasible family care plan during the current pandemic. Army Regulation 600-20 outlines family care plans. Family care plans cannot foresee or prepare for a global pandemic. Comment by Sovie MAJ Clinton US: ? I don’t know what this means.If this is a problem, it should be addressed above. Not in this portion of the paper. Comment by Sovie MAJ Clinton US: Family care plans are not designed to address problems that arise from global pandemics.
Certain factor make a family care plan (FCP) unreasonable during this time. First of all, most family care plans include a family member, usually a grandparent. According to the Center for Disease Control (CDC). The risk of severe illness with COVID-19 increases with age, and older adults are at higher risks. Compared to younger adults, 50-64 year old are at a four times higher risk of hospitalization and 30 times higher risk of death. 65-74 year old are at a five times higher risk for hospitalization and 90 times higher risk of death. It continues to increase with age. This could disqualify grandparents and elderly family members from stepping in during times of need. There are also numerous conditions that would make someone more at risk such as heart conditions, obesity, diabetes, being a smoker, asthma, etc. This could further disqualify even those who people include on their family care plan. Being a single-parent or dual-military parent while serving outside the continental United States, could further complicate a FCP, since family and friends are even less accessible. Comment by Sovie MAJ Clinton US: No citations, and should be addressed in the problem portion of the paper.
A family care plan is a great tool to ensure soldiers plan, however it is detrimental during a pandemic. It is not feasible for leaders to request soldiers to activate their family care plans under these conditions. Daycare have random closures and COVID-19 risks limits the amount of people the Soldiers can rely on. If teleworking is feasible, during a daycare closure, it should be encouraged. The solution is to be emotionally intelligent about Soldier problems and work with them. Soldiers should feel comfortable coming to supervisors with problems and potential solutions. Leaders should embody the “mission first, people always” mindset that is consistently preached. Comment by Sovie MAJ Clinton US: Good paragraph, but emotionally charged. Back with fact, and expand on the solution for the problem. I don’t know if emotional intelligence is a solution to this problem, but virtual workspace employment is. Maybe find some successful examples of this and throw it in here.
The military is an organization that requires consistent readiness. Many could counterarguecounter argue that this proves that soldiers need to better prepare their families and that it is not the United State’sStates military’s job to handle soldiers personal problems.; Hhowever, lack of reliable childcare impacts readiness, diversity, and retention among the military. The department of Defense has recognized that access to high quality and dependable childcare is a readiness and retention issue. 10 Specifically, childcare issues impact female service members more than their male counterparts. 11 The likelihood of e female service member separating from the military is 28% higher than the separation of a male counterpart. 1 This is proven, as married males with dependents are more likely to stay in branches of service, whereas married females with dependents are more likely to separate in all services. 10 This trend is similar in the civilian sector.12 Women are more likely to have declined a new job opportunity than men and more likely to have left the workforce.12 Most women leaving the workforce, report childcare as the primary reason for leaving.12 This is important because if we are recruiting for diversity, childcare cannot be overlooked.
In conclusion, COVID-19

Osiris,

I think you have a solid start here, with a lot of facts to back up your assertions, but need to ensure you keep the paper 100% unemotional. If you do so, you will have much more of an impact with this paper. You provide substantial evidence for the problem, but very little for the solution. Pick the most significant problems, throw your weight into it. Organize your paper.
Problem
Policy
Culture
Solution
Policy
Culture
Counter Argurements
Conclusion

Remember this for the rest of your career, an emotional argument will cease to exist, but an argument based and supported by facts will shift opinions and create change.

Footnotes
1 “Report on the Impact of Deployment of Members of the Armed Forces on Their Dependent
Children,” Military One Source (Department of Defense, October 2010),
https://download.militaryonesource.mil/12038/MOS/Reports/Report_to_Congress_on_Impact_of_Deployment_on_Military_Children.pdf, 11.

2 “Report on the Impact of Deployment of Members of the Armed Forces on Their Dependent
Children,” Military One Source (Department of Defense, October 2010),
https://download.militaryonesource.mil/12038/MOS/Reports/Report_to_Congress_on_Impact_of_Deployment_on_Military_Children.pdf, 12.

3 “Report on the Impact of Deployment of Members of the Armed Forces on Their Dependent
Children,” Military One Source (Department of Defense, October 2010),
https://download.militaryonesource.mil/12038/MOS/Reports/Report_to_Congress_on_Impact_of_Deployment_on_Military_Children.pdf, 13.

4 “Report on the Impact of Deployment of Members of the Armed Forces on Their Dependent
Children,” Military One Source (Department of Defense, October 2010),
https://download.militaryonesource.mil/12038/MOS/Reports/Report_to_Congress_on_Impact_of_Deployment_on_Military_Children.pdf, 10

5 “PIECING TOGETHER SOLUTIONS: The Importance of Childcare to U.S. Families and Businesses” December 2020, 2.
6 “PIECING TOGETHER SOLUTIONS: The Importance of Childcare to U.S. Families and Businesses” December 2020, 5.
7 “PIECING TOGETHER SOLUTIONS: The Importance of Childcare to U.S. Families and Businesses” December 2020, 6.
8 Military Childcare, “New Priority Guidance,” accessed: October 12, 2020,

https://public.militarychildcare.csd.disa.mil/mccu/ui/#/priority#one

9 Moini, Joy S., Gail L. Zellman, and Susan M. Gates, Providing Child Care to Military

Families: The Role of the Demand Formula in Defining Need and Informing Policy.
Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006. Page 19.

https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG387.html
10 Farrell, Brenda. FEMALE ACTIVEDUTY PERSONNEL: Guidance and Plans Needed

For Recruitment and Retention Efforts. page 25

11 Farrell, Brenda. FEMALE ACTIVEDUTY PERSONNEL: Guidance and Plans Needed

For Recruitment and Retention Efforts. page 25
12 “PIECING TOGETHER SOLUTIONS: The Importance of Childcare to U.S. Families and Businesses” December 2020, 2.

Bibliography
“PIECING TOGETHER SOLUTIONS: The Importance of Childcare to U.S. Families and Businesses.” U.S. Chamber of Commerce Foundation, December 2020.
“Report on the Impact of Deployment of Members of the Armed Forces on Their Dependent Children.” Military One Source. Department of Defense, October 2010. https://download.militaryonesource.mil/12038/MOS/Reports/Report_to_Congress_on_Impact_of_Deployment_on_Military_Children.pdf.
Military Childcare, “New Priority Guidance,” accessed: October 12, 2020,

https://public.militarychildcare.csd.disa.mil/mccu/ui/#/priority#one

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/older-adults.html

Argumentative Research Paper 2000 words

SHORTCUTS

Psychology Assignment

Homework Assignment

Argumentative research

Coursework Assignment

Essay (any type)