One of the central premises of social psychology is the power of the situation. The very definition of social psychology reflects this, pointing out the influence of others on thoughts, feelings, and actions. In this discussion, we will consider contextualization by evaluating the fundamental and far-reaching role of culture.
To inform your thinking on this topic, begin by reading “Toward a Psychological Science for a Cultural Species” (Heine & Norenzayan, 2006), “Lessons Learned from a Lifetime of Applied Social Psychological Research” (Ross, 2004), and “Reflections on the Stanford Prison Experiment: Genesis, Rransformations, Consequences” (Zimbardo, Maslach, & Haney, 2000).
Then, locate a peer-reviewed empirical article (see Scholarly, Peer Reviewed, and Other Credible Sources (Links to an external site.)) describing a research study that examines a psychological phenomenon from a cultural perspective. Discuss the research, considering the various elements of a critical review (see Using a Scientific Journal Article to Write a Critical Review (Links to an external site.)) with reference to/explanation of the more broad social-pychological domain (social thinking, social relations, social influence). Appraise the role of culture in our psychological understanding of this phenomenon. Assess the relevance of one “lesson” of applied psychology (Ross, 2004) to your selected study.
Toward a Psychological Science
for a Cultural Species
Steven J. Heine and Ara Norenzayan
University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
ABSTRACT—Humans are a cultural species, and the study
of human psychology benefits from attention to cultural
influences. Cultural psychology’s contributions to psycho-
logical science can largely be divided according to the two
different stages of scientific inquiry. Stage 1 research seeks
cultural differences and establishes the boundaries of
psychological phenomena. Stage 2 research seeks under-
lying mechanisms of those cultural differences. The liter-
atures regarding these two distinct stages are reviewed,
and various methods for conducting Stage 2 research are
discussed. The implications of culture-blind and multi-
cultural psychologies for society and intergroup relations
are also discussed.
Before we inquire into origins and functional relations, it is nec-
essary to know the thing we are trying to explain. (Asch, 1952/
1987, p. 65)
Humans are a cultural species. Cultural learning, or the ability
to acquire behaviors from other individuals, is evident in a va-
riety of different species (Lefebvre & Giraldeau, 1994; Rendell
&Whitehead, 2001; Whiten et al., 1999). However, humans are
unique in the extent to which cultural learning accumulates
rapidly over generations, radically alters the ecology in which
humans live, and pervades their full repertoire of thoughts and
behaviors (Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Tomasello, 1999). There-
fore, a rich understanding of how humans’ minds operate would
be facilitated by a psychological science that is able to study
how specific cultural experiences shape and express universal
biological potentials.
Few people would dispute that culture is relevant to psy-
chology. Yet for much of the history of their field, most psy-
chologists have sought to discover and explain human thought
and behavior in terms of universal principles that are applicable
to all people (at least all non-brain-damaged adults without
clinical disorders) regardless of the cultural and historical
contexts in which their minds develop and operate. Granted,
assumptions of universality are sometimes empirically exam-
ined in developmental research and in gender comparisons that
attempt to disentangle effects of innate structures and matura-
tion from those of experience or socialization. But it has been the
primary goal of cultural psychology to transform this assumption
of universality into an empirically testable hypothesis. Cultural
psychology, and cross-cultural comparisons more broadly, has
enjoyed tremendous growth over the past two decades, and has
moved from themargins of psychology to the central theories and
findings of the field.
Clearly, there are many possible ways one can approach a
project as ambitious and complex as the study of how psycho-
logical patterns are manifested across cultures, and even within
cultural psychology there are different views and lively debates.
Here we offer our own view of the field. The centrality of cross-
cultural comparisons to progress in all areas of psychology is
discussed, and recent advances in cross-cultural research are
outlined.We consider some outstanding issues and critiques and
recommend avenues for future research. A central theme in our
article is that cultural psychology, as is the case with any other
scientific field, advances in two overlapping but distinct stages
of inquiry. Each stage has its own logic and priorities, an issue to
which we now turn.
TWO STAGES OF SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY
Most scientific inquiry proceeds through two stages. In the first
stage, new theories that facilitate the observation and discovery of
interesting phenomena are proposed, and various methodological
confounds are ruled out. In the second stage, the inner workings of
phenomena are more precisely explained, and underlying mech-
anisms are identified. The first stage continues while the second is
under way, because scientific explanations critically depend on
the expansion of the database to novel domains and the discovery
of additional phenomena. Philosophers and historians of science,
although disagreeing about the extent of the role of a priori theories
in guiding observation, say that most sciences seem to mature in
Address correspondence to Steven J. Heine or Ara Norenzayan,
Department of Psychology, 2136 West Mall, University of British
Columbia, Vancouver, BC, V6T 1Z4 Canada, e-mail: [email protected]
ubc.ca or [email protected]
PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
Volume 1—Number 3 251Copyright r 2006 Association for Psychological Science
this sequence (Hempel, 1965; Salmon, 1984). Consider Darwin’s
theory of evolution by natural selection. Darwin developed his
theory of natural selection and embarked on decades of systematic
cross-species observations and meticulous documentation of fea-
tures of various organisms and the ecological peculiarities of their
habitats (Darwin, 1859/1958). His theory hinged critically on the
idea that biological properties are inherited, yet themechanisms of
inheritance were unknown at the time, and his proposal for how
inheritance worked was ultimately flawed. One of Darwin’s influ-
ential critics, Fleeming Jenkin, correctly pointed out that if in-
heritance were the result of taking the average of the features from
the parental contributions, as Darwin proposed, then in each
generational transmission, variation would be cut in half. In a few
generations, there would be little variation left for inheritance, and
natural selection would falter (Boyd & Silk, 2003). Only decades
later was it understood that parental genes remain discrete entities
in reproduction, and Darwin’s theory became grounded in the
principles of Mendelian genetics, which then ushered in the
modern synthesis between evolutionary theory and genetics,
forming the basis of modern biology (Dobzhansky, 1962).
Much of psychology also operates this way (for discussions, see
Cronbach, 1986, and Rozin, 2001). Theories are proposed and
revised in the first-stage process of predicting and discovering
interesting phenomena, but the precise mechanisms underlying
theoretical claims are often poorly understood prior to the second
stage of investigation. We agree with Rozin (2001) that Stage 1
research is a key element of scientific progress in any growing
science, and that unnecessary constraints on this type of research
can damage the prospects of a discipline to develop into a mature
science. Asmore andmore interesting phenomena are discovered,
Stage 2 research is initiated; scientists begin to offer competing
explanations for them, presumed mechanisms eventually become
the subject of debates, and competing accounts for mechanisms
are advanced, animating scientific discovery for long periods of
time. These debates, in turn, may lead to additional discoveries
of interesting phenomena. Only with time and patience are
controversies resolved successfully; paradigms sometimes shift,
and scientific consensus regarding mechanisms emerges.
Research in cultural psychology can also be broken down into
these two stages (see Atran, Medin, & Ross, 2005, for a similar
observation). Stage 1 research typically proposes theories that
predict cultural differences in particular psychological processes,
whereas Stage 2 research typically seeks tomore precisely explain
the observed cultural differences by identifying the critical vari-
ables that account for them. In the following sections, we articulate
how this distinction is useful for understanding how cultural
psychology can contribute to psychological science in general.
STAGE 1 CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH:
IDENTIFYING CULTURAL DIFFERENCES
The most straightforward goal of Stage 1 cultural psychological
research has been to investigate the extent to which people from
different cultures vary in psychological processes. Thus far, the
majority of cultural psychological research has been conducted
at this stage. Such research is of critical importance to scientific
progress in the field, as we explain next.
Stage 1 Research and External Validity
Psychology has long been criticized for ignoring issues of gen-
eralizability of findings, the most prominent criticism being that
its restricted database may limit the external validity of its
findings (e.g., Gergen, 1973; Medin &Atran, 2004; Rozin, 2001;
Sears, 1986). Social psychology has been especially vulnerable
to such criticisms; it investigates questions regarding how
people perceive, understand, and respond to the (culturally
variable) social world, yet most social psychological research
has been conducted within the social environment of middle-
class college students. However, nowhere are the limits of the
restricted psychological database more problematic than when
it comes to cultural representation. A recent review found that
92% of studies published in the Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, the most influential international journal in
these fields, were conducted in North America, and a full 99% of
the studies were conducted in theWest (Quinones-Vidal, Lopez-
Garcia, Penaranda-Ortega, & Tortosa-Gil, 2004). This problem
would not be severe if the publications in such journals did not
make the implicit or explicit claim that their findings are ap-
plicable broadly to humanity at large, rather than to the Western
subpopulations from which participants are selected. That a
similar inattention to cultural variability has been found in other
areas of psychology as well (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005) un-
derscores how much of the psychological database renders re-
searchers ill prepared to speak confidently of the extent to which
many psychological processes are universal.
In many research programs, there are trade-offs between
maximizing internal validity and maximizing external validity.
The tendency for researchers from a number of psychological
disciplines to primarily conduct studies with convenience
samples of Western college students, who are disproportionately
of European descent and of middle-class background, suggests
that psychologists are often inclined to privilege the mainte-
nance of internal validity. That is, studies conducted with con-
venience samples afford opportunities for researchers to more
easily conduct rigorous and systematic series of studies that can
address competing hypotheses and rule out methodological
artifacts. Although a heavy reliance on convenience samples
facilitates the construction of sound theories that are capable of
making reliable predictions, the incumbent sacrifice of external
validity becomes untenable when researchers raise questions
regarding human nature. The limited psychological database
raises a cloud of doubt regarding the generalizability of many
findings. How can researchers know whether they are study-
ing a phenomenon that is characteristic of humans everywhere
or whether they have identified a cultural product that
emerges from participating in Western middle-class culture?
252 Volume 1—Number 3
Psychological Science for a Cultural Species
This distinction cannot confidently be made until appropriate
cross-cultural research tactics are used to test whether the
phenomenon meets the criteria of various levels of universality
(for a review, see Norenzayan & Heine, 2005).
The question of the generalizability of research findings is a
challenge for science more generally, and perhaps ensuring
culturally representative sampling is an onerous technicality
that is unnecessary for psychology. For example, it would hardly
seem reasonable to say that a reliably observed phenomenon
such as social facilitation or transfer-appropriate processing
might not be a universal feature of humankind because no one
has ever investigated it among, say, the Trobriand Islanders.
Such a claim would be dubious because there is no theoretical
basis for anticipating any differences in social facilitation or
transfer-appropriate processing in this population. Were it the
case, however, that one did have compelling a priori theoretical
reasons to anticipate that either of these processes would be
different among the Trobriand Islanders, psychologists’ under-
standing of that process would potentially be in need of revision
if it were indeed found that this population performed reliably
differently on relevant tasks.
Stage 1 Research Identifies Cultural Variation in
Psychological Processes
Recent theoretical and empirical developments in cultural
psychology have brought the field to the point where researchers
need to be mindful of the generalizability of North American, or
more generally Western, findings to other cultural contexts.
There are a number of rich theoretical models that allow for
predictions about the extent to which various models will rep-
licate in other cultural contexts (e.g., D. Cohen & Hoshino-
Browne, 2005; Heine, 2001; Kim, 2002; Markus & Kitayama,
1991; Medin & Atran, 2004; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Nisbett,
Peng, Choi, &Norenzayan, 2001; Shweder,Much,Mahapatra, &
Park, 1997; Triandis, 1989). Furthermore, in the past 20 years,
since the field of cultural psychology reemerged as a significant
discipline, the great extent of documented cultural variation in
psychological processes has been rather unexpected, even for
cultural psychologists. For example, pronounced and theoreti-
cally meaningful cultural differences have been found in fun-
damental psychological processes, such as eye movements for
scanning inanimate scenes (e.g., Chua, Boland, & Nisbett,
2005); attention (Miyamoto, Nisbett, & Masuda, 2006); per-
ception of color, space, and time (e.g., Boroditsky, 2001; Lev-
inson, 1997; Roberson, Davies, & Davidoff, 2000); numerical
reasoning (e.g., Gordon, 2004); unspoken thinking (e.g., Kim,
2002); preferences for high subjective well-being (SWB; e.g.,
Diener, Diener, & Diener, 1995); the manifestation of psycho-
logical disorders such as depression (e.g., Kleinman, 1982;
Ryder et al., 2005) and bulimia nervosa (e.g., Keel & Klump,
2003); the need for high self-esteem (e.g., Heine, Lehman,
Markus, & Kitayama, 1999); and preferences for formal rea-
soning (e.g., Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, & Nisbett, 2002). Re-
search programs in these areas have demonstrated that culture
is implicated at a much more fundamental level of psychologi-
cal processing than what was previously considered, and these
findings are forcing researchers to conceive of these phenomena
differently than they had before.
Predicted cultural differences have also emerged in a diverse
array of phenomena, including how people handle contradic-
tion (e.g., Peng & Nisbett, 1999), prevention and promotion
orientations (e.g., Lee, Aaker, & Gardner, 2000), self-concepts
(e.g., Cousins, 1989), moral intuitions and reasoning (A.B. Co-
hen & Rozin, 2001; Miller & Bersoff, 1992), tendencies to make
situational and dispositional attributions (e.g., Choi, Nisbett, &
Norenzayan, 1999; Morris & Peng, 1994), preferences for
choices made by oneself or by others (e.g., Iyengar & Lepper,
1999), the nature of friendships and enemyships (e.g., Adams,
2005), cognitive dissonance (e.g., Heine & Lehman, 1997b;
Kitayama, Snibbe, Markus, & Suzuki, 2004), memories for focal
and background objects (e.g., Masuda & Nisbett, 2001), moti-
vations for uniqueness (e.g., Kim & Markus, 1999), certain
kinds of category-based inductive reasoning (e.g., Medin, Ross,
Atran, Burnett, & Block, 2002), daily variability in affective
experiences (Oishi, Diener, Napa Scollon, & Biswas-Diener,
2004), the importance of romantic love in marriage decisions (R.
Levine, Sato, Hashimoto, & Verma, 1995), the pace of life and
time perspective (R.V. Levine & Norenzayan, 1999), preferred
decisions in the ultimatum game (e.g., Henrich et al., 2005),
feelings of control (e.g., Morling, Kitayama, &Miyamoto, 2002),
and predilection for violence in response to insults (e.g., Nisbett
& Cohen, 1996), to name several. Systematic cultural differ-
ences have also been found in early childhood (e.g., Grossmann,
Grossmann, Spangler, Suess, & Unzner, 1985; Imai & Gentner,
1997; Tardif, 1996), underscoring just how embedded psycho-
logical life is within cultural experiences.
Furthermore, many of these cultural differences are pro-
nounced in magnitude. Meta-analyses reveal large effects (av-
erage d > .80) for the difference in the magnitude of self-
enhancement motivation between East Asians and Westerners
(Heine & Hamamura, 2006), moderate to large effects for cog-
nitive differences between East Asians andWesterners (average
d 5 .60; Miyamoto, Kitayama, & Talhelm, 2006), and smaller
effects for cultural differences in self-report measures of indi-
vidualism and collectivisms between Asians and Americans
(average ds 5 .39 for individualism and .24 for collectivism;
Matsumoto, 2006; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). In
general, the cultural differences tend to be more pronounced in
studies that compare behaviors that reflect implicit psycholog-
ical tendencies and less pronounced in studies that compare
explicit self-reported cultural values on subjective Likert scales
(for discussion, see Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz, 2002;
Kitayama, 2002).
Stage 1 cultural psychological research is an ongoing project
as more and more theories are developed and psychological
Volume 1—Number 3 253
Steven J. Heine and Ara Norenzayan
phenomena are tested in a growing array of cultures. As it
progresses, this enterprise will paint an increasingly detailed
picture regarding the kinds of processes that are most affected
by cultural influences, and those that operate the most inde-
pendently of cultural context. It is difficult to know a priori
which psychological processes are most susceptible to cultural
variation, so there is no alternative to solid, programmatic Stage
1 research. For example, growing research indicates that at-
tentional processes, initially believed to be fixed and universal,
are in some respects highly responsive to cultural experience
(e.g., Chua et al., 2005). Conversely, some core aspects of rea-
soning about other peoples’ mental states (or theory of mind ),
initially believed to be a folk theory that is culturally malleable
to a large degree, appear to develop in remarkably similar ways
across cultures (e.g., Callaghan et al., 2005).
One important component of Stage 1 research has been to
identify the specific situations in which some cultural differ-
ences in psychological processes are made manifest. Cultural
differences in various processes are often fluid and do not
emerge uniformly as main effects; they often are evident only
when certain contextual variables are present. For example,
people participating in cultures of honor are not more aggressive
than other people across all situations; rather, their aggression
emerges specifically in situations in which their honor has been
slighted (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996); the Protestant work ethic does
not encourage an overall more detached attitude toward rela-
tionships, and cultural differences emerge only when Protes-
tants and non-Protestants are engaged in a work task (e.g.,
Sanchez-Burks, 2002); East Asians do not always prefer intui-
tive reasoning strategies more than Westerners, but show the
same preferences and skills for formal reasoning when com-
pleting abstract tasks (e.g., Norenzayan et al., 2002). In sum,
much Stage 1 cultural psychological research has targeted the
sensitivity of various psychological processes to situational
variables and investigated how cultural differences often appear
only in specific contexts.
A second key focus of Stage 1 research has been to conduct
systematic series of studies to rule out competing artifactual
accounts of cultural differences. A particular challenge of
conducting psychological research across cultures is that there
are many unique methodological concerns that arise regarding
the interpretability of findings (for reviews, see D. Cohen, in
press; Greenfield, 1997; and van de Vijver & Leung, 2000). The
wide array of methodological artifacts that are of concern to
cultural psychologists has resulted in research on cross-cultural
comparability developing into an enterprise in and of itself.
Efforts to determine the validity of cultural differences consti-
tute a large part of the studies that are conducted in Stage 1
cultural psychological research.
In sum, the range of identified cultural differences in psy-
chological phenomena has expanded significantly in the past 20
years. Many of these findings have emerged in the wake of recent
theoretical developments in cultural psychology, most notably
the distinction between independent and interdependent con-
struals of self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) and individualism-
collectivism (Triandis, 1989). These theoretical developments,
coupled with the burgeoning database of documented cultural
variation in fundamental psychological processes, challenge
psychologists to be hesitant in assuming that findings that
emerge from a single population must necessarily be psycho-
logical universals (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005).
Stage 1 Cross-Cultural Research Informs Theories About
Universals
Stage 1 cultural psychological research is as important in doc-
umenting robust similarities across cultures as it is in docu-
menting variability. Such research allows psychologists to
identify the extent to which psychological phenomena are cul-
ture-specific or are psychological universals (Norenzayan &
Heine, 2005; Norenzayan, Schaller, & Heine, in press). We
submit that the restricted database that has historically char-
acterized psychological research has led researchers to inherit a
sense of ‘‘culture-blindness’’ whereby observed findings in one’s
own culture are assumed to be universal. Furthermore, because
some degree of universality is often a central assumption of
evolutionary explanations, this culture-blindness is of particular
relevance to evolutionary explanations, and greatly complicates
efforts to articulate how particular psychological phenomena
may have evolved.
For example, consider the question of whether a need for
positive self-regard is a psychological universal. One way to
approach this question is to conceive of positive self-regard as
self-enhancement, which is usually operationalized as tenden-
cies to dwell on and elaborate positive information about the self
relative to negative information (Heine, 2005b). With this oper-
ationalization, it is clear that people from Western cultures are
motivated to have positive self-regard, as across dozens of dif-
ferent methods, Westerners show consistent and pronounced
self-enhancement (average d 5 .86). In contrast, the same
methods have revealed an average d of �.02 for East Asians
(Heine & Hamamura, 2006). Thus, a need for positive self-
regard operationalized as self-enhancement appears to be far
weaker, if not largely absent, among people participating in East
Asian cultural contexts (see Heine, Kitayama, & Hamamura, in
press, and Sedikides, Gaertner, & Vevea, 2005, for some dis-
agreement about the evidence regarding this conclusion).
Given these findings, howmight one consider the evolutionary
origins of motivations for positive self-regard? On the basis of
the consistent evidence for self-enhancement among Western-
ers, a variety of evolutionary accounts have been offered for the
emergence of this motivation. For example, the self-enhance-
ment motive has been posited to have been selected (a) as a
gauge of changes in one’s status within dominance hierarchies
(Barkow, 1989), (b) as a barometer of the vulnerability of one’s
social relationships (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995),
254 Volume 1—Number 3
Psychological Science for a Cultural Species
or (c) to stave off the debilitating effects of existential anxie-
ties arising from the awareness of one’s impending death
(Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 2004). However, these
theories are rendered less compelling when one considers the
relative lack of self-enhancement motivations that is evident
among East Asians, especially as it seems that concerns with
status, social relationships, and death are at least as strong in
East Asia as they are in the West (e.g., Heine, 2001; Heine,
Harihara, & Niiya, 2002).
We suggest that compelling evolutionary accounts for the or-
igins of psychological processes need to consider the adaptive
value of the processes at a level of abstraction where universality
is more evident, or they need to specify the conditions under
which those processes are operating (Norenzayan & Heine,
2005). For example, positive self-regard can also be considered
in terms of strivings to be the kind of person viewed as appro-
priate, good, and significant in one’s culture (e.g., Crocker &
Park, 2004; Heine et al., 1999). At this level of analysis, a need
for positive self-regard is a plausible candidate for a psycho-
logical universal, and we propose that the most compelling evo-
lutionary accounts for this motivation will be targeted at this
level (see Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006). In sum, cultural vari-
ation identified by Stage 1 research programs serves to highlight
the level of analysis at which evolutionary accounts might most
successfully be proposed.
Future Challenges and Opportunities in Stage 1 Research
Over the past 20 years, Stage 1 cross-cultural research has en-
joyed a period of tremendous growth. What might happen over
the next 20 years?With the humility to recognize that predicting
the future is best left to fortune-tellers and investment bankers,
we venture to suggest some directions that we think would prove
to be fruitful.
One striking shortcoming of Stage 1 cultural psychological
research thus far is that the majority of the most influential re-
search has been focused on comparisons of North Americans
and East Asians. Perhaps it is understandable that North
Americans specifically and Westerners more generally have
usually served as the point of comparison in these studies, given
that the majority of psychological theories have emerged from
these samples. However, the focus on comparisons between
these two cultural groups has resulted in a pronounced neglect of
other cultures. We suggest that East Asians have been the pri-
mary target of comparison because recent cultural psychological
research has built upon the ideas of Markus and Kitayama
(1991), who proposed a model that was largely based on a
contrast ofWestern and East Asian cultures. The richness of that
model has allowed for a growing number of theoretical advances
to be built upon this initial foundation, leading to a wide variety
of predictions for specific differences in the ways that East
Asians and North Americans are likely to differ in their psy-
chology (e.g., D. Cohen & Gunz, 2002; Heine et al., 1999;
Nisbett et al., 2001; Norenzayan et al., 2002; Oishi et al., 2004;
Suh, 2002). Furthermore, in many ways, cross-cultural com-
parisons between East Asians and North Americans have made
for strong arguments for specific cultural differences, as the
samples that are typically contrasted (university students in the
two cultural regions) are similar in so many other respects (i.e.,
they tend to be from highly industrialized, middle-class, urban
environments, and the participants tend to be highly educated
and cosmopolitan) that there are fewer possible demographic
and cultural variables that could potentially account for the
differences than there are with many other kinds of cross-cul-
tural comparisons. The emergence of reliable and pronounced
differences between groups that share so many important soci-
etal and ecological features suggests that there should be at least
as broad and expansive differences in other regions of the world
that are less industrialized.
We call for cultural psychological research to grow beyond
comparisons of East Asians and Westerners. At present, despite
the growth of cross-cultural research, psychologists still know
embarrassingly little about the psychological processes of the
majority of cultures of the world. There appear to be many
opportunities to identify important cultural differences for
researchers enterprising enough to launch psychological expe-
ditions into relatively unexplored terrain. In particular, we think
the role of culture in psychological functioning should become
especially evident when small-scale societies are studied.
Although such research is methodologically challenging, it
stands to greatly advance understanding of the ways that culture
is implicated in psychology, given the multitude of theoretically
important differences in cultural experience. There has already
been much excellent and influential work conducted with such
groups (e.g., Atran et al., 2005; Bailenson, Shum, Atran, Medin,
& Coley, 2002; Cole, Gay, & Glick, 1968; Gordon, 2004; Hen-
rich et al., 2005; Levinson, 1997; Medin & Atran, 2004; Segall,
Campbell, & Herskovits, 1963), much of it having been done to
make arguments for psychological universals (e.g., Barrett &
Behne, 2005; Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen, 1969; Levenson,
…
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