Pleas have this turn in ready it will be check for plagiarism if you need more info please let me know also this needs to be back on the 11th of Jan 2021
Before beginning work on this assignment,
· Read Addressing a Humanitarian Crisis in a Collapsed Region (pp. 10 through 24) in Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World (Links to an external site.)
.
· Read Security Studies/International Relations Paradigm (Links to an external site.)
Using the case study from
Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World (Links to an external site.), the assigned articles, and at least two additional credible sources, complete the assignment:
· Describe the major state actors in the case study.
· Describe the major nonstate actors in the case study.
· Identify statements in the case study reflecting each of the three theoretical paradigms:
· What is one example of a statement that reflects realist principles?
· What is one example of a statement that reflects liberal principles?
· What is one example of a statement that reflects constructivist principles?
· Discuss examples of security categories from the case study:
· What is one security threat?
· What is one security challenge?
· What is one security vulnerability?
· What is one security risk?
· Identify one possible choice to mitigate one of the security domains (economic, technological, sociopolitical, or environmental security) from the case study.
The Analyzing Security Challenges paper
· Must be at least three double-spaced pages in length (not including title and references pages) and formatted according to APA style as outlined.
· Must include a separate title page with the following:
· Title of paper
· Student’s name
· Course name and number
· Instructor’s name
· Date submitted
For further assistance with the formatting and the title page, refer to APA Formatting for Word 2013 (Links to an external site.).
· Must utilize academic voice. See the Academic Voice (Links to an external site.) resource for additional guidance.
· Must include an introduction and conclusion paragraph. Your introduction paragraph needs to end with a clear thesis statement that indicates the purpose of your paper.
· For assistance on writing Introductions & Conclusions (Links to an external site.) as well as Writing a Thesis Statement (Links to an external site.), refer to the Ashford Writing Center resources.
· Must use at least two credible sources in addition to the case study and assigned article.
· The Scholarly, Peer Reviewed, and Other Credible Sources (Links to an external site.) table offers additional guidance on appropriate source types. If you have questions about whether a specific source is appropriate for this assignment, please contact your instructor. Your instructor has the final say about the appropriateness of a specific source for a particular assignment.
· Must document any information used from sources in APA style as outlined in the Ashford Writing Center’s Citing Within Your Paper (Links to an external site.)
Must include a separate reference page that is formatted according to APA style as outlined in the Ashford Writing Center. See the Formatting Your References List (Links to an external site.) resource in the Ashford Writing Center for specifications.
Carefully review the Grading Rubric (Links to an external site.) for the criteria that will be used to evaluate your assignment.
COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK
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authors
Anthony Bell
Kathryn McNabb Cochran
Melissa Dalton
Marc Frey
v*:+:!:+:!
ISBN 978-1-4422-8013-7
Lanham • Boulder • New York • London
4501 Forbes Boulevard
Lanham, MD 20706
301 459 3366 | www.rowman.com
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Alice Hunt Friend
Rebecca K. C. Hersman
Sarah Minot
project director & editor
Rebecca K. C. Hersman
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Meeting Security
Challenges in a
Disordered
World
M A Y 2 0 1 7
Blank
M AY 2 0 1 7
Meeting Security
Challenges in a
Disordered World
PROJ ECT DIRECTOR & EDITOR
Rebecca K. C. Hersman
AUTHORS
Anthony Bell Alice Hunt Friend
Kathryn McNabb Cochran Rebecca K. C. Hersman
Melissa Dalton Sarah Minot
Marc Frey
Lanham • Boulder • New York • London
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About CSIS
For over 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has worked
to develop solutions to the world’s greatest policy challenges. Today, CSIS scholars are
providing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a
course toward a better world.
CSIS is a nonprofit organ ization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 full-
time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analy sis and develop
policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change.
Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS
was dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for
good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has become one of the world’s preeminent international
institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational
challenges ranging from energy and climate to global health and economic integration.
Thomas J. Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in November 2015.
Former U.S. deputy secretary of defense John J. Hamre has served as the Center’s president
and chief executive officer since 2000.
CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should
be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
© 2017 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-1-4422-8013-7 (pb); 978-1-4422-8014-4 (eBook)
Center for Strategic & International Studies Rowman & Littlefield
1616 Rhode Island Ave nue, NW 4501 Forbes Boulevard
Washington, DC 20036 Lanham, MD 20706
202-887-0200 | www.csis.org 301-459-3366 | www . rowman . com
594-69657_ch00_3P.indd 2 5/20/17 1:03 PM
http://www.csis.org
http://www.rowman.com
iii
Contents
iv Acknowl edgments
v Executive Summary
PART 1. INTRODUCTION
2 CHAPTER 1 | Introduction
PART 2. CASE STUDIES
10 CHAPTER 2 | Addressing a Humanitarian Crisis in a Collapsed Region
Melissa Dalton
25 CHAPTER 3 | Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism
Anthony Bell and Alice Hunt Friend
42 CHAPTER 4 | Countering Regional Aggression
Kathryn McNabb Cochran
63 CHAPTER 5 | Responding to a Cross- Border Health Crisis
Sarah Minot
80 CHAPTER 6 | Countering Deepening Criminal Vio lence at the Subnational Level
Marc Frey
PART 3. CONCLUSION
96 CHAPTER 7 | Key Themes and Takeaways
111 CHAPTER 8 | Conclusion
112 About the Authors
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iv
The authors would like to thank all the experts that participated in working group meetings and
provided feedback. In par tic u lar, the study team would like to thank Beth Cole, Max Kelly, and
Loren DeJonge Schulman for reviewing the report and providing valuable comments.
This report is made pos si ble by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship has contributed to
its publication.
Acknowl edgments
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v
Executive Summary
Today the world faces a volatile convergence of instability, state weakness, and conflict. These
conditions are complicating the ability of the United States to operate and pursue security objec-
tives in a number of critical regions. Crises and threats, propelled by advancements in communi-
cation and technology, increasingly disperse instability across state borders and engage regional
powers directly and indirectly. In some cases, nonstate or substate actors have emerged as in de-
pen dent sources of power and authority in both local and regional contexts. Porous borders, weak
national institutions, and power ful nonstate and trans- state actors challenge bilateral and multilat-
eral crisis responses.
While working to resolve the under lying causes of instability might be preferable, ongoing issues
may arise that are within the United States’ interest to address more immediately. The United States
needs to be able to work within the constraints of fragile environments, to implement approaches
that address pressing security threats and objectives and meet relatively urgent security or human-
itarian needs.
Recognizing that need, this study has three primary objectives:
1. Define and characterize a range of operating environments emanating from state fragility to
support planning, preparedness, and response to national security crises.
2. Identify key tools that allow the U.S. government to operate effectively in these environ-
ments when responding to national security crises or challenges.
3. Promote ways in which national security, humanitarian, and development efforts might better
align, in the near and long term, in highly fragile and unstable operating environments.
This report focuses on five functional security imperatives— humanitarian emergencies, terrorism
and violent extremism, great power aggression, health security crises, and international criminal
vio lence— and illustrates each imperative through regionally or subnationally defined operating
environments— namely, Syria- Iraq, Libya, Eastern Ukraine, West Africa, and Mexico, respectively.
Rather than using nations as the unit of analy sis, these case studies elucidate the structural and
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Executive Summaryvi
institutional challenges to crisis responses that principally exist at the substate, trans- state, and
regional levels. The territories chosen encompass fragile or unstable environments from near- total
collapse to subregional weakness in other wise relatively strong states.
CASE STUDiES
Each case study describes the operating environment according to three essential characteristics
adapted from fragility lit er a ture (authority, capacity, and security), lists key tasks to address the
security imperative, and describes the current state of play and U.S. and international efforts under
way. Importantly, the case studies then point to those actors, tools, and circumstances that may
offset or circumvent operational challenges and offer pathways for responding to the crises. The
authors also make policy recommendations for how the United States can better operate in these
specific environments and comparable future environments.
Addressing a Humanitarian Crisis in a Collapsed Region (Syria- Iraq)
Since the Syrian civil war began in 2011, at least 470,000 people have died, and tens of millions
have suffered under siege, become internally displaced, or left the region as refugees traveling to
bordering countries and across the sea to Eu rope. The propensity of the Bashar al- Assad govern-
ment and the Islamic State to use aid as a coercive tool, the Islamic State (ISIS) and Jabhat Fateh
al- Sham’s refusal to abide by humanitarian requests or international rules, and complicated partner
dynamics have stymied U.S. attempts to deliver humanitarian assistance to the Syria- Iraq region.
This case highlights the challenges of operating in highly insecure environments, including regions
where national authority is absent, direct access is limited or non ex is tent, and more effective or
legitimate sources of authority are highly localized and often transcend national borders. The
United States may be able to take advantage of cease- fire- based win dows of opportunity of
decreased vio lence, accessibility through perimeter regions, and a robust civil society to deliver aid
to besieged populations in Syria and Iraq. Strong international outrage against the violation of
humanitarian laws and norms also forms a basis for changing the rules of engagement to make
such aid efforts pos si ble.
Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism (Libya)
Over the last five years, Libya’s po liti cal instability and the outbreak of civil war provided conditions
for a number of international and domestic extremist groups to establish themselves and operate
with relative impunity. In late 2014, ISIS began to seize territory rapidly, amass resources, and unite
fighters from Libya’s fractured extremist landscape. This case exemplifies the prob lem of denying
extremist groups a secure base of operation and reducing their ability to or ga nize and conduct
terrorist attacks when the region’s fragmented power limits U.S. abilities to partner with a national
authority. Left with a fragile economic equilibrium utterly dependent on the central bank and only
semi- legitimate po liti cal leaders with almost no real capacity to impose their will or act as mean-
ingful conduits for outside assistance, the United States is being forced to create new ways to
operate to achieve its objectives in Libya. In doing so, the United States may draw on both interna-
tional and regional support for combating ISIS. Not only do Western powers and Libya’s neighbors
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Executive Summary vii
recognize the threat posed by ISIS’s growth, but local opposition in the area also runs strong,
giving disparate po liti cal and security ele ments a common enemy and an incentive to or ga nize.
The United States’ bases in Eu rope, its naval assets in the Mediterranean Sea, and Libya’s neighbors
provide the regional access from which the United States might lead such operations.
Countering Regional Aggression (Eastern Ukraine)
Rus sia’s annexation of Crimea and destabilization of eastern Ukraine has created a precarious
situation along the two states’ border carefully managed by Moscow, with separatists struggling to
establish the vestiges of a state, and the state struggling to provide ser vices and security to popu-
lations in and around the conflict zone. This case highlights how the United States can operate in
and empower its partners to function in environments where great powers exploit state weakness
for their own gains and violate sovereignty and the rule of law. Supporting Ukraine in its attempts
to counter Rus sia aggression is complicated by a number of under lying issues within Ukraine,
including over- bureaucratization, corruption, and inefficiencies in the military; weak control over
paramilitary groups; and Rus sia’s sophisticated misinformation campaign. Amid renewed hostilities,
the United States might leverage Ukraine’s robust civil society organ izations, strong relationship
with the North Atlantic Treaty Organ ization (NATO), logistics infrastructure capable of supporting
rapid movement of military personnel and matériel in government- controlled areas, experienced
volunteer military forces/militias available to contribute to a counteroffensive, and a deeply frac-
tured authority structure in separatist controlled areas.
Responding to a Cross- Border Health Crisis (West Africa)
In weak and unstable nations, preventing and responding to disease threats is exceedingly prob-
lematic. Epidemics that originate in such regions can fuel the spread of preventable diseases
internationally and may leave already- weak states extremely vulnerable to new health threats. In
West Africa— where Ebola spread through Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia in 2014— inadequate
infrastructure, poor governance, and national governments frequently accused of corruption left
the region vulnerable to outbreak and continue to afford the conditions for a new crisis. This case
emphasizes the complexities and complications of emergency response in a regionalized crisis
that has disproportionate effect on weak, vulnerable, and fragile regions. West Africa has benefited
from strong habitual relationships with international partners, effective containment by neighbor-
ing countries, and the absence of an outbreak of vio lence. Critically, national governments and the
international community have learned from the mistakes from their initial responses to the Ebola
crisis. Should another health emergency surface, they would be better prepared to account for the
cultural specifics of the affected communities and include key local actors.
Countering Deepening Criminal Vio lence at the Subnational Level (Mexico)
Simmering challenges of criminal vio lence and corruption at the substate level can create weak-
ness and pockets of fragility in states that appear other wise stable at the national level. Endemic
corruption afflicting all levels of the Mexican government has undermined central authority and
the rule of law, allowed drug trafficking and associated violent crime to become entrenched in
many communities, and contributed to illicit human migration, while also thwarting government
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Executive Summaryviii
reforms and commercial investment. These prob lems flourish at the subnational level, exemplified
by Guerrero, where nonstate groups tacitly or overtly control much of the territory. This case highlights
the nuances of countering escalation of criminal activity in a sovereign partner state with limited
authority at substate levels. The United States has found it difficult to engage with Mexico’s opaque
municipal and state governments. Corruption at all levels has tainted perceptions of the Mexican
government and led to inefficiencies within the government as suspicion, poor communication,
and limited coordination have undermined potentially critical alliances between law enforcement
agencies and between local and federal officials. Given the depth of these relationships, and wells
of professional effectiveness and proficiency in certain parts of Mexican law enforcement and
governance, the United States may be able to effect credible and joint response in cooperation
with its Mexican partners.
KEY THEMES AND TAKEAWAYS
Taken together, these case studies emphasize that the United States has assets and opportunities
for building near- term strategies and meeting pressing operational needs, even in the most fragile
or difficult settings.
Even as no two crises are alike, there are nonetheless broader systemic challenges shaping and
characterizing the fragility landscape. These trends include the per sis tence of chronic, long- term
crises; the widespread weakening of national, state- based systems of government as the dominant
organ izing structure; the expansion of gray zone conflicts that feed tension short of war; a growing
complacency and disregard for international rules and norms; and the reemergence of great power
tensions. These trends are shaping the operating environment and straining traditional response
mechanisms as the United States seeks to engage its security interests in fragile or unstable areas.
Responding to crises and other security imperatives requires a more detailed characterization of
the operating environment according to critical gaps in capacity, authority, and security. As evident
from the case studies, most fragile or unstable environments reflect all three gaps to at least some
degree, and generally have one dominant gap to which the others are subordinate or from which
they derive. This assessment points toward some generalizable conclusions regarding best strate-
gic approaches in each of these areas of deficiency, both in terms of immediate crisis response
and longer- term crisis management and planning.
There are five primary crosscutting areas where the United States can focus to better operate in
unstable environments:
Enhancing Its Cross- Agency Operational Planning and Execution
While the United States cannot predict when and how national security crises will emerge, it can
do far more to map complex environments, pre- evaluate partners, and embrace diverse expertise.
It can start doing so through several steps:
• Build tailored playbooks, with pre- identified plug- and- play teams, that conduct preparatory
assessments of not only existing fragility gaps, but also areas of opportunity for quicker and
more effective crisis response.
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Executive Summary ix
• Incorporate unconventional expertise to enhance cultural, po liti cal, and resource situational
awareness and deep regional knowledge.
• Fuse operational and assistance efforts as close to the source as pos si ble, utilizing tools such
as cross- sector task forces, incentivized rotations, and enhanced analytics to facilitate U.S.
posture and presence in identified high- priority fragility zones.
Identifying and Utilizing Opportunities and Assets
During crisis, in even the most difficult or fragile environments, the United States will often find
areas of opportunity and leverage points it can rely on to offset or circumvent operational chal-
lenges. These opportunities can provide essential jumping- off points that provide access, relation-
ships, or resources that enable and support effective responses and are key to more effective and
less costly responses. These opportunities generally fall into six basic categories:
• Intermediary actors and access points, such as perimeter regions, that may facilitate rela-
tionships with key governments or organ izations or provide greater access to vulnerable
populations.
• Active civil society and localized credible authority structures that could serve as partners in
the field, whether in the delivery of aid or military force.
• Favorable public sentiments that may be leveraged to minimize knock-on effects.
• Positive bilateral relationships that can enable effective response in coordination with the
relevant national authority (or authorities).
• Credible/strong regional actors who provide critical waypoints, regional credibility, and
expertise in entering and managing crises in complex areas.
• Habitual partner relationships, where structures for collaboration and coordination already
exist and may be augmented or leveraged to support early efforts.
Improving Access
Some leverage points, such as the potential for partnership with local actors, will alleviate access
challenges that prevent the delivery of specific effects such as aid. Still, lack of infrastructure,
resources, and personnel— especially in environments where authority is fractured among national
and localized or subnational actors— pose significant hurdles for U.S. action and engagement. In
these highly insecure areas, gaining access will demand that the United States:
• Learn to operate at the seams, pre- establishing and utilizing interdisciplinary policy and
operational approaches, as well as interagency and international coordination mecha-
nisms for bringing holistic efforts as close to the source of crisis as pos si ble, preferably
through direct physical proximity or through better integration of on- the- ground
partners.
• Improve authorities and mechanisms for engaging at the subnational and transregional
levels, in preparation for the possibility that such fragile environments may impede the
emergence of long- term national entities with clear and respected national borders.
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Executive Summaryx
• Empower regional and perimeter actors who possess better access, resources, and relation-
ships and use hub- and- spoke approaches, in which highly localized implementation of on-
the- ground efforts are supported by regional enabling partners outside of national authorities.
• Pre- negotiate access agreements that include not only military- to- military partnerships, but
also status of forces agreements or other po liti cal or legal authorities that would enable the
United States to enter these complex environments more quickly and safely.
Managing Knock-on Effects and Unintended Consequences
Even where positive gains are made, the United States faces substantial risk— not only that the
effort will fail to deliver the desired result, but also that negative collateral outcomes may result. To
limit such knock-on effects, the United States will need to remain aware of several lessons:
• Don’t kill the opportunities, but think about how to preserve, reinforce, and expand them as
the United States pursues its interests, and remain conscious that employing these assets
will inherently alter them and may even put them at risk.
• Beware the pernicious partner and develop better tools for vetting— beyond “terrorist lists”—
that encompass the criteria, rationale, and flexibility for discerning the difference between a
difficult, challenging, and problematic partner and a totally unacceptable one.
Securing and Sustaining Gains
Delivering the necessary responses in the required locations with a minimum of negative knock-
on effects is a necessary but insufficient objective. The United States must undertake deliberate
efforts to secure and sustain the results of these efforts or simply risk a never- ending game of
“whack a mole” as the same response must be repeated over and over again with little lasting
impact. Ensuring that gains are longer- lasting and sustainable requires better action in the pres ent,
by which the United States works to:
• Get on the right side of history, treating humanitarian values and security imperatives as
complementary priorities, as well harnessing local opprobrium to terrorism, extremism, and
vio lence to foster enduring normative values.
• Build linkages across security imperatives, incentivizing collaboration and drawing direct
linkages between priorities in the interagency pro cess so that security and humanitarian
imperatives are treated as complementary or mutually reinforcing.
• Own the narrative, speaking effectively about U.S. intentions and actions rather than allow-
ing opposing ele ments to distort and mischaracterize the message.
• Better link and synergize crisis response with longer- term developmental assistance,
through longer- term focus, collaboration, and trust- building between and among interna-
tional organ izations and bureaucratic entities that often view their relationships as competi-
tive or adversarial.
• Create favorable incentive structures, preferably those that harness the po liti cal economy in
positive and sustainable ways and that support civil society, build essential human resource
capacities, and support linkages between economic and security imperatives.
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Executive Summary xi
• Track and assess effectiveness to target resources efficiently for sustainability, utilizing better
metrics to provide assessments, feedback, and course- corrections that serve as lessons
learned for future crises.
Time after time, the United States has been caught moving from crisis to crisis without sufficient
planning, tools, or resources to adapt to and operate in fragile environments. Today, the scale and
enormity of the crises faced internationally requires the United States to rethink how to operate
within a changed security landscape of geo graph i cally patchworked authority, functional states
with highly vulnerable institutions, or structurally failed states. Success will depend on the United
States’ ability to better assess and characterize these environments, improve coordination and
access, enhance planning, and diversify partners, while at the same time maintaining a longer-
horizon perspective.
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PART ONE
Introduction
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2
01
Introduction
Today the world faces a volatile convergence of instability, state weakness, and conflict. Lethal
wars rage in Syria, Iraq, Af ghan i stan, Yemen, Libya, and South Sudan, stoking regional rivalries,
offering a safe haven to violent extremist groups, and triggering im mense humanitarian crises. The
world is facing massive movements of forcibly displaced populations with over 65 million people
driven from their homes due to conflict, vio lence, and economic ruin. The rise of ISIS as a violent,
quasi- state- like, transnational entity is remaking the Middle East. Even in regions and states where
overt conflict is absent, such as West Africa or Central Amer i ca, institutional and economic weak-
ness creates unstable conditions that may enflame low- level shocks or simmering criminal activity.
These types of unstable environments serve as incubators for terrorism, illicit trafficking activities,
humanitarian crises, pandemics, economic instability, and regional destabilization. Such security
threats reflect the changing character of conflicts that threaten and complicate the ability of the
United States to operate and pursue security objectives in a number of critical regions.
At times resolution of these conditions may prove elusive and intervention fruitless. Addressing the
under lying causes of instability may be unfeasible in terms of resources, time, and access. Benefits
may accrue too slowly or simply be absent when security challenges emerge in these environ-
ments that require immediate and direct response. Even as long- term efforts are developed, the
United States must identify and implement tools to make its short- term security objectives more
achievable in the nearer term without exacerbating under lying stability.
In a crisis, the United States must live with conditions as they exist, yet still implement approaches
to address pressing security objectives or humanitarian needs. Many typical recommendations for
addressing fragile states are designed to develop effective early warning systems and to build
capacity and institutions so that shocks or crises can be addressed before they become cata-
strophic. Others call for the United States to develop frameworks and strategies to more compre-
hensively address fragility. These are valuable recommendations, but as the current environment
demonstrates, it is too late for early warning and prevention in many instances where the United
States faces security threats. The United States is frequently caught moving from one crisis to
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Rebecca K. C. Hersman 3
another without time to sufficiently plan or adequate resources to adapt to and operate in these
complex environments.
Fragile environments greatly complicate crisis response and challenge typical approaches to
intervention. Advancements in communication and technology disperse challenges and threats
beyond state borders. In some cases, nonstate or substate actors have emerged as in de pen dent
sources of power and authority in both local and regional contexts. Porous borders, weak national
institutions, and increasingly power ful nonstate and trans- state actors challenge bilateral and
multilateral crisis responses. More countries face severe challenges in security, governance, and
stability stemming from the unpre ce dented scale of complex humanitarian crises and conflicts
spanning entire regions. Today, the scale and enormity of the crises faced internationally requires
the United States to rethink how to operate within an increasingly complex security landscape of
state fragility and instability. Lessons from prior cases can be generalized to create a generic toolkit
applicable to the security crises occurring in these unstable environments whether such condi-
tions exist in states with geo graph i cally patchworked authority, functional states with highly vul-
nerable institutions, or in structurally failed states.
STUDY OBJECTIVES
This study has three primary objectives:
1. Define and characterize a range of operating environments emanating from state fragility to
support planning, preparedness, and response to national security crises.
2. Identify key tools that allow the U.S. government to operate effectively in these environ-
ments when responding to national security crises or challenges.
3. Promote ways in which national security, humanitarian, and development efforts might
better align, in …